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Abstract 
 
Intentional actions are those which are performed because the 
subject sees something to be said for performing them; the subject sees 
performing the action “in a positive light”. Intentional actions are therefore 
susceptible to a distinctive kind of explanation, which explains them as 
intentional; that is, which accounts for them in terms of their unique 
property, of being performed because the subject sees that there is 
something to be said for doing so. Practical reasoning is the process of 
figuring out what there is reason to do; that is, what actions are best 
supported by the considerations available to the subject. To put it another 
way, practical reasoning is the process of figuring out which actions there is 
the most to be said for; so practical reasoning explains intentional action 
“properly”, i.e., in terms of its special properties. 
Many philosophers, loosely following the lead of David Hume, have 
argued for a close connection between desire and intentional action. If 
desires explain intentional actions properly, then they must do so through 
practical reasoning; that being the case, how do they do it? Another sizeable 
group of philosophers, the anti-Humeans, have argued that desires cannot 
explain intentional actions properly; they claim that desires are not the right 
sorts of things to appear in the premises of arguments, do not count in 
favour of any action, do not constitute evaluations of any action, and are in 
any case too fickle and lawless to take part in distinctively normative forms 
of explanation. 
The central question in this thesis is, what is the role of desire in 
practical reasoning? I put forward a characterisation of desire which 
explains how some desires can explain intentional actions properly, and 
leaves the question open whether all intentional actions are properly 
explained by desires. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
1. The Problem in Everyday Terms 
 
Alan is trying to decide whether to go to the cinema, or spend 
the evening filling in his tax return. “I need to send off my tax 
return”, he thinks to himself, “but that doesn’t mean I need to do 
it right now. I really want see that new film, and tonight is the 
last showing. I’ll go to the cinema tonight, and do my tax return 
tomorrow.” 
 
 In this example, Alan is doing something which you will probably 
find familiar; he is thinking about different courses of action, weighing their 
advantages and disadvantages, and trying to decide what to do. In the end, 
he decides that the best option is to go to the cinema tonight, and worry 
about the paperwork tomorrow. If, later that same evening, we were to ask 
Alan why he went to the cinema even though he still has to sort out his tax 
return, he might well say “because I wanted to”; and, chances are, we would 
find that a satisfying explanation. We would then know that Alan had gone 
to the cinema because it was what he had wanted to do; and going to the 
cinema because one wants to seems like a perfectly reasonable thing to do. 
 An enormous variety of actions and decisions seem closely analogous 
to Alan’s, in this respect. Choices not just about films, but all sorts of 
pursuits, seem to be settled by what one wants; we read books, listen to 
music, paint, hike, cultivate, collect and explore, because those are the things 
that we want to do. By and large, we eat the food we want to, and keep the 
7 
 
company we want to. Mundane activities also seem to be explained by 
desires; we carry umbrellas because we want to stay dry, or lock the door 
because we don’t want to get burgled. Much more involved and far-reaching 
projects seem to come down to what we desire, too; if we are lucky enough, 
we study the subjects which captivate and enthral us, and pursue the career 
options that we find fulfilling. Certainly, we aim only have romantic 
relationships with the people we truly, deeply want to. 
 All this might make one wonder what, if anything, can’t be explained 
by desires. In the example above, Alan’s wanting to go to the cinema seems 
to make it the case that going to the cinema is a reasonable, sensible, 
justifiable thing for him to do. Would we feel the same way if he had instead 
wanted to paint himself blue and streak through Wembley stadium? Perhaps 
not. We might be inclined to think that, although from Alan’s point of view 
there is something to be said for doing so (and we could even agree with 
him about this), his desire is not a good enough reason to make this sort of 
eccentricity reasonable or sensible. Then again, we might think that this sort 
of desire is aberrant or misplaced in some respect; that it is so bizarre and 
absurd that it cannot possibly reflect Alan’s considered view of what is worth 
doing – and if it does, then Alan needs a stern talking-to. It is most probably 
just a passing fancy; a whim of Alan’s, that would disappear under closer 
scrutiny, or just dissipate over time. 
 Let’s suppose, then, that Alan’s desire to paint himself blue and streak 
through Wembley stadium is just a temporary foible, and that it would not 
make sense for him to act on it for exactly that reason; it is a mere impulse 
which will not last, and does not reflect Alan’s more sober view of the sorts 
of things that are good to do. This seems like a fair diagnosis of this specific 
case, but it gives rise to important questions; what proportion of a person’s 
desires are in fact passing fancies like this one of Alan’s? With regard to 
those desires which are not whimsical, and which seem, on the face of it, 
worth acting on, we can ask: are they different in kind from foibles, or is it 
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only matter of degree? That is, are settled desires just long-lived whims, or 
do they differ from them in some other respect? If it turns out that deeply-
held desires are nothing other than fancies that stick around, we may well 
wonder if explanations which refer to them are really as satisfying as they 
might at first seem. 
 What if Alan had wanted to kidnap the mayor’s daughter and hold 
her to ransom? It seems intuitively plausible that no desire of Alan’s could 
make it the case that kidnapping the mayor’s daughter was the thing to do. 
We watch films or enrol on courses because we want to; we don’t kidnap 
people. The suggestion that Alan might do something like this because he 
wanted to almost seems to call his state of mind into question; the 
explanation, “I kidnapped the Mayor’s daughter and held her to ransom 
because I wanted to”, does not seem like the product of a sound mind. Or at 
least, not one with a sense of empathy, or respect for the safety and dignity 
of others; as an explanation, it sounds flippant to a point somewhere close 
to criminal insanity. If it would be mad for Alan to act on his desire to kidnap 
the mayor’s daughter, then what makes it sane for him to act on his desire 
to go to the cinema? Is it anything to do with differences between the desires 
themselves, or is it wholly to be explained in terms of the difference in their 
objects? If it is the latter, then we might think that, in fact, explaining actions 
in terms of desires is not a useful general strategy, even if it works in specific 
cases. 
 Let’s suppose that on his way to the cinema Alan sees someone 
struggling to get onto the bus with a pushchair, and stops to help them out. 
Acting kindly, in this instance, means taking on a minor inconvenience 
which could permissibly be overlooked, and in doing so gaining no tangible 
benefit for oneself. Now, assuming there is such a thing as a truly kind and 
selfless action, helping a stranger onto a bus seems like a pretty good 
candidate. If Alan were to explain his performing this action by saying “I 
did it because I wanted to”, however, then it would seem as if the initial 
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assessment were false; Alan was not acting selflessly after all, he was acting 
to satisfy his own desires. Like Kant’s “friend of humanity”, Alan was not 
acting out of kindness or compassion, he was pursuing his own agenda; the 
stranger was simply lucky that their needs and Alan’s happened to coincide 
on this occasion. It appears that desires cannot be invoked to explain kind 
actions; acting to satisfy a desire is never the same as acting out of kindness. 
 This last example is an instance of a much more general problem; 
whenever a desire is used to explain an action, the desire “pulls focus” in a 
way that tends to distort the nature of the explanation in a way that can seem 
counter-intuitive. Alan could have explained his going to the cinema by 
saying “I’m going to see this film because I like the director’s other work” or 
“because it is likely to be a lot of fun”; that is, he could have explained why 
he was going to see the film by saying something about why going to see 
the film is a worthwhile thing to do. If he were to say “because I wanted to”, 
then it is not clear that he would have done this. Strictly speaking, he would 
not have said anything about the film at all; he would have asserted a fact 
about the contents of his own mind. 
 It seems at once undeniable that desire plays an essential role in our 
decisions and actions and clear that it is incapable of doing so. Which 
impression is closer to the truth? Why is there such a confusing conflict? 
Might there be an underlying thread to the sorts of problems I have sketched 
above? Addressing these questions properly requires setting up the puzzle 
in a more theoretical framework. 
 
2. The Problem in More Abstract Terms 
 
 Intentional actions, unlike tics and twitches, are susceptible to a 
distinctive kind of explanation, namely, explanation in terms of the subject’s 
reasons for performing them. Susceptibility to this kind of explanation is a 
defining feature of intentional actions, so these kind of reason-giving 
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explanations properly explain intentional actions. That is, they explain 
intentional actions as intentional actions, not as bodily movements or events 
of some other kind. 
 This understanding of intentional action is relatively 
uncontroversial, but it gives rise to a host of much more difficult questions; 
not least among which is, how are reason-giving explanations to be 
understood? To what explanatory set-up are we referring when we say things 
like “S phied because P”, or “because they thought that P” or “because they 
wanted P”? What is the form of a reason-giving explanation? 
 Practical reasoning is the process of figuring out what to do; 
weighing considerations, drawing inferences and arriving at practical 
conclusions. In this sense, “practical reasoning” includes not only those 
instances where the subject explicitly, consciously considers different 
options, compares them against each other in light of their merits, and so 
on; it also covers those cases where it is so clear to the subject what they 
ought to do, or the action required is so familiar, that no forethought is 
required. Not just those cases that are analogous to working out that answer 
to a maths or logic problem with pencil and paper, but also those analogous 
to just seeing the answer, without writing down any workings-out. Explicit, 
deliberative practical reasoning occurs when, for example, the subject is 
confronted with an unfamiliar situation, or the stakes are high, or the 
balance of reasons appears fairly even. Implicit, intuitive practical reasoning 
occurs, for example, when the subject is required to perform a simple, 
familiar task, or when the price of failure is negligible, or when the reasons 
in favour of one course of action seem to dramatically out-weigh the other1. 
                                                          
1 Alan Goldman seems to have this deliberation/reasoning distinction in mind when 
he begins (Goldman 2009) with the words: “Days, weeks, months go by in which I 
engage in no real deliberation about what to do. I do not think I am unusual in this 
regard.” He continues: “Practical deliberation is the exception and not the rule, but that 
does not mean that agents ordinarily act without reasons for what they do” (p.2). 
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George W. Bush’s decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003 was (probably) the 
outcome of practical reasoning; but so was his tying his shoe-laces that 
morning (and, indeed, dodging a flying shoe some five years later). 
 The justification for thinking about practical reasoning in this broad 
sense is that it matches the ubiquitous nature of intentional action. If 
everything from putting one’s shoes on to going to war is intentional action, 
then there is every reason to think that all of those actions are properly 
accounted for by explanations of the same form. So thinking about practical 
reasoning in the broad sense sketched above allows us to understand and 
explain all intentional actions by appeal to a single form of explanation. 
 Practical reasoning is the process of figuring out what to do, which 
properly explains intentional action; but what goes on when the subject tries 
to figure out what to do? In the example at the start of the chapter, it looks 
as if Alan is constructing an argument which supports one course of action 
over some alternatives. With minor paraphrasing, the argument could be 
presented like this: 
 
P1. I need to fill out my tax return 
P2. I want to see the film 
P3. I do not need to fill out my tax return this evening 
P4. Tonight is the last opportunity to see the film 
C. I’ll go to the cinema tonight, and do my tax return 
tomorrow 
 
There is nothing unusual about Alan’s reasoning, though it does have one 
interesting feature (in fact, it has several features worth discussing, but this 
one is, in a sense, the most fundamental); in this example, Alan does what 
he wants to do. More specifically, in this instance of practical reasoning, it 
seems as if Alan’s going to the cinema (let’s assume he does) is explained in 
the right way by his wanting to do so. Since going to the cinema is an 
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intentional action, this looks like a simple, commonplace example of an 
intentional action being properly explained by the subject’s wanting to 
perform it. Ordinary people conduct reasoning like Alan’s all the time; this 
much seems fairly clear from reflection on our own experiences of 
deliberation, and observing and discussing those of others2. 
 It might not seem as if this is an especially interesting feature, when 
one considers how many everyday decisions seem to turn on what we want 
to do, at least to some extent. But the idea that desires can properly explain 
intentional actions, and that they can do so through practical reasoning, 
turns out to be rather difficult to make sense of. The core reason for this, 
which I have tried to bring out in the examples in the previous section, is 
that in many respects desires seem poorly equipped to take part in reason-
giving explanations (i.e., proper explanations of intentional action). 
For example, suppose that at 6:50pm tonight the balance of reasons 
is in favour of Alan leaving the house at 7pm to go to the cinema. If, in the 
minutes before he leaves, the bus is delayed, or the film screening cancelled, 
or the last ticket sold, then it might turn out that come 7pm, Alan ought not 
to leave his house. This seems plausible. It would not seem plausible, 
however, that if the bus is on time, the screening is going ahead and there 
are tickets available but an easterly wind is blowing, then come 7pm Alan 
ought not to leave. And conversely, if at 6:53 the screening were cancelled, 
we should think that Alan would no longer have a reason to leave his house 
at 7:00. Nor would it seem plausible if, with no change in the situation 
whatsoever, the balance of reasons shifts back and forth. If at 6:50 Alan has 
a reason to leave at 7:00, and nothing else changes between 6:50 and 6:53, 
                                                          
2 Although there seems to be at least as many different motivations for Humean views 
as there are Humeans, the claim that the view seems to capture a theory-independent 
truth about the way non-philosophers reason is flagged as a reason to hold the view by, 
among others, (Finlay 2007), and (Audi  1989). 
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then it is reasonable to expect that at 6:53 Alan will still have the same 
reason to leave that he had at 6:50. 
Unfortunately, desires often exhibit exactly these troublesome 
features; they can arrive or disappear without warning or apparent cause, 
and persist after they ought to have been satisfied; subjects often desire 
things that they do not otherwise regard as worth pursuing, and lack desires 
for things that they judge to be valuable. If desires and reasons for action 
are intimately related, then it seems plausible that reasons for action would 
inherit the kinds of instability characteristic of desire. 
Put simply, desires do not seem to be responsive to the subject’s other 
mental states, and to their objects, in the way we expect they would have to 
be were they to play a role in reason-giving explanations. This gives rise to 
two central issues; the normativity problem, and the problem of self-
absorption. Exposing the true nature of these problems, their causes and 
solutions, is part of the project of this thesis, so no full statement of the 
problems can be given at this stage. A preliminary characterisation, based 
on the discussion in this chapter, might go like this: 
 
Normativity Problem: It is not clear how normative conclusions 
can be derived from desires. Desiring to perform an action does 
not seem to be a reason to do so; nor does desiring to perform an 
action constitute a positive evaluation of doing so. 
 
Self-Absorption Problem: When desires appear in practical 
reasoning or practical arguments, they distort the subject of that 
reasoning; reasoning from desires tends to be reasoning about 
how to satisfy those desires. Practical reasoning is not, by nature, 
reasoning about how to satisfy one’s desires; it is reasoning about 
how to act. 
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For instance, recall that I defined practical reasoning as the process of 
figuring out what to do; that is, what there is sufficient reason in favour of 
doing. Now, notice that when Alan says “I want to see the film” he is not, 
strictly speaking, saying that there is anything good about, or even 
worthwhile about, seeing the film. He is stating a quite different fact; the 
fact that he wants to see the film. 
Had he said “I want to paint myself blue and streak through Wembley 
Stadium”, it would be less clear that his doing so was supported by reasons. 
Had he said “I want to kidnap the mayor’s daughter and hold her to ransom”, 
we would have been sure it wasn’t. Notice also that Alan is not, strictly 
speaking, making any claims about the way the rest of the world is, but only 
about his own desires, it seems as if his reasoning is, in some sense, about 
his desires. This is clearer if we consider just P2, P4 and the first conjunct of 
the conclusion: 
 
P2. I want to see the film 
P4. Tonight is the last opportunity to see the film 
C. I shall go to the cinema tonight 
 
Here, Alan’s reasoning seems to be explicitly concerned with his desires, not 
with what he ought to do. Insofar as practical reasoning is about reasons to 
act, Alan does not seem to be reasoning practically at all. Perhaps we should 
conclude that the example I presented is not actually familiar and ordinary 
at all – i.e., that reasoning involving desires is really uncommon, dissimilar 
from ordinary practical reasoning. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
The Self-Ascriptive View 
 
 
 This chapter is concerned with the simplest, perhaps most 
obvious way of thinking about how desires feature in the 
premises of practical arguments, and two main objections to 
that view. These two objections are particular expressions of the 
self-absorption problem and the normativity problem. I argue 
that the normativity problems can, perhaps surprisingly, be 
overcome, or at least much attenuated; but the shallow self-
absorption problem puts paid to the self-ascriptive view. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
If desires are necessary for practical reasoning, then how do they 
appear among the premises of a practical argument? An obvious thought 
would be that, in the premises of every correct practical argument, the 
subject ascribes a desire to themselves. If this is the case, then it would seem 
plausible that correct practical arguments would take the form of practical 
syllogisms, where the major premise is a desire self-ascription and the minor 
premise is a claim about how to satisfy that desire. From these premises, a 
practical conclusion to perform an action alluded to in the minor premise 
(such as, for example, an intention to do so) is inferred. 
The main strengths of this view are its familiarity and plausibility. If 
you recall the main example from chapter 1, it seemed natural to transcribe 
Alan’s episode of practical deliberation in the form of a practical syllogism 
with the major premise “I want to see the film”. Alan’s reasoning there did 
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not seem unusual; part of the point in that example was to elicit the intuition 
that most people’s reasoning, most of the time, was rather like Alan’s. 
Indeed, self-ascription seems to be the “default” Humean view in the 
literature; especially in anti-Humean arguments. When philosophers are 
putting together arguments against those who claim that desires play a 
special role in intentional action explanation, they typically characterise the 
view they are opposing as one on which subjects’ reasons for action are 
desire self-ascriptions, or at least involve them in some important sense3. 
Although appealing, this account (which I’ll call the self-ascriptive 
view; see section 2) suffers from numerous problems. The self-ascriptive 
view claims that subjects reasons from a premise that self-ascribes a desire, 
and a premise about how to satisfy it; this looks like an argument about how 
to satisfy a desire, not about what there is reason to do. The basic non-
Humean challenge developed in the previous chapter is that desiring to do 
something is not the same as having a reason to do it; or at least, it is not 
immediately obvious that they are the same, and it cannot be assumed that 
they are without serious argument. In the absence of such an argument, it 
is hard to see how a self-ascriptive practical syllogism constitutes an 
argument about what one ought to do, rather than merely what would 
satisfy one’s desires. 
This concern can be developed in two directions. First, it could be 
argued that no normative conclusion can be legitimately inferred from a 
desire self-ascription and a proposition about how to fulfil that desire. 
Secondly, it could be argued that, even if it were possible to infer normative 
conclusions from desire self-ascriptions, it is not true that every instance of 
practical reasoning involves a desire self-ascription. In this chapter, I 
consider three objections of the first type (sections 3.1, 3.3 and 3.5) and two 
of the second (section 4.1 and 4.2); I will provide solutions to the first four 
                                                          
3 See, for example, (Alvarez 2008, sections III and IV), (Alvarez 2009, especially 
section IV), (Darwall 2001), (Anscombe 1963, section 11), (Dancy 2000 p.35) and 
(Heuer 2004, section 2). 
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problems (in the sections immediately following the problems, i.e., 3.2, 3.4, 
3.6, and 4.2) which I take to be sufficient to keep the self-ascriptive view on 
the table, if not exactly conclusive responses. The fifth problem, however, 
proves decisive. 
An objection of the first type is put forward by G. F. Schueler in 
(Schueler 2003). Here, Schueler targets not the claims of the view itself (not 
as I have defined it, anyway), but its main strength. He puts forward an 
explanation of the fact that desire self-ascriptions are very widely available 
as explanations of intentional action which provides no support for the self-
ascriptive view, so undermining the claim that the self-ascriptive view is 
prima facie plausible since desire-self-ascriptions are widely available as 
explanations of intentional action. I argue that Schueler's explanation is not 
itself plausible, since it would predict that desire self-ascriptions would not 
be used to explain intentional actions in the way they in fact are. If Schueler's 
explanation were correct, then desire self-ascriptions would have very 
limited application as explanations of intentional action, and it would be 
impossible to use them in a range of cases where we in fact can and do use 
them. 
The second objection is that the self-ascriptive practical syllogism is 
an instance of the naturalistic fallacy; desire self-ascriptions and 
instrumental propositions are mere statements of fact, from which 
normative conclusions cannot be legitimately drawn. I argue that this 
objection only works on the assumption that desire self-ascriptions are to be 
read as simple statements of psychological fact, and that it is very 
implausible that they should be read this way. Ascriptions of other mental 
attitudes are not read this way, even when they are used to explain 
intentional actions properly. I suggest that self-ascriptivists should instead 
claim that desire self-ascriptions are to be read appositionally; that is, as 
modifying the part of the sentence which states what the subject wants. This 
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is a modification of Jonathan Dancy's account of the role of belief self-
ascriptions in action explanation, from (Dancy 2000). 
Adopting an appositional model for desire ascription, however, 
brings its own difficulties. The third objection is that, were desire self-
ascriptions to be read appositionally, then they would not be part of the 
reason for which the subject acts, and therefore need not appear in the 
premises of the subject's practical argument. In fact, some version of this 
objection could probably be found for any account of how desires feature 
among the premises of practical arguments except the crude reading of the 
self-ascriptive view, according to which desire self-ascriptions are to be read 
as statements of psychological fact. I argue that, unlike belief self-
ascriptions, desire self-ascriptions make a difference to the role which the 
premises they appear in can play in a practical argument; therefore there is 
a reason for them to appear in the premises of a practical argument. Finding 
out exactly what difference they make, and justifying the claim that they do 
make some such difference, depends on the possibility of giving a fuller 
account of what desires are and how they come to be normatively 
significant, which I will not attempt until chapters 5 and 6. 
So much for the problems relating to normativity. The fourth 
objection is that if, as the self-ascriptive view claims, subjects necessarily 
reason from their desires, then subjects must necessarily be selfish. Since 
not everyone is selfish all the time, we can tell that the self-ascriptive view 
is false; it is committed to a false account of the psychology of reasoning 
and action. I argue that it does not follow from the claim that subjects 
necessarily reason from their desires that they are necessarily selfish, since 
selfishness is a matter of what one desires, and how one weighs one's own 
interests or welfare against that of others. The self-ascriptive view does not, 
and indeed should not, have any commitments about what desires subjects 
actually act on, and hence cannot be committed to portraying subjects as 
selfish. 
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The fifth and final objection, again from Schueler, is that the self-
ascriptive view is committed to the claim that correct practical deliberation 
necessarily involves the subject entertaining a desire self-ascription as a 
consideration which counts in favour of action; yet it seems clear that not 
every instance of correct practical deliberation includes the subject thinking 
about what desires they have, at all. As such, the self-ascriptive view is 
committed to a false view of the psychology of reasoning and action. 
Schueler's objection, it seems to me, poses an insurmountable obstacle to the 
self-ascriptive view; there is no way to overcome it without relinquishing 
one or more of the distinctive claims of the self-ascriptive theory. I argue 
that the best way to respond to the objection is to claim that even correct 
practical deliberation need not match the practical argument to which it 
corresponds word-for-word; if it must, then it would be impossible to give 
the same explanation of an intentional action in different tenses, which 
seems absurd. What matters is that the deliberation and the practical 
argument agree about the states of affairs and relations between them that 
explain the intentional action properly. Allowing this to be so, however, does 
not help the self-ascriptivist, since it makes it hard to understand why even 
the premises of the practical argument must involve a desire self-ascription. 
This response bodes well for other versions of the Humean theory of 
practical reasoning, however. 
 
2. The Self-Ascriptive View 
 
The self-ascriptive view follows quite naturally from commitment to 
three separate claims, none of which are particularly unfamiliar and only 
one of which, (b), is controversial. It is the simplicity and plausibility of these 
claims which motivates the self-ascriptive view; so although proponents of 
the self-ascriptive view tend to hold (a-c), they are not commitments of the 
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view itself. Two straightforward and explicit commitments of the self-
ascriptive view, (d) and (e), are explained at the bottom of this section. 
 
(a) Intentional Action 
Some actions are performed for reasons; that is, the 
subject takes it that there is something to be said for performing 
the action, and therefore does so. These are usually called 
“intentional” actions. Many philosophers think that intentional 
actions are an important class of actions, but that not all actions 
are intentional; others have argued that to be an action at all 
means to be performed for a reason. An action is intentional 
when some consideration that the subject takes to count in favour 
of performing the action, leads to its being performed; that is, 
when what leads the subject to perform the action is that they 
take it that there is a good reason to perform it. This entails that 
normative reasons, considerations that count in favour of 
performing certain actions, must in some sense or other be 
capable of motivating subjects to perform them. 
 
(b) The Humean Theory of Motivation 
Desires are a necessary (but insufficient) condition for 
action. Subjects only act when they have a desire which the action 
promises to satisfy, and it is the desire which provides the 
motivational impetus necessary for action. What exactly desires 
are remains, for the time being, an open question; at this stage it 
is safe to say that they are non-cognitive, satisfiable mental states. 
It has been claimed that desires have distinctive phenomenal 
characteristics 4 , that they typically tend to produce pleasure 
                                                          
4 See, for example, (Sidgwick 1892), (Schueler 1995, p.9), (Shaw 1992) and (Schiffer 
1976), which is discussed in chapter 4 of this thesis, and in (Schueler 1995, chapter 3). 
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when satisfied or discomfort when frustrated5, and that some 
desires tend to direct one's attention towards their objects6. All of 
these claims are very contentious, and play significant roles in 
the debate between the Humeans and non-Humeans over 
motivation and practical reasoning. There is a further dispute 
over whether, when a desire seems to be what counts in favour of 
performing an action, it is the desire itself that counts, or the 
object of desire, or the future state of pleasure or relief which 
satisfaction of the desire promises. For the purposes of this 
chapter, no terribly precise definition of desire is required (giving 
an account of desire is a major part of the project in chapter 4-6). 
 
(c) The Correspondence Thesis 
“[F]or every intentional action there is a corresponding 
practical argument” (Audi 1989, p.108). Practical arguments are 
those which present considerations in support of a practical 
conclusion. The practical argument which corresponds to the 
performance of a particular intentional action by a particular 
subject is the one which structures the episode of practical 
reasoning by which the subject comes to act. A practical 
argument structures an episode of reasoning when, were the 
subject to reason their way to action with a high degree of 
consciousness and explicitness (i.e., were they to employ 
deliberative rather than intuitive reasoning), then they would be 
“running through” that argument. (The relationship between 
practical arguments and practical reasoning is discussed further 
                                                          
5  That there is a connection between desire and pleasure and/or relief is a 
tremendously widespread assumption, although the nature of the connection is by no 
means agreed upon. See (Fehige 2001, section 1) for a list of philosophers from many 
different backgrounds who share some version of this assumption. 
6 Scanlon discusses the capacity of some desires to direct one’s attention in (Scanlon 
1998, p.43). 
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in chapter 3 section 6; for the purposes of this chapter, all that is 
required is the assumption that making claims about the 
premises of practical arguments entails commitments about the 
mental states involved in practical reasoning.) 
 
It is natural to infer from (a) and (b) that, in the case of intentional action, 
the subject's reason for acting is that they have some desire which might be 
satisfied by so acting, and that this counts in favour of acting that way. 
 
(d) Self-Ascription 
The first claim of the self-ascriptive view is that the correct 
way to express a desire in the premises of a practical argument is 
through self-ascriptive phrases like “I want” or “I desire”. 
 
From (c) and (d), it follows that whenever there is intentional action, the 
corresponding practical argument will feature as a premise a proposition 
which self-ascribes a desire, like “I wanted...”, or similar. Given this fact, 
along with (b) and (d), it seems plausible that correct practical arguments 
would be practical syllogisms which desire self-ascriptions as major 
premises: 
 
(e) The Self-Ascriptive Practical Syllogism 
Correct practical reasoning takes the form of a practical 
syllogism, where the major premise is a desire-self-ascription. 
 
Major Premise – the motivational premise: I want to phi. 
Minor premise – the cognitive premise: My A-ing would 
contribute to realising phi. 
Conclusion – the practical judgement: I should A 
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(Audi 1989, p.99; quoted in Schueler 2003, p.3) 
 
Because simple syllogisms like this can be built up into longer 
sequences known as poly-syllogisms, the practical syllogism can be thought 
of as the most basic unit of practical reasoning, out of which much more 
complicated arguments might be composed. This seems to be what Robert 
Audi means when he describes the practical syllogism as the “most basic 
schema” for practical reasoning. According to (a), in the case of intentional 
action, whatever it is that the subject takes to count in favour of performing 
the action, is what motivates them to act. (b) states that what motivates the 
subject to act is a desire which might be satisfied by so acting; so by 
combining (a) and (b), we arrive at the claim that, in the case of intentional 
action, what the subject takes to count in favour of acting is a desire which 
would be satisfied by so acting. This is the fundamental commitment that 
any Humean theory of practical reasoning must seek to defend, in some 
shape or form. So it is crucially important, from the perspective of finding 
a working Humean theory of practical reasoning, to be clear about whether 
prospective objections show that it is impossible to hold both (a) and (b), or 
whether they bear on something else that is commonly held along with (a) 
and (b), such as (d). To put it another way: it is important to be clear about 
whether a prospective objection counts against all Humean theories of 
practical reasoning, or just some particular version, such as the self-
ascriptive view. 
(Of course, it might be argued that Humeans ought not to advance 
theories of practical reasoning at all; that the Humean account is more 
properly suited to giving more basic, psychological explanations of action, 
not the sort that are distinctive of intentional action. In the next chapter, 
concerned with Pettit and Smith's view, I will argue that the Humean will 
not find a more stable position by retreating into the background.) 
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3. Three Expressions of the Normativity Problem, and Responses 
 
 The basic anti-Humean challenge, as sketched in the previous 
chapter, can be summarised as the claim that desires are not the right sorts 
of things to explain intentional actions properly. Regarding normativity, 
the problem is that desires can appear not to be normatively significant; 
wanting to do something is not the same as, and may be wholly unrelated 
to, having a reason to do it. In the previous chapter, I glossed that objection 
as the claim that desires are fickle; they come and go seemingly without 
explanation, and their objects are not up to the subject to decide. They lack 
the sorts of connections to their objects, and to the subject's considered 
evaluative standpoint, that seem to be required if they are to take part in 
proper explanations of intentional actions. 
 In this section, I will set out three different ways of developing this 
basic opposition into a philosophically interesting objection. The first is a 
kind of “debunking” explanation of the intuitive appeal of the self-
ascriptive view; Schueler aims to show that self-ascriptive theorists have 
correctly ascertained that desire self-ascriptions are always available for 
explaining intentional actions, but they have overlooked the fact that the 
explanations in which desire self-ascriptions are always available are not 
explanations in terms of practical reasoning, and are only available 
because they do not ascribe genuine desires. So the fact that intentional 
actions can always be explained by desire self-ascriptions does not support 
the view that desire self-ascriptions necessarily appear in the premises of 
good practical arguments. The intuitive appeal of the self-ascriptive view 
is thus “explained away”. 
 The second objection is that the self-ascriptive practical syllogism 
arrives at a conclusion about how things ought to be from premises about 
how things are; it is a form of the naturalistic fallacy. The third objection, 
which applies to the self-ascriptive view but also affects the Humean 
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theory more broadly construed, is that mental attitudes do not explain 
actions; at best, their contents do. More precisely, Dancy objects that we 
can recognise cases where a mental attitude (i.e., the state itself, as distinct 
from its content) explains action, and they are noticeably different from 
ordinary cases of intentional action; so it cannot be true that actions are 
explained by mental attitudes, such as desires. 
 The self-ascriptive view can respond to the first two objections 
without significantly changing the view itself. I will argue that Schueler's 
debunking explanation does not succeed in undermining the prima facie 
plausibility of the claim that desire self-ascriptions are always available. 
Schueler claims that desire self-ascriptions explain intentional actions by 
conveying the idea that the subject has adopted a project of which the 
action in question is a component part; but they do not express a 
commitment on the part of the subject to the claim that there is any reason 
to adopt that project in the first place, and hence that there is any reason 
to perform the action. Therefore, according to Schueler, desire self-
ascriptions do not explain intentional actions properly. I will argue that 
this part of the argument is implausible; in the most familiar types of cases 
where “I want to” is used to explain an intentional action, it seems clear 
that the subject does commit themselves to the idea that there is 
something to be said for performing the action. 
 The second objection, that the self-ascriptive practical syllogism is 
an instance of the naturalistic fallacy, is easily overcome by demonstrating 
that the objection only works if the desire self-ascription in the major 
premise is to be read at face value, as an assertion of a psychological fact, 
and that this is a contrived and unnatural way to read it. I will suggest, 
based on Dancy's claims about belief ascriptions, that desire ascriptions are 
to be read appositionally; that is, as qualifying the proposition which 
specifies the reason for which the subject acts, not as stating that the reason 
for which the subject acts is a mental attitude.   
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 The third objection is primarily directed against the self-ascriptivist 
who does, in fact, read self-ascriptions appositionally. If one reads desire 
ascriptions in explanations of intentional action appositionally, then it 
appears that they and, by extension, the attitudes they ascribe are not part 
of the reason for which the subject acts. There are other ways of reading 
attitude ascriptions in explanations of intentional actions, and the self-
ascriptive view is not wedded to the appositional model; I will argue, 
however, that an analogous objection can be deployed against any account 
of how one is to read desire ascriptions which holds that they are not to be 
read at face value. More important is what a proponent of the Humean 
theory of practical reasoning (but not specifically the self-ascriptive view) 
ought to learn from the responses that are available to the self-ascriptive 
view, and the efficacy of this third objection against it. I will argue that the 
best response for the self-ascriptivist is to argue that desire self-ascriptions 
make a difference to what inferences can be drawn from the premises in 
which they feature in a completely different way to belief self-ascriptions; 
though the self-ascriptive view, lacking any substantive characterisation of 
desire, cannot justify or even fully elaborate this claim. So the third 
objection reveals that the self-ascriptive view is insufficient as a 
characterisation of the role of desires in explaining intentional actions 
properly. 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Schueler Debunks the Appeal of the Self-Ascriptive View 
 
 According to Schueler, proponents of the self-ascriptive view have 
correctly noticed that it is always true to say of a subject who acts 
intentionally, that they wanted to do what they did; from this, the self-
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ascriptivists infer that the reason for which the subject acts is their wanting 
to, and hence that their wanting to must be recorded in the premises of 
their practical argument. Schueler argues that the self-ascriptivists have 
jumped to their conclusion. The reason why it is always true to say of a 
subject who acts intentionally that they wanted to act as they did is not that 
every intentional action is properly explained by the subject's wanting to 
perform it. Rather, it is because every intentional action has a purpose, and 
the English phrase “I want to” can be used to express the idea that one is 
acting with a purpose. So the fact that it is always true to say of the acting 
subject that they want to act as they do only amounts to the claim that the 
acting subject always acts with a purpose. In the sense in which it is true to 
say that every acting subject wants to act as they do, this fact does not entail 
that every subject who acts intentionally has a genuine desire to act that 
way, since having a purpose in acting does not entail having a desire. The 
self-ascriptivists have correctly ascertained that the phrase “I want to” can 
be used to explain any intentional action, but mistakenly assumed that the 
phrase explains intentional actions through practical reasoning; according 
to Schueler, the phrase “I want to” can play a role in a different form of 
action explanation, called teleological explanation. In this section I will 
briefly explain what Schueler takes teleological explanation to be, and his 
claim that intentional action is necessarily teleological, then evaluate his 
argument for the claim that the self-ascriptivists have mistaken 
teleological explanation for explanation in terms of practical reasoning. 
The point in offering such an argument is that it helps to undermine the 
prima facie plausibility of the claim that desire self-ascriptions explain 
intentional actions properly, which is both one of the main motivations for 
the self-ascriptive view, and a useful defence against objections which aim 
to expose the view as implausible, rather than impossible. 
 Teleological explanations represent intentional actions as 
contributions to or efforts towards a project or goal. That is, not as segments 
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of an occurrent action, but as steps or stages in the completion of a task, or 
the achievement of a goal. Not all intentional actions are literally parts of 
longer intentional actions, like phases of a journey. My reading Schueler's 
book can be understood as a contribution to the much, much longer project 
of writing my thesis, even though this need not entail that, as I read “Reasons 
and Purposes”, I am literally writing my thesis. Schueler views teleological 
explanations in this way, as relating intentional actions to goals. 
 Alan's running for the bus can be given a teleological explanation, 
for example; it can be understood as a step towards his goal of seeing the 
film. From the observer's perspective, this gives us a way of grasping what 
Alan is doing; his catching the bus is part of a planned sequence of actions 
and events of which Alan's goal is the eventual outcome. From Alan's 
perspective, it makes sense for him to run for the bus in light of this goal; 
he needs to catch the bus in order to get to the cinema in time to buy a ticket 
before the screening starts, so he can see his film. Running for the bus is an 
early stage in his overall plan to see his film (probably one which was added 
in response to changing circumstances, but part of the plan nonetheless). Of 
course, it is not essential to the idea of a teleological explanation that more 
than one intentional action is required to achieve the subject's goal; Alan's 
running could be teleologically explained by relating it to his goal of getting 
to the bus stop before the bus leaves, and remaining silent about his 
overarching goal of seeing the film. 
 Schueler argues that for every intentional action, it must be possible 
to give a teleological explanation. This is because intentional actions are 
performed for reasons, and reasons are considerations which count in favour 
of action in light of some end. For example, the bus's leaving soon is a reason 
for Alan to run if he intends to get to the cinema on time, but not if he 
doesn't. Moreover, Schueler claims that it will nearly always be possible to 
formulate a teleological explanation by using phrases like “I want to phi”. 
This is because of the double meaning of the English word “want”. 
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Sometimes, “want” is used to ascribe or express a genuine desire, but 
sometimes it is used in a weaker sense, to express the subject's having a plan 
about what to do (or in the second-person case, below, the plan we think they 
ought to have, or that we are imposing on them). For example, we use “want” 
in phrases like “I really want a cup of good tea right now”, or “I want my 
team to win!”, but we also use it in phrases such as “I want to finish this 
assignment before I leave tonight”, “you want to turn left at the traffic 
lights”, or even “you don't want to do that”. In these cases, it does not seem 
plausible that the word is being used to refer to a genuine desire. The second-
person cases make this especially clear; when giving directions, it is not 
normal to pass comment on the mental states of the person to whom you 
are speaking, but it is quite normal to use locutions such as “you want to 
take the next right”. 
 In these cases, Schueler claims that “want” is used to express the 
idea that there is a reason to act in the way the speaker says they or their 
interlocutor want to; “you want to turn left at the lights” really means “you 
ought to turn left at the lights”, or perhaps the weaker claim, “there is some 
reason for you to turn left at the lights”. Similarly in the first-person case, 
“I want to finish this task before I leave” means “I ought to” or “there is 
some reason for me to finish this task before I leave”. In this sense of 
“want”, it will be true of any subject who acts intentionally that their action 
can be properly explained using a “want” phrase; but this does not count 
in favour of adopting the self-ascriptive view, since the explanations in 
which desire ascriptions feature are teleological ones, not proper 
explanations of intentional action. A “proper” explanation of intentional 
action is one which reveals the subject's appraisal of the action as 
normatively supported by some further considerations; a teleological 
explanation, in Schueler's sense, merely relates the action to some further 
goal or pattern of activity to which it contributes. It's a further question 
whether there is a reason to pursue that goal; and if the goal itself  is not 
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worth pursuing, then the fact that the action contributes to its fulfilment 
is no reason to perform it. Schueler objects to the possibility of 
“bootstrapping” reasons into existence by adopting goals that are not 
themselves supported by reasons. 
 According to Schueler, then, “I want to” is always available as an 
explanation of intentional action because it is a way of giving a teleological 
explanation, and every intentional action is necessarily susceptible to 
teleological explanation. The self-ascriptivists argue that “I want to” is 
always available as an explanation of intentional action because it is a way 
of ascribing a desire to oneself, and every intentional action is necessarily 
explained properly by the subject employing a practical argument which 
includes a desire self-ascription as its major premise. So Schueler and the 
self-ascriptivists offer competing explanations of a phenomenon that they 
agree exists; the ubiquity of “I want to” as an explanation of intentional 
action. The point in offering a competing explanation of the fact that “I 
want to” is universally available as an explanation of intentional action is 
to undermine any support the self-ascriptive view might derive from that 
fact. As such Schueler does not (so far as this argument goes) aim to show 
that the self-ascriptivists' account of the phenomenon is incoherent, or 
even obviously false; rather, he offers a different account which we ought 
to prefer on the grounds that it carries less substantial commitments 
regarding our understanding of practical reasoning and the explanation 
of intentional action. 
 
3.2 Undermining Schueler's Debunking Explanation 
 
 Unfortunately for Schueler, his teleological explanation predicts 
that phrases like “I want to” would be used to explain intentional actions 
in a way that's quite different to how desire ascriptions are actually used. 
Schueler claims that when these phrases are used to explain intentional 
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actions teleologically, they do not provide proper explanations of 
intentional action. He argues that when “I want to” is used to teleologically 
explain an intentional action, it does not provide a proper explanation of 
that action, because it is not a way of expressing the claim that there is 
some reason to adopt the end to which this action contributes (and if there 
is no reason to achieve some end, then the fact that some action is a means 
to that end is not a reason to perform it). 
 One way to respond to this argument would be to show that desire 
self-ascriptions in fact explain intentional actions properly; this would 
establish the truth of the self-ascriptive view (or justify the adoption of self-
acriptive commitments as part of a wider view), and so render Schueler's 
argument redundant. But there is an easier option on offer. The self-
ascriptivist is only interested in defending the claim that the availability of 
desire ascriptions to explain any intentional action properly makes the self-
ascriptive view prima facie plausible (which Schueler attacks by offering 
an alternative explanation of the fact that desire ascriptions can always be 
used to explain intentional actions). In order to defend this claim, it is only 
necessary to show that ordinarily desire ascriptions are used as if they were 
proper explanations of intentional action; agreement with our ordinary 
explanatory practices is a rich vein of prima facie plausibility. Then, if 
Schueler were to maintain that his teleological account of the explanatory 
role of desire self-ascriptions is correct, he would have to give us a 
convincing reason to accept that our everyday explanatory practices 
misuse desire self-ascriptions. I will first put forward an example of how 
desire self-ascriptions are used to explain intentional action, then offer an 
analysis of the example which purports to show that the speaker (i.e., the 
one who gives the explanation of the action) either intends their 
explanation to account for the intentional action properly, or else is saying 
something incoherent. 
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 Sometimes, often in the early hours of the morning, it strikes me 
that it would be really good to have a treacle sponge pudding; I vividly 
imagine the taste and the texture, and it feels to me as if having one is, 
simply, the thing to do. When I get this feeling, I often decide to make a 
treacle sponge pudding. When my flatmates ask me why I am rooting 
about in the cupboards for mixing bowls and flour and suchlike, I tend to 
say “I want a treacle sponge, so I'm going to make one!”. 
 In this example, it seems natural to say that my desiring a treacle 
sponge explains my actions. Certainly, it seems as if my flatmates ought to 
be and would be satisfied with my explanation. Moreover, when I explain 
my action by saying “I want to”, I do not seem to be offering the sort of 
explanation that, for example, a Freudian psychoanalyst might give of my 
action (I harbour a deep-seated and dimly understood desire for treacly 
desserts as a result of an unsavoury experience in my formative years – I'm 
not giving that kind of explanation). And I do not seem to be giving the 
sort of explanation that a neuroscientist might give; I'm not using the term 
“desire” to gesture towards some pattern of brain activity. Nor am I giving 
a mere characterisation of my behaviour; when I say I am looking in the 
cupboard because I desire a treacle sponge, I seem to be saying something 
more than that this is the thing which I am doing, or which I tend to do. 
And even though I explain my action by reference to a desire, I am not 
saying that I'm just compelled to act, or that I have in some way given in 
to temptation against my better judgement. 
 In short, in appealing to my desire to explain my action, I do not 
seem to be offering a “sub-optimal” or “apologetic” explanation of what I 
am doing; on the contrary, I seem to be offering the most familiar, most 
illuminating sort of explanation of my action that there is. It seems that 
my desire explains my intentional action properly; that is, it explains my 
action by revealing to the observer the positive light in which I saw my 
action. Or if you prefer, it explains my action by making it known to the 
33 
 
observer what I saw to be said for acting this way. I take it that there is 
nothing strange about this example; we are all familiar with the 
phenomenon I am describing here, and the sort of explanation it makes 
available. These examples are quite commonplace. 
 In the treacle pudding example, I distinguished between two kinds 
of explanation of intentional action, which I shall call “primary” and 
“alternative” explanations. Primary explanations commit the speaker to 
endorsing the evaluations that lead the subject to act, whereas alternative 
explanations do not; so alternative explanations are offered when the 
speaker does not intend to commit themselves to sharing the subject's 
evaluations. Alternative explanations are those which are ordinarily only 
offered when the primary explanation is unavailable. Discovered false 
belief cases provide the most obvious examples. For instance, imagine a 
subject who mistakenly takes home the wrong coat after a party; they 
might explain their action by saying “I thought this was my coat, but it 
turns out isn't.” Here, the speaker is the same person as the subject, but at 
a later time; and here, the speaker does not want to endorse the judgements 
made by the subject, so they offer the kind of explanation which does not 
commit them to endorsing the judgements the explanation makes use of. 
In referring to the subject's beliefs, the speaker would not be committing 
themselves to the thought that there was in fact any reason for the subject 
to take that particular coat; but this is consistent with the explanation 
showing that the subject saw their action in a positive light. 
 On the assumption that it is always more informative to explain an 
action by reference to what really is valuable, to correct evaluations and to 
endorsements where possible, it is clear that primary explanations will be 
offered in preference to alternative explanations, because they have 
greater explanatory worth. When we ask why a subject is acting in such a 
way, part of what we want to know is whether there is a good reason for 
them to act like this, so that we can take that reason into account in our 
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own reasoning, and so that we can learn something about the evaluative 
perspectives that we and others ought to have. As such, if our interlocutor 
is being sincere and helpful, then they will prefer an explanation which 
reveals to us what reasons there are to act; being fallible themselves, the 
best they can do is to prefer those explanations which can be given using 
evaluations which they themselves endorse. 
 If there really is a distinction to be drawn between primary and 
alternative explanations (and I take it there is), then primary explanations 
must always be intended as proper explanations of intentional action, since 
the speaker takes the subject's evaluation of the considerations which 
favour their action to be correct, and to explain their action properly. The 
important question, then, is whether desire self-ascriptions are typically 
offered as primary or alternative explanations; if they are typically offered 
as primary explanations, then our explanatory practices treat desire self-
ascriptions as if they explain intentional actions properly, and the self-
ascriptive view can draw plausibility from that fact. If they are typically 
offered as alternative explanations, then at best the issue will be undecided 
and at worst it will favour Schueler's teleological model. This is because I 
have left it open whether alternative explanations are used to properly 
explain intentional actions or not. The difference between a primary 
explanation and an alternative explanation depends on the speaker's 
endorsement of the evaluations used in the explanation, not on whether or 
not the explanation succeeds in accounting for some intentional action 
properly. This being so, if desire self-ascriptions are used in alternative 
explanations, then it will still be the case that we cannot be sure, so far as 
this argument goes, whether they properly explain intentional actions or 
not; so Schueler will have succeeded in undermining the prima facie 
plausibility of the self-ascriptive view (or rather, this response will have 
failed to stop him). 
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 In a purely statistical sense, it would be true that desire self-
ascriptions are typically used in primary explanations if the majority of 
instances of explanation by a desire self-ascription are primary 
explanations. So far as I can tell, there is no data available on how desire 
ascriptions are actually used, in this sense. In light of this deficit, I will 
instead aim to show that there are familiar ways of using desire self-
ascriptions to provide primary explanations of intentional action. This will 
not be enough, of course, to show that desire self-ascriptions must be 
primary explanations, or that all primary explanations must be given by 
desire self-ascriptions; but what is at stake here is the prima facie 
plausibility of the self-ascriptive view, not its truth. 
 Primary and alternative explanations of intentional action differ not 
just in the way they relate the speaker's and subject's evaluations to each 
other, but in terms of the practices of asking for and giving explanations 
in which they are embedded. That is, we can tell when an explanation is 
being given as an alternative. This holds true in the case of desire self-
ascriptions; when a desire self-ascription is used to explain an action, we 
can tell whether or not the speaker endorses the subject's evaluation of 
their action. We can tell because speakers make it clear if they do not 
endorse the subject's evaluations, because it is (or at least, when it is) in 
their interests either as sincere and helpful interlocutors to be understood 
to hold only the evaluations that they in fact endorse. This is especially 
clear in the case where the subject and the speaker are one and the same; 
a speaker who intends to give an alternative explanation of their own 
action is at pains to distance themselves from what they now recognise as 
a mistaken evaluation, and this will be reflected in the way they present 
the explanation. Alternative explanations of one's own action are often 
accompanied by, or included as part of, apologies; or are qualified using 
phrases the emphasise the passage of time between the action and the 
giving of the explanation; or come with explicit rejections of the 
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evaluations employed at the time. We use phrases like “I'm sorry, I just 
wanted to...”, “at the time, I wanted to...”, or “I wanted to... which I now see 
was wrong of me”. Moreover, it appears that in the absence of any attempt 
by the speaker to make clear that the explanation on offer is an alternative 
one, not a primary one, it is natural to infer that the speaker endorses the 
subject's evaluations. This, I presume, is because primary explanations 
have greater explanatory power than alternative ones, and in conversations 
where there is a presumption of co-operation, we tend towards better 
explanations over poorer ones. 
 When desire self-ascriptions are offered as explanations of 
intentional actions, it will nearly always be the case that the speaker and 
the subject are the same person. This could only fail to be so if the speaker 
has made some sort of mistake, or if the reason for which the subject acts 
is someone else's desire self-ascription, which would not be a case of a 
desire explaining an intentional action by playing a special role (see 
chapter 1 section 3). In those cases where the subject and the speaker are 
the same person, if they offer an alternative explanation of their action, 
then either they must be offering an explanation of their action after the 
event, or else they are caught up in some incoherence or self-deception. 
Alternative explanations are given because one does not endorse the 
evaluations that lead to the action, and hence cannot sincerely offer a 
primary explanation; so to give an alternative explanation of an action one 
is in the process of performing would imply one sees nothing to be said for 
performing the action. If the subject were aware of anything to be said for 
performing it, even a reason they take to be insufficient, then that could 
be offered as a primary explanation. Since an intentional action is one 
which is properly explained by the subject's seeing it in a positive light, it 
would appear that if a subject can give only an alternative explanation of 
an action they are performing, then it cannot be an intentional action at 
all. So any case where a subject is performing an intentional action which 
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they explain by using a desire self-ascription must be an instance of using 
a desire self-ascription as a primary explanation. 
 So, explanations which make use of desire self-ascriptions are nearly 
always spoken by the subject; there are some explanations of one's own 
actions which must be offered as primary on pain of incoherence; in any 
case, it is natural to presume that explanations are primary explanations 
unless we are given a reason to think otherwise; and there are familiar, 
accepted ways of flagging an explanation as alternative, which are easy to 
recognise. From this, it seems to follow that there are two classes of cases 
where desire self-ascriptions must be primary explanations: those where 
the subject offers a desire self-ascription as an explanation of an action 
they are currently performing, and those where the speaker speaks 
sincerely, is not mistaken, and does not mark out the explanation as an 
alternative. The existence of these two classes of case provides some 
justification for the claim that desire self-ascriptions are typically used as 
primary explanations of intentional action; which is to say, desire self-
ascriptions are usually intended to explain intentional actions properly. 
This provides the self-ascriptive view with a source of prima facie 
plausibility in the face of Schueler's debunking argument. Furthermore, if 
the above argument is correct, then Schueler would have to provide a 
different account of the explanatory practices I have mentioned, or an 
explanation of how and why it is that they are in error. 
 It might be thought that were the self-ascriptivist to offer the above 
response, they would be making a very substantial concession to Schueler. 
The strength of the self-ascriptive view comes from the idea that it is a 
necessary truth that whenever intentional action takes place, it can be 
properly explained using a desire-ascribing phrase like “I want to”; all I 
have shown is that it usually can be, and that desire-ascribing phrases are 
normally used in that way. This is a far cry from the very general claim the 
self-ascriptivists started out with. 
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 The argument I offered above provides a basis from which to defend 
the much stronger claim. The self-ascriptivist would need to endorse my 
distinction between primary and alternative explanations; and the claim 
that whenever a desire self-ascription is used to explain an action, it must 
be offered as a primary explanation (on pain of incoherence); and that 
every intentional action can be explained (not necessarily properly) by 
using a desire ascription. If it is always possible to explain an intentional 
action using a desire ascription, and desire self-ascriptions are always 
proper explanations (incoherent subjects notwithstanding), then unless 
there is some reason to think that an explanation of an intentional action 
using a desire ascription could be offered third-personally but not first-
personally, then it follows that every intentional action can be properly 
explained by a desire self-ascription. For example, suppose Alan is running 
for the bus. Since his action is intentional, it can be explained using a desire 
ascription phrase, like “he wants to”. If Alan were to offer such an 
explanation himself, then it would be a primary explanation, and hence 
would have to be a proper explanation (unless Alan were lying or deeply 
confused). There is no reason to think that Alan could not offer this 
explanation himself; so it is possible to explain Alan's action properly by 
reference to a desire self-ascription. 
 I take it that every subject is like Alan, and that therefore the 
following hypothetical claim is true: if the subject is sincere, coherent, not 
affected by some complicating factor which would make it inconceivable 
for them to offer in the first-person an explanation of their action which is 
available from a third-person perspective, and it is possible to explain that 
intentional action (in any sense, not necessarily properly) using a third-
person desire ascription, then it will be possible to properly explain their 
intentional action using a desire self-ascription. This is still not quite the 
very general claim that every intentional action can be properly explained 
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using a desire self-ascription, but at least it covers what might be called the 
“normal” cases of intentional action. 
 
3.3 The Naturalistic Fallacy 
 
Practical reasoning is the process of figuring out what to do; that is, 
what there is reason to do. Assuming there are such things as reasons, it 
makes sense to assume that it must in principle be possible for subjects to 
be right about what reasons there are to perform a particular action. That 
is, it must be possible for subjects to reason in such a way that their 
reasoning is structured by a sound practical argument7. That being the 
case, it is reasonable to require of a theory of practical reasoning that it 
does not make it impossible in principle for a subject to reason correctly. 
If there wasn't at least the possibility of reasoning correctly about what to 
do and then as a result actually doing it, it is hard to see what the point 
could be in engaging in such reasoning in the first place. 
The self-ascriptive view claims that correct practical arguments 
have as their premises a desire self-ascription and a proposition which 
states that performing some action or type of action is a way to satisfy the 
desire. From these, according to the self-ascriptive view, it is legitimate to 
infer a normative, practical conclusion. It could be objected, however, that 
neither a desire self-ascription nor an instrumental proposition has any 
normative significance, so a normative conclusion cannot be legitimately 
                                                          
7  The question of what it means to act for a good reason (i.e., on the basis of a 
consideration which really does count in favour of acting that way) is a particularly 
vexed one, which I do not intend to enter into here. For the purposes of this chapter, it 
is best to understand Schueler as claiming that it must be possible for subjects to reason 
in such a way that their reasoning is structured by a sound practical argument, and not 
to worry too much about what it takes for a practical argument to be sound. The key 
text on this problem is (Dancy 2000), where Dancy argues that understanding what it 
means to act for a good reason requires us to renounce the common ground in which 
the disagreements between Humeans and cognitivists take place. As such, I think it is 
best to regard the debate about what it means to act for a good reason as orthogonal to 
the debate between Humeans and their opponents with which this thesis is concerned. 
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inferred from them 8 . A desire self-ascription is claim about what 
psychological states the subject is in, and the sort of instrumental 
proposition described above is just a claim about the relationship between 
actions of a certain class and a particular outcome. Neither of these says or 
need entail anything about what the subject ought to do. 
 
3.4 Evading the Naturalistic Fallacy 
 
One way to remedy the naturalistic fallacy directly is to regard the 
afflicted piece of reasoning as if it is missing some premises, and treat it 
accordingly. In the following example, the original argument on the left is 
fallacious; adding the missing premise produces the argument on the right: 
 
P1: There is a shortfall in the NHS 
budget. 
P1: There is a shortfall in the NHS 
budget. 
P2: The shortfall could be met by 
raising taxes. 
P2: The shortfall could be met by 
raising taxes. 
 P3: There is a reason to bring about 
any state of affairs in which the NHS 
has more money to spend. 
C1: Taxes ought to be raised. C1: Taxes ought to be raised. 
  
 So far so good. The practical syllogism, however, is not readily 
susceptible to this kind of treatment. In the example above, P1 describes a 
deficiency in an aspect of the world described by the argument; in that sense, 
P1 is analogous to the motivational major premise in the practical 
syllogism. P2 connects a state of affairs with a consequence of that state 
obtaining, much in the same way as the minor premise in a practical 
syllogism connects an action (the bringing about of a state of affairs) to a 
                                                          
8 The naturalistic fallacy is traditionally attributed to philosophers who attempt to 
analyse goodness in terms of some natural properties. G. E. Moore coined the term in 
his objection to J. S. Mill in (Moore 1903). For discussion of this issue see, for example, 
(Nowell-Smith 1954), Searle (1964) and (Frankena 1939). Schueler and Stroud press the 
naturalistic fallacy on the Humeans in (Schueler 2003, p.92) and (Stroud 2011, ch.4). 
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desire (which would be satisfied by that action). P3, the extra premise, is a 
hypothetical imperative which links P1 to the state of affairs described in P2, 
by stating that there is a reason to bring about any state of affairs in which 
the deficiency described in P1 would be less severe, of which the action 
described in P2 is one. But the conclusion, C, follows from P2 and P3 alone; 
if there is a reason to do anything that would free up NHS money, and a 
certain action would, then there is a reason to perform that action, 
regardless of whether the NHS needs the money or not. 
 
Major: I want to phi Major: I want to phi 
Minor: Psi-ing is a way to phi Minor: Psi-ing is a way to phi 
 Evaluative: If an action is a way to phi, 
then there is a reason to do it. 
Conclusion: I ought to psi Conclusion: I ought to psi 
     
 The major premise is superfluous to requirements; the conclusion 
follows from the minor and evaluative premises alone. Introducing an 
evaluative premise in order to rid the traditional practical syllogism of the 
naturalistic fallacy renders the major motivational premise inoperative, 
purging the syllogism of its characteristic structure as well. 
The self-ascriptivist could respond by modifying their 
characterisation of the practical syllogism so that the conclusion is not a 
judgement about what the subject ought to do, but is something more 
practical and less normative, like a statement or expression of an intention. 
Not “I should A” but “I shall A”, or even “I A”. Statements of intention are 
not straightforwardly normative; they do not seem to make claims about 
what the subject ought to do, but only what they will do. In response, it 
could be argued that even if the conclusion of the self-ascriptive practical 
syllogism is not a judgement with normative content, the explanation of 
the subject's action which the practical syllogism is supposed to provide 
had better be a normative explanation, or else it will not explain the 
42 
 
subject's intentional action properly. Intentional actions are those which 
are performed for reasons, and hence which are properly explained by 
revealing what the subject saw to be said for acting that way. Even if the 
conclusion of a practical argument is a non-normative statement of 
intention, it must be possible to refer to the practical argument in order to 
properly explain the subject's intentional action; it is hard to see how this 
could be possible if (as the proponent of the naturalistic fallacy objection 
claims) the premises of the argument are not normatively significant, but 
are mere statements of fact. So even if the practical syllogism (suitably 
altered) is not, strictly speaking, an instance of the naturalistic fallacy, if it 
were the case that its premises are not normatively significant then the 
self-ascriptivist would still face a problem. As such, both this problem and 
the naturalistic fallacy proper could be solved by showing that a normative 
conclusion can be legitimately inferred from the premises of the self-
ascriptive practical syllogism. Therefore I will refer only to the naturalistic 
fallacy objection for the remainder of this section. 
 The naturalistic fallacy objection to the self-ascriptive view crucially 
depends on the claim that desire self-ascriptions are to be taken at face 
value, as reports of psychological facts. Only if this is so can it be objected 
that the premises of the self-ascriptive practical syllogism are (both) mere 
statements of matters of fact. The objector claims that desire ascriptions 
are to be read at face value, as reporting non-evaluative facts, and hence 
are not normatively significant; the self-ascriptivist could agree that if 
desire self-ascriptions were to be read at face value, then they would be 
normatively insignificant, and then go on to argue either that since desire 
self-ascriptions are normatively significant, they must not be read at face 
value, or that desire self-ascriptions are not to be read at face value (for 
reasons not dependent on the claim that they are normatively significant), 
and therefore might be normatively significant. Pursuing either option 
requires the self-ascriptive theorist to put forward an argument for the 
43 
 
claim that desire self-ascriptions are normatively significant; I will not 
present any such argument on behalf of the self-ascriptive theorist until 
the end of this section, after the objections to the self-ascriptive view have 
been made clear. I am going to look into the second option first, since 
showing that desire self-ascriptions are not simple statements of 
psychological facts might give us some insight into how, or in virtue of 
what features, they could be normatively significant. 
 It is always fair to assume that a statement should be read at face 
value unless there is a reason to think otherwise; in the case of desire self-
ascriptions, however, there is such a reason. We can see this by considering 
the role that self-ascriptions of other mental states are sometimes put to in 
action explanation. If self-ascriptions of other attitudes sometimes feature 
in the explanation of intentional actions and are clearly not to be read at 
face value, then there will be a good reason to think that desire self-
ascriptions are not to be read at face value either. 
 For example, consider the recent debate between Dancy and Hyman 
regarding the role of knowledge in the explanation of intentional action9. 
Neither think that knowledge ascriptions should be read at face value, 
though they offer different reasons for thinking this. Dancy argues that 
ascriptions of knowledge, belief, certainty, etc., are to be read 
“appositionally”; that is, as qualifying the proposition known/believed/etc., 
not as introducing psychological facts. Dancy claims that sentences like 
“he ran because he believed the bus was about to leave” should be treated 
as if they mean “he ran because (so he believed) the bus was leaving”. The 
function of the self-ascription is usually to allow the speaker to make or 
withdraw commitments to the truth of the proposition which is supposed 
to be the reason for which the subject acted. A speaker who says “his reason 
for running was that the bus was leaving” seems to commit themselves to 
                                                          
9  See,for example (Hyman 2010), then (Dancy 2011), then Hyman (2011). 
44 
 
the truth of the proposition that the bus was leaving10; this commitment 
can be cancelled by inserting “as he believed” into the sentence. But the 
insertion of this phrase should not be understood as changing the speaker's 
claim about what the subject's reason was. In either case, the speaker 
claims that the reason for which the subject acts was that the bus was 
leaving; in the former case, they present this as a truth, and hence a good 
reason for action, whereas in the latter (where they use a belief self-
ascription) they do not commit themselves to its truth, and hence do not 
present it as a good reason for action. They do not, however, present the 
subject's belief as the reason for which they acted, even when they use a 
belief ascription to explain their action. 
 Hyman also thinks that ascriptions of knowledge or belief should 
not be read at face value. Discussing an example in which the subject is 
going to the train station to meet their daughter off the train, he writes 
“”My reason for going to the station is that I believe that my daughter is 
arriving on a train” does not mean that I am being guided by a fact about 
my state of mind” (Hyman 2011, p.365). Regarding the ascription of 
knowledge, Hyman writes that when the subject knows something to be 
the case and acts in light of that fact, “if he knew that [the world was a 
certain way], we can say either that he [acted] because he knew that [the 
world was a certain way] or that he [acted] because [the world was that way]. 
In this kind of explanation, knowledge is transparent: we can look straight 
through it to the fact” (p.367). Much like Dancy, Hyman argues that 
employing an attitude ascription does not (or at least, does not necessarily) 
commit one to the claim that the reason for which one acts is the attitude 
itself, rather than its content. 
                                                          
10 In fact, Dancy claims that in using this particular formulation, the speaker does not 
make even a cancellable commitment to the truth of the proposition which is the 
subject's reason. This strikes me as false, and a straw poll of friends and colleagues 
reveals that it seems false to them, too. 
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 Of course, there are important differences between desiring, 
believing and knowing, which might make it difficult, even impossible, for 
a proponent of the self-ascriptive view to make use of either Hyman's 
strategy or Dancy's. Hyman's strategy is much more complicated, 
depending as it does on a particular account of knowledge as an ability, 
and on related claims about the nature of proper explanations of 
intentional action. Since there is no apparent connection between either of 
these required grounds and the Humean view, I will not go into Hyman's 
account any further; it is primarily interesting for my purposes in that it 
provides another example of attitude ascriptions in action explanation not 
being read as reports of psychological facts. Having said that, Hyman's 
mysterious claim that when the subject knows some fact and acts in light 
of that fact, we can “see through” the knowledge to the fact known, could 
shed some light on how a Humean theory of practical reasoning should 
proceed. I will try to explain what I think Hyman means, and how it relates 
to the Humean project, after the third objection (below). 
 Dancy's appositional view seems more readily adaptable to Humean 
purposes, though it still poses problems. For a start, part of the point in 
reading attitude ascriptions appositionally is that it allows Dancy to claim 
that the attitude ascription is not part of the reason for which the subject 
acts; the reason is the content of the attitude, nothing to do with the 
attitude itself. If the self-ascriptivist is to make the claim that desire self-
ascriptions are to be read appositionally as a way of showing that desire 
self-ascriptions need not be read at face value, then they will also need to 
provide some reason for thinking that the self-ascriptions need feature in 
practical reasoning at all. 
 If explanations featuring desire ascriptions can be rewritten 
appositionally, then the view that desire self-ascriptions in action 
explanations are to be read appositionally will at least be available, even if 
it turns out to be false for some other reason. When we rewrite a belief-
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ascribing explanation appositionally, we take the proposition which is the 
content of the belief and present it as the reason for which the subject acts, 
then present the belief ascription as qualifying that proposition. In the case 
of desire-ascribing explanations, there is not (or does not appear to be) a 
proposition which can be separated from the desire self-ascription. From 
“he believes that the bus is leaving”, we can separate the proposition “the 
bus is leaving”; but from “he desires another cup of coffee” we get “another 
cup of coffee”, which is not a proposition. 
 One might argue that we should use a proposition which specifies 
what the subject wants, such as “he comes to have another cup of coffee to 
drink”; or in the first-person case, “I come to have another cup of coffee to 
drink”. Then the desire self-ascription can be inserted appositionally in one 
of a number of ways: “I come to have another cup of coffee, as I desire”; 
“As I desire, I come to have another cup of coffee”, “I come to have, as I 
desire, another cup of coffee”, etc.. All of these are grammatically correct, 
but hardly sound like natural, idiomatic English; in particular, none of 
these alternatives sound anywhere near as clear and familiar as “I want 
another cup of coffee”. Since the question at issue here is in what sense 
should we understand desire ascriptions, not how they should be phrased, 
it seems reasonable to think that the familiar form of desire ascription is 
as suitable as any other. What matters here is whether we can (in fact, 
whether we do) read desire ascriptions not as reports of psychological facts, 
but in some other way. 
 In the propositions above, I have used the phrase “come to have” 
rather than the more natural “get”, since the former phrasing implies that 
the proposition specifies a way in which the world might be changed by 
the subject, rather than simply a way the world might be. The propositions 
being discussed here are intended to play the role of major premises in a 
practical syllogism, so they have to specify goals; i.e., states of affairs which 
might be brought about by the means specified in the minor premise. Even 
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so, it must be said that even “I come to have a cup of coffee” seems more 
like a prediction than a goal; and moreover, it does not appear to be an 
evaluation of my coming to have a cup of coffee. That is, the subject who 
uses this proposition in their practical reasoning does not, to that extent, 
seem to see their coming to have a cup of coffee in a positive light. 
Although non-Humeans may argue that having a genuine desire for 
something doesn't constitute seeing it in a positive light either, there is at 
least an argument to be had there; at first blush, desiring something does 
seem to be a way of holding it in a positive light. Merely entertaining the 
thought that it will happen, as a subject would when their practical 
reasoning included a proposition like “I come to have another cup of 
coffee”, does not even appear to be a way of holding it in a positive light 
(see also chapter 6 sections 2 and 3, where I develop this line of thinking 
into a response to several non-Humean accounts of desire). 
 The idea that propositions like “I get a cup of coffee” seem to be 
predictions suggests a way of understanding how desire ascriptions are 
supposed to qualify these propositions in a way which would be useful in 
action explanation. According to Dancy, a belief ascription employed in 
intentional action explanation is not to be read as a statement of 
psychological fact, but as a qualified statement of the subject's reason, 
which is the proposition believed. The role of belief ascriptions is to allow 
the speaker to suspend or withdraw their commitment to the truth of the 
proposition which is presented as the subject's reason for acting. It could 
be argued that desire ascriptions in intentional action explanation are not 
to be read as statements of psychological fact either, but rather as qualified 
statements which specify the subject's reason for acting. A belief ascription 
allows the speaker to present the subject's reason for action without 
endorsing it as a good reason; that is, it allows the speaker to cancel or 
withhold a commitment to the truth of the proposition which is the reason 
for which the subject acts. A desire ascription allows the speaker to present 
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the performance of some action or the coming about of some state of 
affairs not merely as an open possibility, but as the one the subject views 
in a positive light (if, of course, desiring something constitutes seeing it in 
a positive light). The proposition “I go to the cinema this evening” simply 
specifies a state of affairs which does not yet obtain; a way the world might 
be. Asserting it would amount to a prediction. The proposition “I want to 
go to the cinema”, when the desire self-ascription is read appositionally, is 
a positive evaluation of a going to the cinema this evening. 
 If desire ascriptions can in fact play this role, then there might be 
justification for the claim that desire ascriptions feature in the premises of 
practical arguments. Explanations in terms of practical reasoning, being 
proper explanations of intentional action, are supposed to reveal the 
positive light in which the subject sees their action. If the role of desire 
ascriptions (read appositionally) is to make a mere prediction into a 
proposition which specifies a goal the subject sees in a positive light, then 
it seems plausible that desire ascriptions should appear in the premises of 
practical arguments. In this respect, desire ascriptions are very different 
from Dancy's belief ascriptions; but that should come as no surprise, since 
the ascribed attitudes are completely different. 
 Of course, offering this sort of account of the role of desire self-
ascriptions in practical reasoning depends on the claim that desiring to do 
something does in fact constitute seeing it in a positive light, which anti-
Humeans will deny. The point, however, is that by employing Dancy's 
appositional model for understanding attitude ascriptions, the self-
ascriptivist can shift the point of disagreement away from the role of desire 
ascriptions, to the normative significance of desires generally. This 
suggests that, although there may be problems with the claim that desires 
explain intentional actions properly (at all), there is no further, particular 
problem with claiming that they do so through self-ascriptive premises 
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appearing in practical reasoning. This is at least a moderate victory for the 
self-ascriptivist. 
  
3.5 Appositionally-Read Self-Ascriptions are not Reasons for Which the 
Subject Acts 
 
 A third objection, put forward this time by Dancy, purports to show 
that it cannot be the case that every reason to act is an attitude ascription, 
since those cases where the reason for which the subject acts is an attitude 
ascription can be distinguished from ordinary cases. Above, I suggested 
that the self-ascriptivists can avoid any suggestion that their practical 
inferences are naturalistically fallacious by claiming that desire self-
ascriptions are to be read appositionally. This third objection poses a 
particular problem for that view, since it seems to show that if attitude 
ascriptions are read appositionally, then they are not part of the reason for 
which the subject acts; and therefore presumably need not appear in the 
subject's practical argument. So the self-ascriptivist faces a dilemma: 
accept that desire self-ascriptions are to be taken at face value and that, 
therefore, the self-ascriptive view commits the naturalistic fallacy; or else 
claim that they are to be read appositionally, and that, therefore, they need 
not be part of the reason for which the subject acts, so the self-ascriptive 
view erroneously claims that desire self-ascriptions are necessary for 
practical arguments. 
 It does not appear to me that the self-ascriptive view can overcome 
this line of objection without considerable modification, if at all. Below, I 
set out what I think it would take for the self-ascriptive view to surmount 
this objection, and a reason for thinking that the objection could be 
modified to apply to any version of the self-ascriptive view which holds that 
desire ascriptions are not to be read at face value (even those which do not 
claim they are to be read appositionally). More importantly, I will argue 
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that a similar objection applies to any version of the Humean theory of 
practical reasoning (though with less dramatic effects). As such the 
proponent of any Humean theory would be well-advised to shape their 
account with this sort of concern in mind. At the beginning of the section 
4, I will show that Dancy's objection brings to light a different sort of 
problem which poses a potentially much greater difficulty to the 
proponent of the Humean view. 
 
3.6 Response to Dancy's Objection 
 
 One might find the claim that desires (or indeed beliefs) play a 
special role in explaining intentional actions properly to be problematic, 
for the following reason: assuming that proper explanations of intentional 
actions are given by presenting the reason for which the subject acts, when 
a mental attitude explains an intentional action properly, it must be the 
reason for which the subject acts. If a mental attitude of a given type is 
required for intentional action (as Humeans say about desires, or some 
cognitivists say about beliefs, for example) then it follows that the reason 
for which a subject acts is always an attitude of that type. But, they say, we 
can tell when the reason for which a subject acts is a mental attitude; those 
cases are unusual. In fact, they are downright weird. It simply cannot be 
true that every instance of intentional action is an instance of one of these 
odd cases; everyday experience makes it clear that this is not so. Now, if the 
self-ascriptivist responds as I have suggested they should, by claiming that 
the desire ascription in the explanation is to be read appositionally, then 
the proponents of this objection will claim that the desire ascription is not 
part of the reason for which the subject acts, at all. To say that the desire 
ascription is to be read appositionally is to say that it is to be understood as 
modifying or qualifying the subject's reason, which seems to entail that it 
is distinct from that reason. If the desire ascription is not part of the 
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subject's reason itself, then there does not seem to be any justification for 
claiming that the desire ascription should ever be among the premises of 
the subject's practical argument, never mind the claim that it necessarily 
must be. 
 The point behind this objection is that the only way in which an 
attitude ascription can be part of the reason for which the subject acts, is if 
it is read at face-value; and where attitude ascriptions are read at face value, 
the explanations they give rise to are too odd to plausibly be part of the 
mainstream of human life. For example, take Dancy's “crumbly cliff ” case. 
Dancy describes a subject who is preparing to scale a cliff, and believes that 
the cliff is unstable. The subject decides not to climb the cliff, since they 
think that their belief that the cliff is crumbly might make them hesitant 
or overly cautious, which may result in them making mistakes and getting 
injured. It is not the case that they choose not to climb for the reason that 
the cliff is crumbly; rather, they choose not to climb for the reason that 
they believe that the cliff is crumbly. This is, according to Dancy, what it 
means for a mental attitude to be the reason for which the subject acts11: 
 
Consider a case where my reason for acting is genuinely that I 
believe that p. For instance, that I believe that the cliff is 
crumbling is my reason for avoiding climbing it, because 
having that belief I am more likely to fall off (I will get 
nervous). This is a case where that I believe what I do is 
genuinely my reason for action, in a way that is independent of 
whether the belief is actually true. As I might say, whether the 
cliff actually is crumbling or not doesn't matter. I believe that it 
is crumbling, and this alone is sufficient to motivate me to stay 
away from it. I recognize that if the cliff were not crumbling, I 
                                                          
11 By way of comparison, see Hyman's views on knowledge and knowledge 
ascriptions (Hyman 1999, especially p.440-1) 
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would still have just the same reason not to climb it as if it were, 
so long as I continue to believe it to be crumbling. But this is a 
quite unusual situation, not at all the normal case.  (p.124) 
 
 The possibility of reading desire ascriptions appositionally seems to 
give the self-ascriptivist an easy response to this objection. They can agree 
with Dancy that the subject in the crumbly cliff case is doing something 
odd, but claim that the oddness derives from the fact that in their 
reasoning (as Dancy explains it) the attitude self-ascription has to be read 
at face-value, and this is not how attitude ascriptions are usually read. 
There is a truth to this which Dancy will readily acknowledge; it is his view, 
after all, that attitude ascriptions are usually to be read appositionally. But 
he also thinks that attitude ascriptions are not part of the reason for which 
the subject acts, which is why they are to be read appositionally. The 
crumbly cliff example only works as an objection if it is grounded on the 
claim, which Dancy takes himself to be justified in making, that if a mental 
attitude turns out to be the reason for which the subject acts, then the 
ascriptions which appears in the subject's practical argument will have to 
be read at face value. 
 The self-ascriptivist cannot accept this claim; that is, the self-
ascriptivist must argue that not even the attitude ascriptions which appear 
in practical arguments are to be read at face value. They are to be read in 
some other way; perhaps appositionally. In that case, Dancy would object 
that the self-ascriptivist will have to explain why it is that attitude 
ascriptions should be understood appositionally even though they feature 
as part of the subject's reason; the point in reading them appositionally, 
from his point of view, is to show that they are not part of the subject's 
reason, but merely qualify it. 
 In order to overcome the objection, the self-ascriptivist would have 
to put forward a good reason for thinking that appositionally-read desire 
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self-ascriptions must feature in practical arguments. Reading attitude 
ascriptions appositionally has three alleged benefits; it avoids shifting the 
focus of the explanation from the object of the attitude to a psychological 
fact, it allows us to see that attitude ascriptions modify or qualify the part 
of the premise which corresponds to the content of the ascribed attitude, 
and that they are not part of the reason itself (according to Dancy, at least). 
The self-ascriptivists will want to keep the first two features while finding 
some way around the third. This may be problematic since, on Dancy's 
construal, the second feature is evidence for the third as much as for the 
first; the fact that attitude ascriptions qualify the part of the sentence which 
corresponds to the contents of the ascribed attitude, is evidence for the 
claim that the ascriptions themselves are not part of the subject's reason, 
only their contents are. Perhaps the most promising line of response for 
the self-ascriptivists is to show that the qualifications imposed by desire 
ascriptions make some difference to how the subject's action is to be 
explained, and that difference is best expressed or recorded by having the 
desire ascription appear in the premises of the practical argument. The 
self-ascriptive view claims that desires, which make a difference to what 
there is a reason to do, are best featured in the premises of practical 
arguments through self-ascription. The response I just suggested holds 
that whether or not a desire for some non-obtaining state of affairs can be 
ascribed to a subject makes a difference to whether or not that state of 
affairs (qualified by a desire ascription) can be used to explain their 
intentional action properly; that is whether that state of affairs qualified by 
a desire ascription is one of the premises from which the subject reasons 
their way to action. 
 In exploring how to understand desire self-ascriptions 
appositionally, above, I gestured at some ways in which desire self-
ascriptions change the role played by the phrase which the self-ascription 
qualifies. It appears that desire self-ascriptions, to put it loosely, make goals 
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out of mere possibilities; a desire ascription marks the difference between 
the thought that a certain course of action is available, and a positive 
evaluation of it. A proper elaboration and defence of this idea will have to 
explain how (i.e., in virtue of what features) having the desire which the 
ascription refers to constitutes seeing some action in a positive light, which 
means going beyond the confines of the self-ascriptive view as I have 
represented it here. I have characterised the self-ascriptive theory as 
primarily an account of the featuring relation; that is, an account of the 
relationship between a desire and the premise in the subject's practical 
argument to which it corresponds. The self-ascriptive view as I have set it 
out says nothing about what desires themselves are, but only makes claims 
about how desires are related to the premises of practical arguments. 
 The self-ascriptive view as represented in this chapter does not have 
the resources to meet this challenge; the important question is whether 
the view can be augmented in such a way that it can overcome this 
objection. I will remain agnostic about whether it can or not; partly 
because it turns out that the best ways to engage with this objection also 
militate against the self-ascriptive view (see chapter 5), and partly because 
the objections discussed in the section 4 present much more direct, 
pressing problems for the self-ascriptive theory. In the last sections of this 
chapter, therefore, I will attempt to set out what I think the proponents of 
non-self-ascriptive Humean theories of practical reasoning can learn from 
this objection to the self-ascriptive view, and the measures that the self-
ascriptive view can take to defend against them. 
 
4. Selfishness and the Self-Absorption Problem 
 
 Dancy's “crumbly cliff ” case gestures at a different and more 
problematic issue for the self-ascriptive view, and the Humean theory of 
practical reasoning more generally, which is that, normativity problems 
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aside, the theory seems committed to an implausibly self-centred 
psychology of reasoning and action. 
 Supposing we understand the crumbly cliff case in the way I have 
suggested: the climber's reasoning is odd not merely because it involves a 
belief ascription, but because it involves a belief ascription which has to be 
read at face value (in order to meet Dancy's characterisation of the case as 
one in which the climber's reason for staying put is his own belief that the 
cliff is crumbly). Then we can imagine a very similar case in which the 
reason for which the climber stays put is best captured by a belief 
ascription, but one which is not to be read at face value. In this case, it is 
hard to see why the belief ascription should appear in his practical 
argument at all, since (as I argued above) the only way it changes the 
premise is by making clear that the subject takes the proposition in that 
premise to be true, and it is not usually necessary to make this explicit. 
Where it does have to be pointed out, i.e., where a belief ascription appears 
in the premises of the subject's practical argument, it may be that there is 
a sense in which the subject is “reasoning from” their belief, even if the 
reason for which they act is best captured by a premise which features a 
belief self-ascription in apposition, not a mere statement of psychological 
fact. For example, belief ascriptions are sometimes used to express 
uncertainty, or to acknowledge that one's belief is insufficiently justified 
without cancelling one's commitment to the truth of the belief; people say 
things like “I believe he is in the next room”, or “I believe United will win 
the league”. And because most practical deliberation, let alone most 
practical reasoning, is not conducted with a self-conscious feeling of 
uncertainty, we have at least a prima facie reason for thinking that most 
practical arguments do not, in fact, include belief ascriptions in the 
premises. 
 Now let us return to the discussion of desire ascriptions. Where 
Alan's running for the bus is explained properly by his desiring to get to 
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the cinema, the self-ascriptivists will claim that one of the premises in his 
practical argument must be a desire self-ascription, like “I want to get to 
the cinema on time”. I have argued that the desire self-ascription here 
should be read appositionally, as qualifying the phrase “to get to the 
cinema on time”. Even supposing it is, there does seem to be a sense in 
which Alan is reasoning from his desire to get to the cinema on time, 
rather that directly from the mere thought of getting to the cinema on 
time. In fact, it seems much clearer that Alan is reasoning from his desire 
than that the climber is reasoning from his belief, even where both 
ascriptions are read appositionally, since Alan's desire makes a difference 
to the role played by the premise in which it features, and it is not clear 
that this is the case with regard to the climber's belief. Insofar as other 
Humean views besides the self-ascriptive view claim that desires make a 
difference to how a premise performs in an argument, it seems that they 
too will be committed to saying that subjects reason from their desires. 
There's nothing surprising about this. 
 The self-ascriptive view will claim that every intentional action is to 
be explained just like Alan's, in that every sound practical argument 
features a desire self-ascription. Indeed, any proponent of the Humean 
theory of practical reasoning broadly construed will claim that every 
intentional action is to be explained somewhat like Alan's is here, in that 
every sound practical argument necessarily includes a premise which 
features a desire (though they may disagree with the self-ascriptivists' 
account of the featuring relation). 
 There's nothing surprising about this either; but taken together, the 
points from the above three paragraphs give rise to a problem for the 
Humean theory of practical reasoning broadly construed. If it is the case 
that we can tell when a subject reasons from their mental attitudes 
themselves rather than from the contents of those attitudes, and that the 
Humean theory is committed to claiming that subjects always reason from 
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their mental attitudes themselves, then it appears that the Humean theory 
is committed to a false claim regarding the psychology of reasoning: 
namely, the Humean theory is committed to the claim that subjects 
necessarily reason from their own mental attitudes, but we can tell that 
this is not the case. I'll call this the “self-absorption problem”. In the 
subsections below I will first set out a simpler but related problem 
regarding selfishness, which I take to be interesting since it goes some way 
to showing the importance of the impartiality principle; though this 
problem is not, in fact, an issue about self-absorption in the more technical 
sense in which I will be using the term. Then, I will outline two versions 
of the self-absorption problem, which I will label the “shallow” and “deep” 
self-absorption problems; the adjectives are supposed to describe the 
nature of the problem, not the extent to which the subject is self-absorbed. 
The shallow problem of self-absorption can be applied to the self-ascriptive 
view with particular efficacy, in virtue of that view's account of how desires 
feature in the premises of practical arguments. I shall argue that the 
shallow problem of self-absorption does not amount to a conclusive 
refutation of the self-ascriptive theory; but it gives us good reason to be 
sceptical about that view. 
 
4.1 Selfishness 
 
 The self-ascriptive theory claims that every practical argument 
contains a desire self-ascription, which explains the subject's intentional 
action properly. Besides problems relating to the way in which the self-
ascriptive practical syllogism is supposed to work, and how desire self-
ascriptions are supposed to license inferences to normative conclusions, 
the self-ascriptive view has two problematic implications. First, one might 
think that a subject whose every action is explained by their desires is 
condemned to exemplify one of a number of character defects that could 
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be lumped together under the heading “selfishness”. Secondly, the self-
ascriptive view entails that every instance of good, explicit practical 
deliberation includes the subject thinking to themselves, “I want to...”, or 
something closely analogous; it appears that this is not the case, and so the 
self-ascriptive view is committed to a false account of the psychology of 
practical reasoning and intentional action. 
 Most of us have been unfortunate enough to encounter individuals 
who are always principally concerned with their own pleasure, benefit or 
satisfaction; persons who approach almost every situation with the implicit 
question, “how can this state of affairs be used to my advantage?”. Such 
individuals are guilty of making value judgements and performing actions 
which the rest of us regard as selfish, unkind, uncharitable, perhaps cold, 
insensitive, or manipulative. If a theory predicts that all practical 
reasoning or all practical arguments involve desire self-ascriptions, then it 
also predicts that all subjects necessarily suffer from a character flaw. That 
is, in the world described by such a theory, all people are selfish. The very 
fact that we can, in principle if not always in practice, tell the difference 
between people who are selfish and those who are not (or at least, between 
instances of selfishness and instances of impartiality) shows that such a 
theory does not describe reality. It is plainly false that subjects are 
necessarily selfish, so any candidate theory of practical reasoning had 
better not have this implication. 
 
4.2 Desire and Selfishness 
 
 Does the self-ascriptive theory portray subjects as necessarily 
selfish? It represents subjects as always acting from their own desires in 
the sense that whenever a subject acts, the practical argument which 
underlies and explains their action will have as its major premise a desire 
self-ascription; the question is whether or not it is fair to understand this 
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feature of the view as equivalent to the claim that subjects are necessarily 
selfish. In order to show that this is not a fair interpretation of the view, the 
self-ascriptivist would need to show that the subject's desires having a 
prominent role in practical reasoning is distinct from the subject being 
fixated with those desires, and instances of selfishness and desire-based 
reasoning are not strongly correlated. Commonplace examples can be 
found of subjects who reason from their desires in the way that a Humean 
theory of practical reasoning claims they must, but who are not selfish, 
and vice versa (subjects who are selfish, but whose reasoning makes no 
mention of their desires). These examples are evidence that Humean 
theories of practical reasoning are not committed to the psychologically 
implausible claim that subjects are, always and necessarily, selfish. 
 Being self-consciously concerned with the satisfaction of one's own 
desires is a way of being blatantly and unequivocally selfish; but it would 
be surprising if it turned out to be the one and only way. Even if reasoning 
is primarily concerned with factors that do not easily reduce to the subject's 
own desires, such as what purport to be objective values, like prudence and 
kindness, that still leaves plenty of room for self-centredness. We can 
imagine a subject who always frames their deliberation in terms of values, 
never their own desires, but whose evaluations betray an unmistakeably 
egocentric streak. They might employ standards of evaluation 
inconsistently according to whether or not they or their own interests are 
under scrutiny; or they might apply standards of evaluation which benefit 
or flatter themselves or their own interests, but apply this already-skewed 
standard impartially. For example, with regards the first possibility, they 
might take themselves always to be concerned with prudence, but weigh 
considerations that promote their own future well-being disproportionately 
heavily compared to those that promise equivalent benefits for others. This 
would be an example of their applying an inconsistent standard; they claim 
to value prudence as such, prudence itself, but they are more interested in 
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actions that are prudent from their own point of view than those that would 
be considered prudent for others. 
Alternatively, they might, unbeknown to them, regard the virtues or 
interests which they possess in noticeable degrees as superior to those which 
they lack, even in cases where the two are related, or where the latter is 
reasonably agreed to outweigh the former. A naturally intelligent person 
might regard intelligence as a remarkable virtue, equally in themselves and 
in others, and this evaluation might lead them to reason their way to courses 
of action which unfairly underestimate and disparage those who lack 
intelligence but possess other virtues. A subject deeply concerned with 
social justice might regard it as of the most profound importance, and this 
evaluation might lead them (through reasoning) to ride roughshod over the 
equally noble interests of others. 
 These examples show that there are ways of being selfish which do 
not amount to the subject giving their desires a prominent position in their 
practical reasoning. If it can also be shown that subjects whose desires are 
key parts of their practical reasoning do not necessarily reason selfishly, 
then there will be good grounds for thinking that the Humean theory of 
practical reasons does not entail that subjects are necessarily selfish, since 
selfishness and reasoning from ones desires are distinct ideas that do not 
entail one another. In order to defend this second claim, it is only necessary 
to assert that a theory of the nature of reasons and reasoning should not 
place substantive restrictions on what there could, in principle, be a reason 
to do. If this is so, then since the Humean theory holds that every 
intentional action is properly explained by a desire, it follows that any 
Humean theory of practical reasoning must not claim that there are some 
things which the subject cannot desire, since that would make a difference 
to what there could possibly be a reason to do. Therefore the theory does 
not entail that subjects necessarily have desires for things which benefit 
them at the expense of others; it is, in principle, possible for a Humean 
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subject to desire to perform altruistic, self-sacrificing actions, since it is 
possible, in principle, for them to desire to perform any action at all. So the 
objector who wishes to claim that the self-ascriptive view renders subjects 
necessarily selfish cannot simply point to the fact that, according to the 
view in question, every sound practical argument contains a desire self-
ascription among its premises. They must argue either that the self-
ascriptive view in fact contravenes the impartiality principle; or else that 
although it does not contravene the impartiality principle, the subjects it 
portrays would so strongly tend towards selfishness that the view is still 
committed to an implausible psychology of reasoning and action. The 
former seems very implausible; the self-ascriptive view is simply a set of 
claims about how desires feature among the premises of practical 
arguments. It seems highly unlikely that there is any putative intentional 
object of desire which cannot be built into a desire self-ascription; what 
could one want such that a phrase which refers to it could not complete 
the sentence “I want...”? The latter alternative appears to be an empirical, 
psychological claim, so is unlikely to find an adequate defence or a 
convincing rebuttal through theoretical reasoning alone. 
 
4.3 The Shallow Self-Absorption Problem 
 
 It appears, therefore, that the self-ascriptive view does not portray 
reasoning subjects as necessarily selfish; there is another way, however, in 
which the view might turn out to be committed to false claims about the 
psychology of reasoning and action. The self-ascriptive view claims that 
every sound practical argument has a premise which includes a desire self-
ascription in it; more specifically, the view holds that every sound practical 
argument is a practical syllogism in which the major premise is a desire 
self-ascription. This seems to entail that whenever a subject practically 
deliberates well (that is, whenever a subject conducts practical reasoning 
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through consciously or explicitly entertaining the premises of a sound 
practical argument) they must have a thought of the form “I want to...”. 
Schueler argues that this is manifestly false: 
 
[I]t seems obviously inaccurate psychologically to think that all 
[intentional] actions are like this. Many cases, by far the majority 
I would say, start from facts, or perhaps evaluations of facts, about 
things other than the agent’s own desires, needs, cares and 
preferences. That is, the first premise in the agent’s practical 
reasoning, if made explicit, would not refer to something the 
agent wants but to something he or she holds to have some 
positive or negative value, or to be a requirement of some sort or 
the like.    (Schueler 2003, p,118) 
 
 This is what I shall call the shallow problem of self-absorption, here 
tailored for the self-ascriptive view. In general terms, the problem is that 
whatever claims a proponent of the Humean theory makes about how 
desires feature in the premises of practical arguments, they commit 
themselves to the further claim that a premise of that kind is employed 
whenever a subject reasons well; and furthermore, that the subject 
explicitly entertains that premise whenever they deliberate well, which is 
an even more problematic claim since it is much more clearly open to 
counter-examples. 
 The shallow problem of self-absorption appears to be particularly 
problematic for the self-ascriptive theory, since the theory makes quite a 
demanding claim about how desires feature in the premises of practical 
arguments. There are only so many ways to self-ascribe a desire, in any 
given language; even allowing ascriptive phrases relating to non-cognitive 
attitudes which are not genuine desires to count for the purposes of action 
explanation (such as “I wish”, “I hope”, “I like” etc.), it seems that English 
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only furnishes us with a handful of different options. The self-ascriptive 
view is committed to the claim that one of a very limited selection of turns 
of phrase must crop up in the subject's practical deliberation, when their 
deliberation is guided by a sound practical argument. This is a very tight 
restriction on what subjects' practical deliberations must be like, which 
seems unlikely to be met. It appears that the only way to loosen the 
restriction would be to weaken the distinctive claim of the self-ascriptive 
view (i.e., that desires feature in practical arguments just when a desire 
self-ascription is among the premises), which seems to be really just a way 
of rejecting the view. 
 The self-ascriptivist could reject the claim that the best and most 
explicit practical deliberation is constituted by the subject's consciously 
running through the premises of the relevant practical argument, and 
hence that Schueler is wrong to think that the self-ascriptive view is 
committed to the claim that correct practical deliberation begins with a 
desire self-ascription. Actual episodes of deliberation conducted by real 
subjects are susceptible to all sorts of minor errors, unclarities and 
obfuscations, so a faithful characterisation of the subject's deliberative 
process would not match the practical argument perfectly; but this in no 
way detracts from the idea that the explanatory power of the subject's 
deliberation is captured by the premises and inferences of the practical 
argument. The practical argument records the considerations and 
inferences which explain the subject's intentional action properly; when 
they deliberate well, a faithful characterisation of the subject's deliberation 
would be in agreement with the practical argument regarding what states 
of affairs and relations between them explain the subject's intentional 
action in the right way. But they need not refer to these states of affairs in 
precisely the same way, using the very same words, in order for the 
practical argument to be the one which structures the subject's reasoning, 
and hence for the argument and the deliberation to give the “same 
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explanation” of the same action. Such a demand would be unreasonable. It 
would seem to entail, for instance, that the same explanation cannot be 
given in the third person as in the first person, or in the past tense as in the 
present tense; since in each case, the explanation will have to be phrased 
differently. 
 This is all true, but it does not help the self-ascriptivist much. This 
line of response relies on the hidden assumption that there is some non-
self-ascriptive way in which a desire can feature in a faithful 
characterisation of a subject's deliberation which would put it in 
agreement with a practical argument in which the desire features through 
self-ascription. If there is not, then the above response is not available, since 
if the deliberation and practical argument did not both contain desire self-
ascriptions then they would not be in agreement about how the subject's 
intentional action is to be explained. And if there is a way in which the two 
can be in agreement without a desire self-ascription appearing in the 
deliberation, then we would have to ask why it is that the practical 
argument necessarily includes a desire self-ascription when there are other 
ways in which a desire might feature in the argument. 
 For example, suppose the major premise in Alan's practical 
argument is “I want to get to the cinema on time”; the self-ascriptivist 
could argue that Alan's deliberation need not perfectly match the practical 
argument; so long as what Alan takes to count in favour of his running for 
the bus is his wanting to get to the cinema on time, then Alan's deliberation 
and the practical argument in question will be in agreement regarding the 
reason for which Alan runs for the bus. What explains Alan's action is his 
wanting to get to the cinema on time (and the bus's being about to leave); 
this state of affairs can be referred to either self-ascriptively, as it is in the 
practical argument, or non-self-ascriptively, as it is in Alan's deliberation. 
The problem now is, why should we accept the self-ascriptivist claim that 
sound practical arguments must include desire self-ascriptions if (for 
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example) Alan's deliberation can be in agreement with the relevant sound 
practical argument without including a desire self-ascription? The answer 
cannot be that there is some special role which can only be played by self-
ascription, because then the Alan's deliberation would not be in agreement 
with the practical argument (since his deliberation does not include 
anything which plays the special role of a self-ascription). Rather, the 
answer would have to be that desire self-ascriptions play an irreplaceable 
role in practical arguments, but that very same role can be played by 
having desires feature in deliberation in a variety of different ways (and it 
must be the very same role, or else the argument and the deliberation 
would not be in agreement). If “deliberating” is the process of constructing 
an argument in favour of some conclusion, which I take it to be, then there 
can be no role which is unique to desire ascriptions in practical arguments, 
but can be fulfilled by something else in deliberation. 
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Chapter 3 
 
 
The Strict-Backgrounding View 
 
 
This chapter deals with one way of responding to the 
failure of the self-ascriptive view, which is to provide an account 
of how desires properly explain intentional actions that does not 
appeal to practical reasoning. The aims of this chapter are to 
make the deep self-absorption problem clear, and to show that it 
cannot be circumvented by trying to explain intentional action 
properly without appealing to practical reasoning. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The self-ascriptive view is committed to a false account of the 
psychology of reasoning and acting; that is, it falls foul of the shallow 
problem of self-absorption. That problem is generated by accepting two 
claims: first, that in episodes of correct practical deliberation, the subject 
runs through the practical argument to which their reasoning corresponds; 
and secondly, that desires feature in the premises of practical arguments in 
some way which is reflected in the contents of those premises. Together, 
these two claims entail commitments about the exact way the reasoning 
subject must frame their thoughts when they deliberate correctly and as 
explicitly as possible. 
In the previous chapter, I suggested that the first claim should be 
rejected in favour of a less demanding correctness condition for practical 
reasoning. This might be one way to avoid the shallow problem, if some 
account can be given of the featuring relation such that there are many and 
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varied enough ways being in agreement with a premise which features a 
desire to piece together a plausible picture of the psychology of reasoning. 
Alternatively, one might refuse to give any account at all of how 
desires feature in practical reasoning, and so avoid making any claims of 
the second sort. That is, a Humean might seek to avoid commitment to a 
false account of the psychology of practical reasoning by showing that 
desires explain intentional actions properly without necessarily featuring in 
practical reasoning at all. The core Humean claim is that desires have a 
special role to play in explaining intentional actions properly; a Humean 
might argue that desires play this role without necessarily featuring in the 
subject's practical reasoning. This sort of Humean advances a theory of 
intentional action, but no theory of practical reasoning. I'll call these 
Humeans “backgrounders”, for reasons that will become obvious shortly. 
The backgrounders aim to get around the shallow problem of self-
absorption by refusing to make any claims regarding how desires feature in 
the premises of practical arguments. By not making these claims, they shirk 
any commitment to what the premises of practical arguments must be like, 
and are therefore under no obligation to say anything about episodes of 
practical reasoning which are structured by these arguments.  As such, they 
claim that desires need not take part in practical reasoning at all; desires 
explain intentional actions properly, but in some other way. 
In a sense, this sort of view seems very natural. For one thing, it is 
closer to Hume's own view, on most readings; Hume argued for a role for 
desire in explaining actions in a causal sense, not in justifying them. 12 
Likewise, opponents of the Humean theory of practical reasoning often 
                                                          
12 For a well-known example of this reading of Hume's view of action, see 
(Milgram 1995): “ Hume is not an instrumentalist. An instrumentalist holds that 
there is one (but only one) kind of practical reasoning, viz., means-end reasoning. 
Hume holds the rather more minimalist view that there are no legitimate forms 
of practical reasoning; he is, to adapt a phrase of Christine Korsgaard's, a skeptic 
about practical reasoning.” (p.78) 
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characterise desires as little more than psychological drives or urges; so it 
might seem natural to them that desires, while ill equipped to take part in 
proper explanations of intentional action, could find a home in a more basic, 
causal-psychological form of explanation. 
It is important to notice, however, that the backgrounders will not 
want to adopt this deflationary way of understanding the role of desire in 
explaining action; the backgrounders do think that desires explain 
intentional actions properly, just not by appeal to practical reasoning. 
Making sense of this idea is the unique explanatory challenge facing the 
backgrounding view. Schueler, for example, argues that acts of practical 
reasoning are explanatorily prior to the kind of explanation the 
backgrounders have in mind, so the backgrounders do not succeed in 
presenting a proper explanation of intentional action which is independent 
of practical reasoning (section 3). I will argue that Schueler's argument is 
mistaken, since performances of the “mental acts” that are required for the 
backgrounders' explanations to be available do not amount to episodes of 
practical reasoning, even by Schueler's own standards (section 4). 
On the other hand, I will argue that the backgrounding explanations 
themselves do constitute episodes of practical reasoning, because those 
explanations can only be understood as proper explanations of intentional 
action by reference to a practical argument (section 5). Briefly: 
backgrounding explanations can only be understood as revealing the 
positive light in which the subject sees their action because the mental states 
that feature in those explanations are related to one another in a particular 
way, such that they can be seen to favour some action over another; these 
relations between the contents of mental states are precisely what is 
represented in practical arguments. So the backgrounding explanation only 
works because those explanations are structured by practical arguments. 
Backgrounding explanations, therefore, are instances of an intentional 
action being properly explained by the subject's mental states being 
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appropriately related such that they favour that action; which is to say, they 
are instances of practical reasoning, as I have defined it. 
This argument exposes a more serious problem with the strict 
backgrounding view. Backgrounding subjects are not subject to the shallow 
self-absorption that affected self-ascriptivist subjects, but they are self-
absorbed in a deeper way. In the final section of this chapter, I will consider 
what threat this deep self-absorption poses, and how the Humean theory of 
practical reasoning can be adjusted to mitigate it. 
 
2. The Strict Backgrounding View 
 
A proponent of a Humean theory of practical reasoning might seek 
to evade the shallow self-absorption problem by putting forward an account 
of the role of desire in explaining intentional actions which does not appeal 
to practical reasoning at all, but rather to another kind of explanation. 
Rationalising explanations, for example, explain intentional actions by 
showing what the subject took to count in favour of acting in a certain way, 
and by causally explaining the subject's action. Rationalising explanations 
differ from merely causal or psychologising explanations, in that 
rationalising explanations portray their subjects as seeing their actions "in a 
positive light", as taking it that there is "something to be said for" (Davidson 
1980, p.17) so acting, and so on. In rationalising explanations, beliefs and 
desires in the background explain intentional action "causally...in virtue of 
rationalizing it: [they] causally explain it in the "right" way." (Pettit & Smith 
1990, p.566). 
If rationalisation provides a way to explain intentional actions 
properly which does not involve any practical reasoning, then it might be 
possible to make good on the core Humean claims that intentional actions 
are properly explained by desires without having to provide an account of 
how desires feature in practical reasoning, or confront the problems 
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attendant on giving such an account. One might claim instead that desires 
play a special role in rationalising explanations, but that they need not 
appear in practical reasoning. Then, there would be no inherent threat from 
the shallow problem of self-absorption, since the view would have no 
commitments regarding the contents of practical reasoning (since it would 
not make the second claim listed on page 66). The fact that desires are 
necessary for a subject to act intentionally would therefore not entail that 
the subject is necessarily self-absorbed or necessarily selfish, since the 
Humean claim would have no bearing on how practical reasoning is 
conducted. 
This is what I will call the “backgrounding strategy”, or the 
“backgrounding move”. Pettit and Smith propose adopting the 
backgrounding strategy in (Pettit and Smith 1990)13; I will set out their view 
in sections 2.1 and 2.2, before discussing Schueler’s criticism of it in sections 
3 and 4, and my own objection to the backgrounding strategy in section 5. 
 
2.1 The Foreground/Background Distinction 
 
In (Pettit & Smith 1990), Pettit and Smith consider two different ways 
of explaining intentional action. On the one hand, there are rationalising 
explanations14, which seek to explain intentional actions by pointing to the 
subject's beliefs and desires; on the other, there is the "deliberative 
conception", which appeals to reasoning conducted by the subject. Pettit and 
                                                          
13 Mark Schroeder's hypotheticalism is another kind of backgrounding view. See 
(Schroeder 2005, chapter 2), Philosophers who argue that desires play an important 
role in explaining why a subject has the reasons they have, but are not themselves 
reasons, can plausibly be read as proponents of the backgrounding strategy. This 
sort of position is more prolific in moral psychology and philosophy of action 
generally than in philosophy of practical reasoning. Examples include (Railton 
1986) and (Frankfurt 1969). 
14 Pettit and Smith sometimes call these “intentional explanations”; I will stick to 
“rationalising explanations”, for clarity. 
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Smith argue that these two ways of explaining intentional action are not in 
competition, but ought to be thought of as occupying different ‘explanatory 
spaces’; the intentional background and the deliberative foreground. Since 
practical reasoning is only relevant to the deliberative conception, if desires 
play their explanatory role as part of the intentional conception, then there 
need be no interesting and substantive account of how desires figure in 
practical reasoning. Desire might, in some sense or other, occasionally 
appear in the premises of practical reasoning; for instance, there is nothing 
obviously wrong with the idea that desire self-ascriptions might be among 
the factors taken into consideration in specific cases, such as those where 
what one wants is relevant or explicitly at issue. But in these minority cases, 
desires will be accommodated in the same way as any other consideration, 
like the refreshing taste of lemonade or the garish colour of a hat; they will 
not play a special role. If desires do their explanatory work in the 
background, then there is no pressing need to fully characterise desires in 
practical reasoning, since whatever desires necessarily do, they needn't do it 
by featuring in practical reasoning. 
 
2.2 The Strict Backgrounding View 
 
Hence, Pettit and Smith can maintain the Humean commitment that 
desires are necessary for action by making the further claim that desires are 
necessary only for rationalising explanations, i.e., those that are given in 
terms of beliefs and desires in the background. This is what Pettit and Smith 
call the "strict backgrounding view", and does not follow immediately from 
the foreground/background distinction itself; the distinction is a division 
between two explanatory spaces, which are the demarcated realms of two 
different kinds of explanation. The strict backgrounding view is required in 
order to get any sort of reply to the charge of shallow self-absorption out of 
the foreground/background distinction; in fact, the conjunction of the 
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foreground/background distinction and the shallow self-absorption 
objection (along with the commitment to desires as necessary for action) 
entails the strict backgrounding view. The foreground/background 
distinction opens up the possibility that desires might explain actions 
without appearing in practical reasoning; and the shallow self-absorption 
objection says that desire self-ascriptions cannot be necessary premises for 
practical reasoning. If desires are necessary for action but cannot be 
necessary features of practical reasoning, then they must appear always in 
the background and only contingently in the foreground; which is just what 
the strict backgrounding view says.15 So the strict backgrounding view is an 
attempt to take anti-Humean concerns about the self-absorption problem 
into account, by giving up claims about practical reasoning. 
The strict backgrounding view, then, maintains that desires do not 
feature in practical reasoning. Given the intuitive ease of the move from 
this claim to simple, causal-psychological model of action explanation 
according to which desires do explain intentional actions but not properly, 
it is probably worth making sure first that Pettit and Smith regard 
rationalising explanations as proper explanations of intentional action; 
and secondly that there is sufficient reason to. That is, that there is a reason 
to prefer the more ambitious, more vulnerable backgrounding view over 
the simpler, more defensible causal-psychological model. 
It seems clear from (Pettit and Smith 1990) that Pettit and Smith 
intend their background explanations to account for intentional actions 
properly; as they put it, beliefs and desires in the background explain 
intentional action "causally...in virtue of rationalizing it: [they] causally 
explain it in the "right" way." (Pettit & Smith 1990, p.566). They also refer 
the reader to (Davidson 1980) for an account of the sense in which desires 
                                                          
15 There is another possibility: necessarily, desires appear either in the background 
or in the foreground, but it is a contingent matter where a particular desire appears. 
I know of no-one who holds this view, and it makes little difference to the argument 
in this chapter 
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and beliefs in the background provide reasons for action. That answers the 
first question. Whether or not backgrounders ought to regard 
backgrounding explanations as proper explanations will of course depend 
on whether or not the backgrounding view is defensible. For now, though, 
it is enough to see that if backgrounding explanations are intended to 
account for actions in a more basic sense, then the backgrounding strategy 
would not be a useful resource for the proponent of the Humean theory of 
practical reasoning. 
If, in response to the shallow self-absorption problem (by denying 
that desires necessarily feature in the premises of practical reasoning), the 
strict backgrounding view gives up not just the possibility of a truly 
Humean account of practical reasoning, but the possibility of a Humean 
account of intentional action as such, then it is difficult to understand the 
strict backgrounding view as a response to that problem. At best, this could 
be seen as an indication that, according to the backgrounders, it is a 
mistake to think that Humeans ought to be interested in intentional action 
in the first place. But if the only viable option open to a Humean 
confronted with the shallow self-absorption problem is to adopt  the strict 
backgrounding view, and adopting the strict backgrounding view means, 
essentially, running away from the problem, then this doesn't speak very 
well of the Humean family of views. Surely there must be some way in 
which the Humeans can try to meet the problem head on, even if the 
attempt is ultimately fruitless. 
I suggest, then, that it would be more charitable to read the strict 
backgrounding view as an attempt to properly explain intentional action 
along Humean lines. A “proper explanation” of intentional action, you will 
recall, is one which accounts for intentional actions as intentional; one 
which explains an intentional action by revealing the positive light in 
which it is seen by the subject. Otherwise, we should regard adopting the 
strict backgrounding view as inadvisable for anyone who holds Humean 
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intuitions, as doing so represents making an exorbitant concession to their 
opponents. Let's suppose therefore that desires and beliefs in the 
background are supposed to provide Davidsonian explanations of 
intentional actions; that is, they should explain intentional actions by 
showing what the subject saw in favour of acting in a certain way, and by 
causally explaining the subject's action. Rationalising explanations differ 
from merely causal or psychologising explanations, in that rationalising 
explanations portray their subjects as seeing their actions "in a positive 
light", as taking it that there is "something to be said for" (Davidson 1980, 
p.17) so acting, and so on. 
 
3. Schueler's Objection 
 
The backgrounding move only helps if the foreground/background 
distinction can be maintained. Schueler presents an argument which 
purports to show that the distinction cannot be maintained, since the 
occurrence of an episode of practical reasoning (albeit a simple, implicit, 
minimally-demanding one) is a necessary condition on the kinds of 
explanation that are given in terms of background beliefs and desires. 
The argument goes as follows: we can easily imagine (in fact, have 
probably experienced) a situation in which a subject has a desire and a belief 
about how to fulfil it, and simply fails to act on them. We might say, they do 
not notice that there is a way to fulfil their desire; or that it does not occur 
to them; or that they do not realise. Perhaps they end up pursuing a different 
course of action, instead; in that case, we will be unable to point to the desire 
and belief on which they acted to explain their action, since the very same 
sort of explanation would apply to the desire and belief which they did not 
act on. So the mere presence of a desire and the relevant instrumental belief 
is not enough to explain intentional action. 
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Schueler claims that what is missing from the rationalising 
explanation is as follows: 
 
(1) The desire and the belief must be “brought together” as a pair. 
(2) This requires that the subject be aware of the belief and of the 
desire, 
(3) and that the subject bring the belief and desire together through 
“mental activity” (Schueler 2009, p.108-9). 
 
Finally, 
 
(4) This mental activity (bringing together a belief and a desire of 
which one is aware, in such a way that a conclusion can be drawn 
from them) constitutes reasoning practically. 
 
Schueler argues that this poses the following problem for Pettit and 
Smith: if background explanations require that the belief and the desire be 
brought together, and bringing together beliefs and desires constitutes 
practical reasoning, then background explanations require practical 
reasoning. That is, desire-belief explanations, which operate in the 
background, cannot properly account for intentional action without the 
beliefs and desires they make use of appearing in the subject's (actually 
occurrent) practical reasoning. 
Taken together, the shallow self-absorption problem and the 
putting-together point make the strict backgrounding view, and indeed the 
foreground/background distinction, inadvisable for any Humean to adopt. 
If beliefs and desires in the background do not explain intentional actions 
properly, adopting the strict backgrounding view means giving up on the 
possibility of a proper explanation of intentional action that does justice to 
Humean intuitions. If they do provide proper explanations of intentional 
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actions, then either they require the putting together point in order to do 
so, or they do not. If they do, then either practical reasoning takes place in 
the background, in which case the foreground/background distinction 
collapses; or else desires are necessarily present in the foreground as well 
as the background, in which case Pettit and Smith's strict background view 
is as susceptible to the threat of shallow self-absorption as the self-
ascriptive view (it could even be regarded as an elaboration of that view, 
not a rejection), and the foreground/background distinction does nothing 
to overcome self-absorption or Schueler's criticisms. Worse still, arguing 
that background beliefs and desires provide proper explanations of 
intentional action without requiring the putting together point means 
committing oneself to the claim that practical reasoning is not required 
for proper explanations of intentional action. None of these are attractive 
options. 
 
4. Response to Schueler 
 
(3) is a remarkably strong claim; even if we rule out cases where a 
belief and a desire are brought together but no action ensues (perhaps 
because the desire is overruled by a stronger one) it still entails that 
whenever a desire-belief pair can be used to explain an action, the subject 
brought that pair together by a prior mental action. Plausibly, “realising” 
(Schueler 2009, p.109), “noticing” (ibid p.107) or “having it occur to one” (ibid 
p.108) that the belief and desire pair up are not always mental actions, and 
these are terms which Schueler himself uses to describe what happens when 
a belief and a desire come together. We might want to add “seeing”, “having 
it dawn on one” or “it becoming apparent to one” that the belief and desire 
go together. None of the above sound obviously or emphatically like mental 
actions. Conversely, we have a set of expressions which quite decisively 
convey the idea that some mental action was involved: “she worked it out”, 
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“he figured out that…”, “I reasoned that…”, “she deduced that…”, “he 
thought it through and…”, “I came to the conclusion that…”, and so on. 
For instance, Schueler describes a case in which his car has broken 
down and he needs to get to campus to give a lecture. It would be best for 
him to take the bus to campus, and he knows that there is a bus he could 
take which stops nearby; unfortunately, this fact does not occur to him, and 
he ends up taking the bus in the opposite direction, to his sister’s office, to 
borrow her car. Schueler describes this as a case in which he has the relevant 
desire (to get to campus) and belief (that he could take the bus) but fails to 
make the connection between them, and so does not act in the way that those 
mental states seem to favour. We can imagine Schueler’s frustration if, while 
sat on the bus on the way to his sister’s office, he became aware that he could 
have taken the bus to campus. We might imagine him saying afterwards, 
“and then it dawned on me – I should have just got the other bus!”. Contrast 
this with a case in which he reports, “at that point I worked out that I could 
have taken the bus, but by then it was too late to turn around.” The latter 
seems to describe an episode of mental activity, while the former does not. 
Either way, had Schueler had this realisation before he got on the bus, then 
it seems clear that he would have acted on it and taken the bus to campus, 
whether he arrived at that realisation through mental activity or not. 
It is worth wondering why Schueler thinks pairing up beliefs and 
desires is necessarily a mental action, since it seems so implausible that it 
must be. He claims that putting together beliefs and desires cannot be 
reducible to the formation or adoption of a further mental representation 
about how the belief and desire fit together, or else we would run into 
something like Lewis Carroll's paradox (Carroll 1895); if a third 
representation is required to relate the belief and the desire to each other, 
then why not a fourth to unite the first three, and so on ad nauseam. From 
this, he concludes that we have to regard the putting together of beliefs and 
desires as a mental action, in order to avoid the regress. This explains why, 
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when he entertains the possibility of a Humean rejecting (1), he provides 
the following description of the resultant picture of reasoning: 
 
[D]enying the putting-together point would be tantamount to 
holding that beliefs and desires simply interact on their own to 
produce actions, independently of whether the agent is aware of 
them or not, rather in the way two different chemicals might 
interact whether or not anyone is aware of them. 
(Schueler 2009, p.119) 
 
But Schueler does not suggest that in this scenario the beliefs and 
desires do not pair up, or that the subject is in fact unaware of them; merely 
that they do not come to be paired up as the result of a mental action. The 
Humean might plausibly contend that the coming together of a belief and 
a desire of which the subject is aware is, at least sometimes, a non-agential 
mental event, not a mental action. This seems like a good fit for the sort of 
commonplace descriptions canvassed above (“it dawned on me”, “I realised”, 
“it became clear that...”). 
If the Humean rejects (3), then, according to the standards laid out 
in (4), the pairing up of beliefs and desires of which the subject is aware 
would not constitute practical reasoning. By accepting (1) and (2), the 
Humean puts themselves in a position to concede to Schueler that 
explanations that proceed from background beliefs and desires do require 
that the beliefs and desires be paired up, and that “pairing up” is a type of 
mental “happening” (i.e., something that really occurs; not simply a 
relational property that holds between the belief and the desire, or their 
contents, etc.). This means that the Humean can utilise background 
explanations which do not involve practical reasoning; the 
foreground/background distinction stands. 
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5. My Objection to the Backgrounding Strategy 
 
Although Schueler’s objections are not decisive reasons for rejecting 
the strict backgrounding view, there is such a reason; the view fails to gain 
the advantages for its proponent that it is supposed to. The main motivation 
for adopting the backgrounding view is that backgrounders do not have to 
explain how desires feature in practical reasoning, which makes it easier to 
defend the claim that desires are necessary for intentional action. It turns 
out, however, that the backgrounding view does not have this advantage at 
all; backgrounders carry just the same explanatory burdens as everyone 
else. In essence, this is because rationalising explanations and explanations 
in terms of practical reasoning are both proper explanations of intentional 
action; they are both supposed to explain the very same phenomenon 
(intentional action) in the very same way (in terms of the subject’s reasons 
for acting), and by appeal to the same resources (mental states and mental 
happenings). It would be more surprising if it turned out to be possible to 
give one sort of explanation wholly independently of the possibility of 
giving the other. 
The backgrounding view fails to have its advertised advantage 
because rationalising explanations explain intentional actions in terms of 
the positive light in which the subject sees them, and to see an action in a 
positive light is just to be committed to a practical argument in its favour.  
So rationalising explanations are to be understood by appeal to a 
practical argument, in just the same way that explanations in terms of 
practical reasoning are. The mental states that are involved in a rationalising 
explanation are able to explain intentional actions properly precisely 
because their contents are related to each other in such a way that a practical 
conclusion follows from them. Claims about what mental states have to be 
involved in rationalising explanations therefore entail matching claims 
about what the contents of practical arguments must be. When Pettit and 
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Smith claim that desires are necessary for background, rationalising 
explanations, they commit themselves to the claim that desires necessarily 
feature in the premises of practical arguments. 
Rationalising explanations explain intentional actions by showing 
the positive light in which the subject sees the action; they accomplish this 
by appeal to the subject’s mental states. In Pettit and Smith’s case, these 
mental states are beliefs and desires. The subject who acts intentionally is 
not propelled into action by an inscrutable inner drive or urge, any more 
than they are moved by strings attached to their arms and legs; they act 
deliberately, in virtue of seeing their action in a positive light. Appealing to 
the light in which the subject sees their action explains intentional actions 
properly (or rather, if it does not, then there is really no point talking about 
rationalising explanations at all, and this whole discussion is moot). 
Therefore, to explain an action in terms of the light in which the subject 
sees their action must be to show that the subject sees the action as properly 
supported by reasons. One might object that the point in making use of 
rationalising explanations is to avoid talk of reasons and reasoning; this 
presents no problem, since we can instead use a less loaded phrase. To 
explain to an action in terms of the light in which the subject sees their 
action must be to show that the subject sees the action as the thing to do. 
The point is that if rationalising explanations are proper explanations of 
intentional action, then they must portray the subject as finding something 
to be said for acting in that way. 
In case this argument seems unconvincing, the explanation can be 
run in the opposite direction, as it were. Given a particular intentional 
action, which mental states would rationalise it? It seems that this question 
can only be answered by answering a different question: which propositions 
can this action be practically inferred from? The way to find out which 
mental states jointly constitute the subject’s seeing some action in a positive 
light is to work out what propositions support the performance of that action 
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in the right way, i.e., by forming the premises of a practical argument with 
that action as the conclusion. 
So making claims about rationalising explanations entails 
commitments about practical arguments. Strict backgrounders claim that 
rationalising explanations necessarily feature desires; which is to say, seeing 
some action in a positive light necessarily involves having some desire 
which supports that action in the right way. Since supporting that action in 
the right way means being a premise in a practical argument which counts 
in its favour, strict backgrounders are committed to the claim that, in some 
sense or other, desires feature in practical arguments. They are not, however, 
committed to any particular account of how they do so. 
It could be objected that the point in the foreground/background 
distinction is to clearly separate rationalisation from explanation in terms 
of practical reasoning; by arguing that claims about rationalisation entail 
commitments about practical reasoning, I have ignored one of the main 
aims of the backgrounding view. Backgrounders like Pettit and Smith might 
accept that both rationalising explanations and episodes of reasoning are to 
be understood in terms of practical arguments, but deny that in the case of 
any particular subject, the argument which structures their reasoning need 
be the same as that which makes sense of the mental states which rationalise 
their action. After all, they argue that rationalising explanations and 
explanations in terms of practical reasoning are two different “levels” of 
explanation; why would they share the same argument? 
The answer is that they do not necessarily share the same argument, 
but they ought to; where a subject's action has to be explained by appeal to 
two different arguments depending on whether the explanation proceeds 
through reasoning or rationalisation, the subject is committed to two 
different evaluative perspectives on the same action, and is more than likely 
acting in some sort of error or ignorance. When subjects act well, the 
practical argument which underlies their action will be the same whether 
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we put forward a rationalising explanation of their action, or try to explain 
it in terms of practical reasoning. Therefore if we focus on those cases where 
the subject is not in error, claims about the practical arguments which 
underlie rationalising explanations do entail commitments about the 
contents of practical reasoning. With regard to the whole range of cases, 
therefore, the following is true: making a claim about some feature of the 
practical arguments which structure rationalising explanations commits 
one to the claim that that feature is reflected in the subject's practical 
reasoning, or else the subject is making some sort of mistake. An example 
should help to make this clear. 
Alan has won a modest amount of money betting on the football, and 
is deciding what to do with it. Alan considers that he has been lucky, and 
that he did not count on having this money to spend, so it would be right to 
share his good fortune with those who are less well off; he decides to donate 
some of his winnings to a homeless shelter. Bert, who is very wealthy, as you 
may recall, sees Alan do this. Bert reasons that he has more money than he 
needs, and the homeless shelter is a good cause, so he decides to make a 
contribution of his own; deep down, though, Bert is moved to act by his 
desire to avoid the acute guilt he would experience if he found himself 
giving less to good causes than his poorer neighbour. Alan, meanwhile, has 
no further motive than his reasoning discloses. 
Here, Alan exemplifies what it would mean for a subject's reasoning 
and rationalising explanations to be structured by a single practical 
argument (or rather, for the arguments which structure their reasoning and 
rationalisations to be in agreement with each other). Although his action 
can be accounted for in different ways, he has a unified attitude towards his 
action. If we were to consider the rationalising explanation and the 
explanation in terms of his reasoning side by side, we would see that what 
Alan regards as counting in favour of giving money to charity is the same 
in either case. If we were to give a rationalising explanation of his action, 
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the mental states which it referred to would have as their contents the 
propositions which would be the premises in his reasoning. 
This would not be true in Bert's case; the rationalising explanation of 
his action would cite his desire to avoid the unpleasant feeling of guilt and 
his belief about how to do so, neither of which are mentioned in his 
reasoning. Bert does not have a unified attitude towards his action. At one 
level, his action is explained by what he takes to count in favour of donating 
to charity; but at another, his action is explained by his desire to avoid 
discomfort, which, so far as his reasoning goes, he does not take to count in 
favour of action. 
Pettit and Smith are committed to the claim that when the subject 
acts on the basis of a unified evaluative perspective (like Alan's) rather than 
a fractured one (like Bert's), their reasoning must feature the desire which 
properly explains their action at the level of rationalisation. This is because 
the subject only acts without problematic ignorance of their own 
motivations when the practical argument which structures the rationalising 
explanation is in agreement with that which structures their practical 
reasoning, and the former always features one of the subject's desires. If it is 
better to act from a unified evaluative standpoint than a fractured one, and 
if in setting out a theory of practical reasoning we are primarily concerned 
with explaining those cases in which the subject gets it right, then this 
commitment is enough to show that the backgrounding view is no better 
off with regard to shallow self-absorption than the self-ascriptive view before 
it. 
 
6. Deep Self-Absorption 
 
In this section, I will discuss a more general issue which arises for 
any version of the Humean theory of practical reasoning, to a greater or 
lesser extent: deep self-absorption. Humeans are all committed to the claim 
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that every intentional action is properly explained by a desire. As a result, it 
could be argued that Humean subjects are necessarily concerned with 
themselves and their own attitudes towards the world, whereas we normally 
think of reasoning subjects as directing their attention outwards, towards 
objective, external, publicly-shared reality. Deep self-absorption is not a 
problem in need of a solution.; rather, it is a concern which needs to be 
responded to. What I refer to below as the “problem of deep self-absorption” 
is the threat posed by deep self-absorption. In much the same way that some 
versions of the Humean theory are more afflicted by “shallow” self-
absorption than others, some versions of the Humean view are more 
susceptible to deep self-absorption than others. For instance, the self-
ascriptive view is so badly afflicted by shallow self-absorption as to make the 
view untenable; self-ascriptive subjects are not psychologically plausible 
characterisations of real people. With regard to deep self-absorption, it may 
be that some Humean views are committed to portraying subjects as 
implausibly inward-looking. 
Before I begin to explain the deep problem of self-absorption in more 
detail, I shall distinguish it from other problems that I have raised so far. In 
the list below, (a) is a simple anti-Humean argument, (b) is the normativity 
problem, (c) the shallow problem of self-absorption, and (d) is the deep 
problem of self-absorption. Humeans are committed to the claim that every 
intentional action is explained by a desire, but we can tell that this is not the 
case because... 
 
(a) ...there are plenty of cases where it seems that the subject has 
 no desire to perform the action in question, and yet they do. 
(b) ...desires are fickle and capricious, whereas reasons are not. 
(c) ...desires do not necessarily feature in even the most 
 explicitly worked out and sound deliberation. 
85 
 
(d) ...reasoning subjects do not always and necessarily act on the 
 basis of highly subjective considerations (and desires are 
 highly subjective). 
 
The next section will (of course) be concerned with explaining what it 
means for a consideration to be “highly subjective”, and why this is a 
problem for a theory of practical reasoning. In section 6.2 I will make clear 
why it is that the deep problem of self-absorption applies to the 
backgrounding view even if the shallow one does not (that is, even if my 
argument in section 5 is unsound); and why, in fact, every Humean theory 
of practical reasoning is susceptible to the deep problem. In section 7, the 
conclusion, I will sketch a plan for finding measures to solve, or mitigate 
the threat posed by, the deep problem; that plan will be enacted in chapters 
4, 5 and 6. 
 
6.1 The Deep Self-Absorption Problem 
 
Even supposing that the backgrounders were able to avoid making 
any claims regarding practical reasoning, they would still face another 
potential problem which they share in common with every other Humean 
theory of practical reasoning. According to the backgrounding view, what 
explains a subject's action in the right way is their desiring something that 
they take to be delivered by acting. What makes acting in one way preferable 
to any alternative action, according to the background view, is to be found 
within the subject themselves; it is part of the subject, not part of the 
“objective” world (i.e., not part of the world of non-subject objects). 
There are a number of ways to spell out this problem, but for now I 
want to stick with the most general (so this paragraph is bound to sound a 
bit vague). Deep self-absorption might be regarded as a relative of the idea 
that is at the heart of the anti-Humean views. Many anti-Humeans have 
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claimed that having a reason to do something is simply not a matter of 
wanting to do it, since we are all familiar with cases where we want to do 
things we have reason to refrain from doing, and where there are 
compelling reasons for adopting courses of action for which we have 
absolutely no desire. What we have reason to do is not “up to us” in the sense 
that what we desire might be. Even those desires which are often described 
as “assailing” the subject, as simply imposing themselves on the subject 
without cultivation or endorsement, are still desires; as such, they are the 
sorts of things which usually fall within the scope of the subject's control, 
even when in specific cases they do not. Reasons belong to a different 
category entirely; they are not merely dissidents within the subject's mental 
realm, they are external to the subject. 
In fact, what matters is not really whether or not reasons and desires 
are within the subject's control, but whether they are part of the subject at 
all. Desires, of course, necessarily belong to subjects. Reasons, 
considerations which count in favour of or make sense of actions, are not 
necessarily parts of subjects; at least, it is not in the concept of a reason, as a 
consideration which favours an action, that it must involve or concern a 
subject. Reasons are, in that sense, “objective”; when a reason involves a 
subject, it is so only in virtue of being the particular consideration it is, not 
in virtue of being a reason. If it turned out that only desires are reasons, i.e., 
that the only considerations which count in favour of action are desires, then 
this would represent a severe narrowing of the metaphysical scope of 
reasons. 
The problem really bares its teeth when we consider what sorts of 
entities desires are. They are mental states; specifically, mental attitudes. 
There are other things towards which desires are attitudes. One might 
expect that it would be the objects of desire which count in favour of action; 
then at least the range of possibilities for what might be an object of desire 
might be as wide as the range of possibilities regarding what could 
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conceivably be a reason to act. The Humeans do not claim that the object of 
desire makes sense of action, however, but rather that desiring does (I 
sketched some of the reasons why they must make this claim in chapter 1, 
and will explore it in more detail in the next chapter). The Humeans claim 
that what makes sense of an action is not some part of objective reality, but 
rather the subject's attitude towards it. When, in reasoning practically, the 
Humean subject is concerned with what favours an action over its rivals, 
they are necessarily concerned not with objective reality, but with their own 
attitudes towards it. The issue here is not that the reasoning subject must be 
somehow actively concerned with, or fixated with, their desires; that was the 
shallow self-absorption problem. Rather, the issue here is that however 
desires feature in practical arguments and practical reasoning, the Humean 
is committed to portraying subjects as looking for (and finding!) reasons in 
what many would consider the wrong place. 
Deeply self-absorbed subjects find that all reasons are subjective; all 
reasons are attitudes of subjects towards objective reality. What counts in 
favour of action is not the way things are in the objective world, but one's 
engagement with it; specifically, one's wanting certain states of affairs over 
others. If we recall some of the less felicitous characteristics of desires and 
desire-like states (chiefly capriciousness and fickleness; see chapter 1) then 
it becomes easy to see how a deeply self-absorbed, Humean subject might 
appear to be entirely out of touch with objective reality. The actions of a 
Humean subject are properly explained by mental states which come and 
go without that subject's consent or control; not by objective considerations, 
or even by cognitive attitudes towards them. There is, the anti-Humeans will 
argue, a fundamental mismatch between the subject portrayed above and 
the way we think of ourselves as practical reasoners and performers of 
intentional actions. 
 
6.2 Deep Self-Absorption in the Backgrounding View 
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The Humean theory of practical reasoning (in any of its guises) is 
committed to the claim that what really makes sense of an intentional 
action is the subject's desiring something which might be gained by 
performing it. This is different from the shallow problem of self-absorption, 
which is that the Humean theory portrays subjects as fixated with their own 
desires. The deep problem remains even if the shallow problem is solved. 
We can see this by considering again Pettit and Smith's 
backgrounding strategy. Supposing that my argument in the previous 
section is mistaken, and Pettit and Smith really can give a Humean, proper 
explanation of intentional action without committing themselves to any 
claims about practical reasoning; it would still follow that, at the level of 
rationalisation, every intentional action is properly explained  by a desire. 
Every action is susceptible to a rationalising explanation, so every 
intentional action is properly explained by a desire. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The problems of normativity and self-absorption, and the way in 
which the anti-Humean conception of desire exacerbates these problems, 
together expose a rough outline of what desires would have to be like were 
the Humean theory of practical reasoning true. The normativity problem 
states that desires cannot take part in normative explanations because (and 
this is where the anti-Humean conception comes in) they are too fickle. The 
problems of self-absorption state that desires cannot play an ineliminable 
role in the explanation of intentional action because subjects are not in fact 
as they would be were that the case; specifically, they are neither fixated with 
their own desires nor necessarily introverted in their reasoning. To 
overcome these problems, one would need to make it plausible that desires 
are significantly less fickle than the anti-Humeans suggest, an account of 
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the featuring relation according to which desires need not be the focus of a 
premise in an argument in order to be featured there, and a characterisation 
of desires which plays down their subjectivity. 
All of these aims can be achieved by an account of the connection 
between desires and their objects. The defining feature of the anti-Humean 
account of desire is that there is no relationship between a desire and its 
object, beyond the bare fact that the latter is the intentional object of the 
former. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that from the anti-Humean 
perspective, there is no explaining why desires arrive and depart as and 
when they do, and no accounting for the often antagonistic relationship 
between the subject's desires and their overall evaluative stance (i.e., the 
perspective on the world espoused by all of their evaluative attitudes taken 
together). Since desires are individuated by their objects, a change in object 
is the same as a change in the particular desire. If we have no explanation 
for how or why desires come to have the objects they do, then it is highly 
likely that we will have no explanation for how and why the objects of 
desires can change, either; and hence the arrival of new desires and 
departure of old ones (which is to say, changes in what the subject desires) 
will be wholly mysterious to us. Likewise, if we lack any understanding of 
why a subject has the particular desires they do (that is, why their desires 
have the objects they do), then we will be unable to analyse conflicts between 
what the subject desires and what they judge to be worth having. Given the 
enormous range of what one can desire, if we really have no account of how 
desires come to have their objects, we should probably be more surprised 
when a subject's desires and non-desire evaluations line up than when they 
do not. 
I have, of course, run together the idea that we have no grasp of the 
rules or mechanisms that govern the objects of desire, and the idea that 
there are no such rules or mechanisms. It could have been the case that 
desires were perfectly predictable and orderly, and we still lacked any 
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understanding of their comings and goings; but they are not. They can be, 
as the anti-Humeans claim, invasive, unruly, dissonant and transient 
(though whether they in fact possess these qualities to the extent that many 
anti-Humeans seem to think, is another matter); but in focussing primarily 
on those desires which have these properties and largely ignoring desires 
which are long-standing and faithful reflections of the subject's other 
evaluations, the anti-Humeans draw together the two ideas that I 
deliberately mingled in the paragraph above. To regard the fickle desires as 
exemplifying the concept of desire is to court the illegitimate inference 
from our ignorance of any mechanism that governs the objects of desire to 
the absence of any such mechanism. 
The task ahead, therefore, is to use examples of more stable desires 
to elucidate and explain the connections between desires and their objects 
in such a way as to make it plausible that these sorts of desires are better 
representations of desires generally than the erratic ones with which anti-
Humeans tend to be concerned. 
By making the connections between desires and their objects clear, it 
will be possible to show that desires can explain intentional actions properly 
(solving the normativity problem), and that combining such a conception 
of desire with the core Humean claim does not produce an implausible 
portrayal of reasoning subjects (solving the self-absorption problems). The 
next chapter is concerned with finding the connection between desires and 
their objects in virtue of which they are able to explain intentional actions 
properly, which I will call the “normative dimension” of desire. Chapters 5 
and 6 set out the way in which the representational characteristics of desire 
make the normative dimension available for use in reasoning, and explain 
how desires feature in the premises of practical arguments. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Reason-Providing Desires 
 
 
This chapter asks and begins to answer the question, How or in 
virtue if what, do desires have the ability to explain intentional 
actions properly? In line with the conclusions of the previous 
chapters, I consider what sort of connections desires might 
possess which would explain this ability. A number of relatively 
simple options are examined and rejected, culminating in 
Schiffer's account of reason-providing desires. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 If desires have the ability to explain intentional actions properly, then 
in virtue of what features do they have this ability? At the end of the previous 
chapter I argued that, since the heart of the anti-Humean opposition to the 
idea that desires play a role in practical reasoning is to be found in the 
characterisation of desires as fickle and transient, Humeans would be well-
advised to account for the ability of desires to explain intentional actions 
properly by appealing to some connection between desires and something 
else more stable and predictable. Perhaps there are important connections 
between desires and their objects (i.e., not objects in the everyday sense, but 
rather the intentional objects of desires; what they are desires for) which 
anti-Humeans have overlooked. There are other alternatives. Desires are 
certainly closely related to pleasure and frustration; getting what one wants 
is pleasurable, and being denied it is grating and uncomfortable. Perhaps 
there is some important connection between desire and these sensations 
which could explain the normative significance of desires. Or, perhaps it is 
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simply the possibility of satisfying a desire which accounts for their ability 
to explain intentional actions properly. 
 In each case, one question is whether equipping desire with 
connections of that sort would account for desires having just the 
explanatory powers that they seem to have. For instance, the desire to have 
a cup of coffee has the potential to explain a limited range of intentional 
actions; I might go to the café or put the kettle on because I want a cup of 
coffee, but that desire would not make sense of my walking around in circles 
or going for a bike ride. Furthermore, one must ask whether and how the 
proposed connections account for desire's explanatory powers. If it were 
argued that satisfying a desire is pleasurable, the it would be reasonable to 
think that the subject of a desire would view actions which promise to satisfy 
that desire in a favourable light. If it were argued that the desires a subject 
has are predictably governed by the direction of the wind, on the other hand, 
then it would be hard to see how this connection could allow desires to 
explain intentional actions properly. 
 
2. Rational Authority 
 
 Suppose, for the sake of argument, that there are some normative 
reasons which depend on the desires the subject has, and some which do 
not. Consider a case where a subject is faced with two mutually exclusive, 
alternative courses of action, such that all and only the reasons in favour of 
one course of action are reasons against the other, and vice versa (that is, 
imagine that the subject is bound to take one option or the other, cannot 
take both, and there are no outlying considerations that weigh for or against 
just one option and are irrelevant with respect to the other). Suppose now 
that all putatively non-desire-related reasons seem to the subject to be 
perfectly balanced between the two. The alternatives, and the reasons 
themselves, need not be identical, or even similar; what's important is that 
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consideration of what reasons there are which does not take the subject's 
desires into account will reveal the reasons in favour of one option to have 
precisely the same weight as those in favour of the other. Finally, imagine 
that the subject has a single, quite ordinary desire, which would be satisfied 
by selecting one option but not the other. I will call these sorts of situations 
“indifference cases”16. 
 Now that the form of the example is clear, let me provide a concrete 
instance: Bert needs to buy a new bicycle; after shopping around for a while, 
Bert has identified the two best options, but is having a hard time choosing 
between them. The Alphacycle benefits from enclosed gears, which are 
much more durable than exposed ones, and so much less likely to break 
down and require expensive maintenance. The Betabike, on the other hand, 
features an innovative new dérailleur, which provides for smoother gear 
changes, less chain slippage and an overall more comfortable ride. All in all, 
judges Bert, the advantages are equally weighted. From (what Bert thinks of 
as) an objective standpoint, there is nothing to choose between the two bikes. 
But Bert finds himself drawn to the Alphacycle; he likes the clean lines and 
bright, primary colours. He can easily picture himself riding happily 
through the neighbouring countryside; he visualises himself wheeling it out 
of the shop, and riding away down the highstreet. Bert wants the Alphacycle, 
                                                          
16 Stampe presents an example which is similar to the indifference cases as I have 
described them, and also intended to evoke the intuition that, in the example, the 
subject’s desire makes sense of their action. In Stampe’s example, two subjects with 
identical beliefs spend the weekend learning German (p.344). Neither of them has any 
belief that would explain their doing this; in fact, the only difference between them is 
that one of them wants to learn German, whereas the other does not. Stampe says that 
the subject who lacks the desire “has absolutely no reason” to act as they do, and so 
their action is “utterly irrational”; whereas the subject with the desire “does at least have 
a reason – something of a reason, surely” to act as they do, and so their action is “not 
utterly irrational”. I have provided what I hope is a clearer and more evocative example. 
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and does not take himself to have any other reason to choose it over the 
Betabike. 
 In the example, it seems intuitively plausible first that Bert would, in 
fact, choose the Alphacycle; and secondly, that it makes more sense for him 
to choose the Alphacycle, given his assessment of the situation. (I intend 
“makes more sense” to be as non-committal a statement of how things are 
as possible; precisely why it is that it makes more sense (or at least seems to) 
for Bert to act in this way, is part of what is at issue in this chapter.) I take it 
that this result can be generalised; any subject who has two options 
supported by equally-weighted non-desire-involving reasons, and a desire-
based reason that counts in favour of one option over the other, will act in 
accordance with their desires, and it will make sense that they do. 
 The power to make sense of actions, seemingly exemplified by the 
subject's desire in the indifference cases, is what Stampe calls “rational 
authority”. A consideration with rational authority does not merely cause 
actions, and thereby explain them; it explains them properly, by making 
sense of them. What might it mean to say that an action makes sense 
(compared to a relevant alternative)? Presumably that there is comparative 
explanation on offer; something which explains why the subject selected 
one option over the other. Intentional actions in general are properly 
explained by reference to the reasons the subject took themselves to have 
for acting; so if there is a comparative explanation available, then it must be 
that there is something which the subject takes to count in favour of one 
action over the other. So we can conclude that whatever makes sense of an 
action (whatever has rational authority) does so by introducing the reason 
for which the subject acts into the explanation. At this point, it would be 
unwarranted to say that whatever has rational authority just is the subject's 
reason for acting; there are several possible accounts of rational authority 
on offer in the case of desire alone (as we will see in a moment), and the 
mere concept of rational authority does not tie us to any one in particular. 
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All we can say with justification, at this stage, is that if something has 
rational authority, then it has what we might call a "normative dimension"; 
that is, it might not itself be a reason, but it will serve to bring one into the 
explanation of action. In order to account for the rational authority of some 
factor (a mental state, for instance), we must characterise its normative 
dimension. 
 There are a number of other possible explanations of the rational 
authority of desire which do not involve appealing to desires as counting in 
favour of action. For example, it could be that since the subject has the 
desire, they are confronted with the prospect of its satisfaction, and the 
promise of future pleasure or relief to be had therein. It might be this which 
counts in favour of acting, not the desire itself. Or perhaps the desire does 
not itself count in favour of action, but the subject comes to have other 
reasons for action in virtue of having the desire; perhaps, having a desire, a 
subject has a reason to perform actions which promise to satisfy the desire. 
That is, the desire acts as an “enabling condition” for other considerations to 
be viewed as reasons. Or perhaps it is the object of the desire, that which is 
desired, which counts in favour of action. 
  In the indifference cases, the only (relevant) difference between the 
two options, from the subject's point of view, is that one would promise to 
satisfy a desire, while the other would not. This is not enough for us to 
conclude that the subject takes their desire to count in favour of acting; but, 
if this reading of the indifference case is correct (and it is not uncontentious, 
by any means) then it is enough to show that desire has a normative 
dimension, and that is a significant result, in itself. 
 Nevertheless, if the possibility that desires are reasons to act is on the 
table, consideration of the indifference cases provides that possibility with 
some prima facie credibility – albeit no more so than some other, competing 
possibilities. The question, then, is how well the authority of desire can be 
accounted for by each of these competing views. Stampe's favoured view is 
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that desires themselves count in favour of action. The account he gives of 
the authority of desire, set out below, also contains a powerful objection to 
the “future relief” and "desired object" views. 
 How are we to explain the normative dimension of desire? In virtue 
of what features do desires have rational authority? In virtue of what 
features do they make sense of actions? Anti-Humean philosophers put 
forward accounts of intentional action that make use of mental states; if 
those explanations are at all credible, those mental states must be thought 
to have some rational authority. Perhaps the rational authority of desire is 
similar to the authority of other mental states; or at any rate, perhaps the 
project of figuring out what the authority of desire is, and where it comes 
from, could benefit from consideration of other examples. It will be worth 
paying particular attention to whether the rational authority of other mental 
states fits one (or more) of the models mentioned above (enabling 
conditions, future relief, object, or reason-in-itself), as this will give us an 
interesting point of comparison; do desires have rational authority in the 
same sense, or in virtue of the same features, that other mental states do? 
Stampe begins his investigation into rational authority, with the rational 
authority of belief. 
 
2.1 The Rational Authority of Belief: Authority per objectum 
 
 When we see someone engaged in some activity, we can make sense 
of what they are doing as an intentional action by appealing to their beliefs 
(specifically, by ascribing a belief to them; probably by an exercise of the 
principle of charity). Why did she give money to the cold callers? She 
believes disaster relief is a good cause. Why did he throw the banana away? 
He believes it has gone bad. Why is she painting that room? She believes it 
looks shabby and run down. These are the sorts of things we say about other 
people; explanations given in the third-person, as it were. First-personal 
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explanations do not have the same form: Why did you give money to the 
cold caller? Because disaster relief is a good cause. Why did you throw away 
the banana? It had gone bad. Why are you painting the room? Because it 
looks shabby and run down. When we utilise our own beliefs to explain our 
behaviour, we appeal first and foremost to what we believe, not to our 
believing of those things. This is just the by-now-familiar claim that, when 
a mental state is used in a reasons-based explanation, it is the content of the 
mental state that is important, not the mere existence of that state; what the 
subject takes to count in favour of acting is what they believe, not, ordinarily, 
that they believe it. (Some exceptions to this rule comprise important 
evidence in favour of Stampe's account, so they will be discussed below.) This 
strongly suggests that the rational authority of belief is not derived from the  
beliefs themselves counting in favour of actions, which was one of the 
possible sources of rational authority considered above. 
 It has already been stated that intentional actions are those which are 
performed because the subject takes themselves to have a reason to perform 
them; and that they are properly explained by appeal to what the subject 
takes to count in favour of so acting. A little earlier, I claimed that the 
rational authority of a mental state is accounted for by characterising its 
normative dimension; the feature that relates the authoritative mental state 
to the subject's reason for action. In the above example, the subject's reason 
for painting the room is the room's shabby appearance; i.e., what the subject 
takes to count in favour of painting the room is the shabbiness of the room. 
The proposition, that the room looks shabby, is the content of the belief 
referred to in the third-personal explanation of the subject's painting the 
room. What the subject takes to count in favour of acting is specified by the 
propositional content of one of their beliefs (I shall follow Stampe in using 
"specifies" to describe what a proposition does to the state of affairs which 
obtains when and only when that proposition is true; and I will use 
"entertains" to refer to what a mental state with propositional content does 
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to the proposition that is its content). Furthermore, if the object of belief is 
what is believed, and what is believed is that things are such that the 
propositional content of the belief is true, then the object of the belief is the 
state of affairs specified by its propositional content. What the subject takes 
to count in favour of acting is some feature of how things are; so the rational 
authority of belief is derived from its object.  Stampe calls this sort of 
rational authority “per objectum”. 
 The beliefs which make sense of the subject's actions are those which 
have as their objects the considerations the subject takes to count in favour 
of acting; and they make sense of those actions in virtue of having the 
objects they do. This is a somewhat convoluted way of saying that beliefs 
make sense of actions by being the subject's beliefs about what reasons there 
are for them to act (“about” in the sense that they have those reasons as their 
objects, not that they are “concerned with” what reasons there are). So the 
normative dimension of belief (the feature in virtue of which beliefs have 
the rational authority to make sense of actions) is that the objects of relevant 
beliefs are what the subject takes to be normative reasons. Above, I 
suggested that this very feature might account for the rational authority of 
desire; might not desires, like beliefs, make sense of actions by having as 
their objects considerations which the subject takes to count in favour of 
acting? 
 
2.2 Do desires have per objectum  authority? 
 
 Stampe argues not. He claims that genuine normative reasons, 
considerations which really do count in favour of particular actions, are 
necessarily facts; so whatever the subject takes to count in favour of acting, 
they must take to be a fact; and the objects of desire are necessarily taken 
not to be facts, by the subject. Hence the subject cannot take the objects of 
their desires to count in favour of action. This argument is deceptively 
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simple, and very important to Stampe's positive view, so I will go over the 
premises individually. 
 Stampe's first premise is that normative reasons are facts (p.336). He 
has very little to say in defence of this premise; it is not hard to see why, as 
there is something very natural about the suggestion that reasons there 
really are must be part of reality. Normative (practical) reasons are those 
considerations which actually count in favour of actions, so they must be 
grounded in reality, in two directions. First, the consideration itself must be 
a feature of reality in the requisite sense, not an illusion or a mistake; 
secondly, since it is a normative reason, it must actually count in favour of 
something. That is, for some consideration to be a normative reason to 
perform a particular action, the consideration itself must not fail to exist, 
and it must not fail to count in favour of that action. 
 Stampe's second premise follows from the first, and the condition that 
subjects must, in principle, be capable of reasoning correctly (which was 
argued for in the chapter of this thesis concerned with the self-ascriptive 
view); all other things being equal, it must be possible for a given subject to 
be right about what reasons there are for them to act in a particular way. If 
normative reasons are necessarily facts, then for a subject to have any hope 
of reasoning correctly, they must regard whatever it is they take to count in 
favour of acting, as a fact. Take some feature of reality, F, which counts in 
favour of our subject performing a particular action, and which (to avoid 
complication) cannot be correctly overlooked in reasoning about whether 
to perform that action; if normative reasons are necessarily facts, then F 
must be a fact. If the subject takes F to count in favour of action, then what 
they take to count in favour of acting, if they are reasoning correctly, is F, 
which is some feature of reality which counts in favour of acting. If they did 
not regard F as a fact, then what they would be taking to count in favour of 
acting, would not be F; it might be the possibility that F, or the hope that F, 
or something along those lines. But it would not be F itself, because F itself 
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is a fact. So whenever the subject takes F to count in favour of action, they 
must regard F as a fact; if they do not, then they cannot take F to count in 
favour of action. If the subject does not take F to count in favour of action, 
and if F is a normative reason, then the subject cannot be reasoning 
correctly with regard to F. Given that F could, for all that can be said at this 
stage, be replaced with any object, property or state of affairs, if the subject 
cannot reason correctly with respect to F, then they cannot reason correctly. 
 The third premise is more ambitious. Stampe, accordingly, supports 
it with more explicit argument. He claims that the objects of desires (i.e., 
what's desired) are states of affairs that are specified by propositions such as, 
in the case of a desire for a hat, “that I have a hat, or that it should be the 
case that I do” (p.336). These propositions are presented in the subjunctive 
mood, not the assertoric. They are not put forward as things the subject takes 
to be so; rather, these propositions are raised for consideration, or made 
available for reasoning. This indicates that the states of affairs specified by 
these propositions are not taken by the subject to be facts (insofar as they 
are the objects only of desires). Facts are the right sorts of things to be 
asserted, not merely raised; assertion is the indicator of the subject's 
regarding some proposition as specifying a fact. 
 The reader may be concerned for Stampe's argument at this stage, if 
they think that the objects of desires are not states of affairs at all, but that 
they are objects, or that they are actions. That is, that when one has a desire, 
what one wants is some object; or that what one wants is to do something. 
For instance, it might be thought that what one wants when one wants a cup 
of coffee, is not that some state of affairs in which one has the coffee should 
obtain; what one wants is, precisely, the coffee. Alternatively, it could be 
claimed that what one wants, when one wants a cup of coffee, is to drink the 
coffee. Or, perhaps most plausibly, it could be claimed that although some 
desires are as Stampe describes, there is no perfectly uniform specification 
of what the object of a desire must be; perhaps some desires are for objects, 
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some to perform actions, and some that states of affairs obtain. In claiming 
that all desires are desires that states of affairs obtain, Stampe may be trying 
to impose order where there is none to be found. 
 What is at stake here? The current question is whether the normative 
dimension of desire is the same as that of belief; that is, whether desires 
bring reasons into the picture by having as their objects considerations 
which the subject takes to count in favour of acting. Stampe argues not, on 
the basis that what the subject takes to count in favour of an action, they 
must take to be a fact, and the objects of desires are not taken by the subject 
to be facts. Even if some desires take actions or objects as their objects, it 
would seem that the subjects who have those desires do not regard the 
objects of those desires as facts. It is not at all clear what it would mean for 
the subject who desires to do something, or desires such-and-such an object, 
to regard what they want as a fact. If I desire to drink a cup of coffee, then I 
do not regard that action as a fact; if what I want is the coffee itself, then I 
do not regard the coffee as I fact (I might regard it as a fact that there is 
coffee, but what I want is not (the fact) that there is coffee; that could be 
reread as the Stampe-style desire that there be coffee. Either way, it is not a 
desire for the object, the coffee itself). 
 So it would seem that precisely what the objects of desires are is not 
the important question for Stampe, so much as what the objects of desires 
are not; or even, what they are not represented as being, by the desiring 
subject. If it can be shown that the subject who has a desire does not regard 
what they want as a fact, then Stampe's argument will be a good one, even 
if we do not all agree on why it is that the third premise is true. The 
discussion of the last few paragraphs seems to show exactly this: several 
plausible possible answers to the question, what are the objects of desires?, 
have been examined, and it has in each instance been clear that the subject 
who has such a desire does not regard the object of their desire as a fact. 
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 It follows from this (as Stampe argues) that desires do not inherit 
their rational authority from their objects; the normative dimension of 
desire is not that desires have as their objects considerations which the 
subject takes to count in favour of acting. The three other possibilities 
mentioned in 2.1 all share the common assumption that desires do not 
merely enjoy rational authority, but that they are the source of it; 
nevertheless, they disagree about how the normative dimension of desire is 
to be characterised. 
 
3. The Rational Authority of Desire 
 
 If desires do not have authority per objectum, where does their 
authority come from? Two alternatives were mentioned in 2.1: the future 
relief view, which holds that desires are unpleasant sensations which count 
in favour of actions which would relieve them, and the simple satisfaction 
view, which maintains that satisfaction is simply a good thing, so desires 
count in favour of actions which promise to satisfy them. Additionally, there 
is Stephen Schiffer’s view, which Stampe regards as a composite of the future 
relief and simple satisfaction views. 
Stampe rejects the future relief view on the grounds that it does not 
make use of the representational character of desire, and hence cannot 
account for the fact that a subject who has a desire seems to have a reason 
to act so as to satisfy their desire, which different to the reason they have to 
act so as to no longer have the desire. Against the simple satisfaction view, 
Stampe claims that it is implausible to think that there is something 
intrinsically good about satisfying desires, and the view is structured in such 
a way that it cannot appeal to anything else for credibility; so the view is 
faced with explaining the unexplainable. Finally, Stampe claims that 
Schiffer’s account results in an unwarranted proliferation of desires and 
reasons. I argue that Stampe's objection to Schiffer does not give us 
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sufficient reason to reject his account. After considering a further objection 
from Schueler, I abandon Schiffer's account on the basis that it is too 
simplistic to work as a characterisation of rationally authoritative desires. 
   
3.1 The Future Relief View 
 
 Proponents of the future relief view, as set out by Stampe (p.348), 
identify desires with feelings of uneasiness or discomfort, and claim that 
this is what counts in favour of satisfying a desire; “any discomfiture is itself 
a reason to do what will relieve that discomfiture...Therefore, a desire is a 
per se reason to act.” So whenever one has a desire, one has a reason to act 
so as to rid oneself of that desire; and that reason is a fact about that desire 
itself, namely that its continued presence is uncomfortable. On this view, the 
normative dimension of desire is characterised like so: desires introduce 
reasons into action explanations by bringing in facts, facts about those 
desires themselves, which count in favour of acting. These desires have per 
se rational authority, in that what counts in favour of acting is the desire 
itself; or rather, a certain aspect of it: that it is partially constituted by a 
feeling of uneasiness or discomfort. On the future relief view, desires have 
per se rational authority because they feel unpleasant, and unpleasant 
feelings give the subjects who have them some reason to act so as to rid 
themselves of the discomfort. 
  
 
3.2 Stampe’s Objection to the Future Relief View 
 
 Stampe aims to show that even if pleasure and relief were predictably 
and reliably associated with desire satisfaction (and discomfort with 
frustration), these feelings would not be enough to explain the rational 
authority of desire. The future relief view purports to explain that rational 
authority by characterizing the normative dimension of desire by appeal to 
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unpleasant feelings associated with the frustration of desires; on the future 
relief view, desires have rational authority because it makes sense to relieve 
uncomfortable feelings, and it is uncomfortable to have unsatisfied desires. 
This is a reductive explanation; the authority of desire is subsumed under 
the authority of discomfort. Desires have rational authority because 
uncomfortable feelings do, and unsatisfied desires are uncomfortable 
feelings. Even if they are uncomfortable feelings, desires are not just any 
uncomfortable feelings; and the authority of desire differs from that of mere 
discomfort in at least one significant way. 
Suppose that every desire which has rational authority has it because 
the desire is unpleasant to endure unsatisfied, and unpleasant feelings count 
in favour of acting so as to make them stop; one way to end the 
unpleasantness of an unsatisfied desire is, of course, to satisfy it. So it is 
natural to think that every desire which has rational authority would, then, 
count in favour of acting towards its own satisfaction. Indeed they would, 
but only because unpleasant feelings count in favour of a broader class of 
actions which includes satisfying one’s desire; plausibly, any unpleasant 
feeling counts in favour of any action which would reduce or relieve it. 
Having an unsatisfied desire is an unpleasant feeling, and one way to be rid 
of the feeling is to satisfy the desire. But it is not the only way; one could 
simply stop desiring, and be done with the discomfort that way. Of course, 
ceasing to desire is never exactly simple, but there are a number of 
commonplace strategies. The subject of an unsatisfied desire could try to 
take their mind off it, and so reduce the discomfort; or overwhelm it with 
other pleasant (or intoxicating) sensations; or try to put the object of desire 
out of sight, and so reduce its hold over them; or, if they are particularly 
strong-willed, resolve to stop desiring the unobtainable; or take even more 
drastic action to rid themselves of the desire, such as seeking psychiatric 
help. 
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Insofar as unsatisfied desires are unpleasant feelings, it makes sense 
for a subject with an unsatisfied desire to act either so as to satisfy the desire 
or so as to cease to have it. That is, the discomfort of a frustrated desire is a 
reason for the subject to act so as to relieve the discomfort; this can be 
achieved either by satisfying the desire or by eradicating it. Ordinary 
discomfort itself does not count in favour of one type of action or the other, 
but rather it counts in favour of its own relief; the disjunction of the two 
options. Stampe objects that desires are not quite like this (p.350); although 
a subject with an unsatisfied desire may have reason to get rid of the desire 
in some unsatisfying way, they also have a reason to satisfy the desire. 
Discomfort gives the subject a reason to do away with the unpleasant 
feeling by any means. If unsatisfied desires are uncomfortable feelings, then 
the discomfort of an unsatisfied desire gives the subject a reason to act so as 
to do away with the feeling by any means necessary. One way to get rid of 
the feeling is to satisfy the desire; so an unsatisfied desire counts in favour 
of its own satisfaction, but only because satisfying the desire is a means to 
relieve the discomfort. Satisfying the desire is in no way privileged above 
the other means of getting rid of it. Stampe objects that we take it to be true 
of desires that having a desire gives the subject a reason to satisfy it, even if 
it also gives them a reason to get rid of the uncomfortable sensation in some 
other way, too. 
For example, imagine a subject afflicted by a strong and recurrent 
desire for chocolate; this subject has, first and foremost, a reason to eat 
chocolate, whenever the feeling takes them. But chocolate, sadly, is not the 
healthiest of foods to gorge oneself on, so it might be that the subject has 
other reasons not to eat piles and piles of it whenever they feel like it. If so, 
then it seems plausible that their desire to eat chocolate (the unpleasant 
sensation that periodically accompanies the absence of chocolate in this 
subject’s life) gives them a reason to take action so as to relieve the 
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discomfort, without eating more chocolate (i.e., without satisfying the 
desire); perhaps by eating something else instead. 
Stampe says nothing explicit about why one should think that a 
desire is a reason to act so as to satisfy the desire (even when it is also a 
reason to act so as to eradicate the desire), but an adaptation of his example 
(Stampe 1987, p.350) might shed some light on the matter. Suppose, next 
time you are hungry and have the opportunity to eat, that rather than eating, 
you had the option to simply stop being hungry, instead. While it is difficult 
to predict how others might feel about the situation, it seems to me that the 
option to stop being hungry without eating is not at all attractive. Being 
hungry, insofar as hunger is a desire, counts in favour of eating; only under 
special circumstances does it count in favour of not being hungry any more, 
and even then, it does so not as a desire, but merely as a discomfort. The 
prospect of merely ceasing to be hungry, without eating, sounds 
unsatisfying. 
We can extend the argument into the chocolate example. Suppose 
the subject decides that, all in all, it would be better if they did not eat 
mountains of chocolate, and better still if they could be rid of the irritating 
desire for it (perhaps because the discomfort of the desire is liable to lead 
them to break their resolution, or perhaps just because it is unpleasant to 
put up with). If they follow this line, they are treating their desire for 
chocolate not as a desire to be satisfied, but as a mere discomfort, to be 
eliminated as swiftly and effectively as possible. Regarding the desire in this 
light evokes the ordinary use of the word “craving”. A craving exhibits most 
of the hallmarks of desire, but the subject regards it as a hindrance, a burden, 
an unwelcome intruder17 . Typically, a craving does not cohere with the 
subject’s other desires and beliefs, and is not a part of how the subject sees 
                                                          
17 The literature on unwanted or alienated desires is extensive and important, and 
I do not wish to delve into it here What I say about desires and cravings in this 
paragraph, therefore, is mostly stipulation rather than argument. 
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themselves. Depending on the object craved, craving can be a disturbing, 
undermining experience; we employ complex strategies to resist and 
ultimately rid ourselves of them. Cravings, as such, are to be eradicated; they 
differ from desires with respect to their rational authority in that desires, as 
such, are to be satisfied. Occasionally, desires must be eradicated, too; but 
those are minority cases, and do not reflect the nature of desire, and the 
connection between desires and reasons. Desires are “properly” reasons to 
act so as to satisfy them, and only “deviantly” or “improperly” reasons to act 
so as to eliminate them. 
Hopefully, the above examples have made clear that satisfying a 
desire is not the same as merely ceasing to have it any more. The future 
relief view is insensitive to that difference, since it aims to explain the 
rational authority of desire in terms of the rational authority of discomfort, 
and discomforts cannot be satisfied, only relieved. Thus, the future relief 
view fails to capture the rational authority of desire; desires do not make 
sense of actions in virtue of being uncomfortable to endure unsatisfied. This 
raises two questions: first, what role does satisfiability play in explaining the 
rational authority of desire? We have seen that there is a difference between 
the authority of desire and that of discomfort, in that desires can be satisfied, 
but that leaves open the question of how satisfiability is supposed to explain 
the authority of desire; what exactly would it mean to say that satisfiability 
is the normative dimension of desire, i.e., that it is the feature of desire which 
brings normative reasons into the picture? Secondly, one might want to ask 
what features of desires explain their satisfiability, or what features of 
particular desires explain their satisfaction conditions. These issues are 
important for Stampe's view, so answers to these questions will be discussed 
in chapter 6. 
 
3.3 The Simple Satisfaction View 
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The third possible account of the normative dimension of desire 
(after the per objectum account and the future relief view) holds that there 
is something intrinsically good about the satisfaction of desires. On the 
plausible assumption that, all other things being equal, there are reasons for 
subjects to act so as to promote good things, it follows that if a subject has a 
desire, then they have a reason to act so as to satisfy it. That is how, according 
to the simple satisfaction view, desires bring normative reasons into the 
explanation of action. 
One might ask whether, according to the simple satisfaction account, 
what counts in favour of performing a particular action is the desire that the 
action promises to satisfy, or a property of the action itself, namely, that it 
promises to satisfy the desire. For example, if Bert’s desire to own the 
Alphacycle works as the simple satisfaction account says it does, then what 
exactly counts in favour of Bert’s buying the bicycle: is it his desire to do so 
(which the action promises to satisfy), or is it something about the action 
(that it promises to satisfy his desire)? In so far as the simple satisfaction 
account is intended to show how desires come to be features of practical 
reasoning, it seems likely that the first reading must be the one to adopt; if 
what counts in favour of the action is a property of the action itself, even one 
it has in virtue of its relation to a desire, then it is less than obvious that the 
desire itself would have to appear in the subject’s practical reasoning. 
Stampe dismisses the simple satisfaction account in very short order. 
He objects that, in making the ultimate source of desire's rational authority 
(i.e., what counts in favour of acting so as to satisfy one's desires) an intrinsic 
property of the desire itself, the simple satisfaction view makes it mysterious 
what this goodness could amount to. By locating what counts in favour of 
satisfying one's desires in the satisfaction of those desires (as an intrinsic 
property), the simple satisfaction view leaves itself unable to answer the 
question, what is good about satisfying one's desires? According to the 
satisfaction view, desire satisfaction isn't good because it promises relief or 
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pleasure, or because the objects of desire are good things to have or bring 
about; desire satisfaction is just good, in and of itself. Compare this to a very 
basic anti-Humean challenge: just because you want to do something 
doesn't mean you ought to do it. The simple satisfaction view has no way to 
respond. 
Stampe seems right to claim that the simple satisfaction view is 
hobbled by its inability to explain why there are reasons to satisfy one's 
desires, but it should also be noted that there is a tension between the need 
to provide some sort of explanation, and the threat of “explaining away” the 
rational authority of desire, by locating its source in something outside of 
desire. For example, Stampe rejects the per objectum view on the grounds 
that the objects of desires are of the wrong sort to count in favour of 
anything; there is a pragmatic value to this rejection, since if it were claimed 
that the normative dimension of desire is its object, that desires introduce 
reasons into action explanation because the objects of desire count in favour 
of action, then it may well be possible to give proper explanations of 
intentional action in terms of those objects, without referring to desires at 
all. The need to give an explanatory characterisation of the normative 
dimension of desire without locating reasons outside of desires, causes 
problems for Stampe's view, discussed in section 5. First, however, comes a 
view which makes use of elements of the simple satisfaction and future 
relief views. 
 
 
3.4 Schiffer’s Reason-Providing Desires 
 
 Schiffer's view combines what I have called the simple satisfaction 
view with the basic motivations behind the future relief view. Schiffer claims 
that not all of the phenomena we might group together under the heading 
“desire” actually have a normative dimension. Those which do, called 
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“reason-providing desires”, operate according to the simple satisfaction 
account; but in answer to that difficult question, what is good about 
satisfying desires?, Schiffer points to the connection between desire and 
pleasant or unpleasant sensory states. According to Schiffer, what counts in 
favour of performing a particular action is the desire which it promises to 
satisfy; and it does so because satisfying a desire tends to produce pleasure 
or reduce discomfort. So practical reasons, on Schiffer’s view, have a layered 
structure; as well as the action supported by the reason, there is the reason 
itself, which is always a desire, and some further facts which explain why the 
desire counts in favour of the action. 
 
3.5 Schueler’s Objection to Schiffer 
 
Schiffer writes that a reason-providing desire “is a...desire for its own 
gratification; [a desire] to phi is a desire to phi to relieve the discomfort of 
that desire, a desire to phi for the pleasure of its own relief”. Schueler objects 
that this “at best describes only the clearest or most dramatic cases” (p.87) 
of the relevant sort of desires, since a great many of these desires (including 
some of Schiffer's own examples) will, according to Schueler, lack the 
relevant phenomenology. In fact, Schueler thinks some desires which 
Schiffer would want to claim provide reasons for the subjects who have 
them, indeed even some of the desires which Schiffer puts forward as 
examples of this type, lack any phenomenological presence at all. Schueler 
contends that “[i]t doesn't seem plausible, for instance, to hold that a craving 
throughout dinner to have chocolate mousse for dessert need actually be 
uncomfortable” and that “[f]or most people, the mild thirst they experience 
at least a few times every day, of the sort that leads them to the water cooler 
or soft drink machine, has practically no phenomenological character at all, 
certainly nothing that could be called "discomfort."” (p.87-8) Even if it should 
turn out that extremes of hunger and thirst do provide reasons for those 
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subject to them, Schueler argues, the problem would still remain that 
Schiffer’s account only correctly characterises a small minority of desires, 
and is only applicable in a small range of quite unusual cases. 
Schueler takes Schiffer to be in broad agreement with him on this 
point, and to favour a conception of reason-providing desires on which such 
desires are not necessarily uncomfortable to endure unsatisfied. That is, 
Schueler takes Schiffer’s view to diverge from the future relief view, in that 
Schiffer does not take the unpleasant sensations we associate with some 
unsatisfied desires to be essential properties of those desires (whereas the 
future relief view goes even further, and identifies the desires with the 
feelings). But, Schueler continues, if this is the case, then it is hard to see the 
difference between the reason’s being provided by a reason-providing desire, 
and its being provided by a future pleasure. In the former case, what counts 
in favour of the subject performing a particular action is their desire which 
that action promises to satisfy – which may result in pleasure or relief. In 
the latter case, what counts in favour of the subject performing a particular 
action is the future pleasure or relief that might be gained from performing 
that action, since it promises to satisfy a desire of the subject’s. If it’s the 
former, then there seems to be a good case for thinking that the desire would 
appear in the subject’s practical reasoning, since it is what counts in favour 
of action. In the latter case, it seems unlikely that the desire need appear in 
the subject’s reasoning, since it is only playing a facilitating role; at best, the 
desire is part of the explanation of why the subject has the reasons they have. 
Schueler proposes a solution, which is to claim that the satisfaction 
of a reason-providing desire is itself pleasurable, hence satisfying a reason-
providing desire is “automatically pleasurable”. What counts in favour of 
action is the pleasure of the satisfaction of the reason-providing desire; so a 
reason-providing desire counts in favour of acting so as to satisfy it. At least, 
it would, says Schueler, if we were to accept the further claim that there is a 
“good reason” to do whatever it would be pleasurable to do. He finds this 
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implausible, and so rejects even this modified theory (having already 
rejected Schiffer’s own account on the basis that it is phenomenologically 
inaccurate). 
 
3.6 Response to Schueler’s Phenomenological Implausibility Objection 
 
That there is a connection between desire and pleasure and 
discomfort seems undeniable, elusive as it may be to pin down. It seems 
highly plausible that a Humean proper explanation of intentional action 
will have something to say about this connection, and the role of these 
sensations in practical reasoning (as we have seen in the future relief view 
and Schiffer’s account). Or at any rate, if a complete explanation of action, 
including both practical reasoning and motivation, can be had along 
Humean lines, then the relationship between desire and sensation will be 
an important part of it. This is one reason to be interested in Schueler’s 
objection, and how Schiffer’s view might be defended. Another is that 
Schueler’s objection seems very similar to the blunt anti-Humean challenge 
discussed earlier (“just because you want to, that doesn’t mean you have a 
reason to”), so whatever can be said in Schiffer’s defence here might be more 
broadly applicable. A third reason is that some of Stampe’s claims about 
which desires have rational authority and which do not, according to his 
preferred account, is vulnerable to an analogue of Schueler’s 
phenomenological inaccuracy objection; so the form of the response in 
defence of Schiffer may well be applicable there, too. 
Schueler aims to show that Schiffer’s view does not account for the 
supposed rational authority of desire, since there are plenty of examples of 
desires which seem well-placed to explain intentional actions properly, but 
which do not have the connection to discomfort or pleasure that explains 
the rational authority of Schiffer’s reason-providing desires. Since Schiffer 
provides some explanation of why it is that reason-providing desires have 
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rational authority while Schueler does not, it is open to a proponent of 
Schiffer’s view simply to deny that the desires Schueler refers to actually 
have any rational authority (if indeed they lack any connection to pleasure 
or discomfort). The intuitive plausibility of Schueler’s counterexamples can 
be easily explained by the proponent of Schiffer’s view. Contrary to 
Schueler’s claims, they will argue, most desires actually are either 
uncomfortable to endure unfulfilled, or pleasurable to satisfy, or both. While 
it may be true that there are such things as desires which lack any 
connection to discomfort, it is a mistake to think that they could have any 
rational authority. 
The connection between desire and pleasure seems one of the most 
obvious, most distinctive features of desire, yet there is no consensus about 
the nature of that connection. For instance, it seems common sense that 
satisfying a desire produces pleasure in the subject; if getting what we want 
is not enjoyable, then what is? This might lead one to think that producing 
pleasure when satisfied is one of the defining properties of desire. But one 
must ask, how general is the proposed connection between desire and 
pleasure? Do desires always produce pleasure when satisfied? Do they do so 
necessarily? Do they do so typically? Are they abnormal when they do not? 
etc., etc. There are equally familiar examples of cases where the subject, 
perhaps after great effort and exertion, finally satisfies their desire – and 
experiences no pleasure. Or where we might be inclined to describe a subject 
as doing something they desire to do (especially if we think that desires are 
necessary for intentional action) but which it would be strange or simply 
false to say they derive pleasure from doing; filling in tax returns, 
commuting to work, tying one's shoelaces, returning an impulse purchase 
under false pretences, etc. 
As we have seen already, theories which rely on the connection 
between desire and sensation (such as Schiffer’s) seem vulnerable to 
objections based on readily-available counter-examples. This is puzzling. On 
114 
 
the one hand, it seems absolutely clear that getting what one wants is 
pleasurable, and being denied it is unpleasant. Yet as soon as a Humean tries 
to lean on this piece of common sense as a premise in an argument, it gives 
way; moreover, in retrospect, it seems completely obvious that it would! 
Whenever a Humean makes a sweeping claim about desires in 
general, it falls to their opponent simply to find a class of counterexamples. 
The Humean claims that desires are uncomfortable to endure unfulfilled; 
Schueler puts forward some everyday cases of desires which need not be 
uncomfortable. The conflict could be resolved in favour of the Humean if a 
way could be found to restrict the scope of their claim, so that it applied not 
to all desires, but to some important subset. The means by which this subset 
is marked out will have to be intuitively plausible, philosophically useful, 
and must not simply beg the question by labelling the relevant features of 
the counter-examples as what sets them outside the set of desires covered 
by the Humean claim. 
This may seem like an ambitious enterprise, but the basics are really 
quite simple. What is required is for parties on both sides of the debate to 
realize that not everything which might for various purposes be lumped 
together under the heading “desire” really belongs there, and that there 
might be further conditions which even genuine desires have to fulfil if they 
are to count in favour of actions (over and above simply being a desire). 
There will, of course, be disagreements about how those boundaries are to 
be marked out, especially between different Humeans; but it seems clear 
that a Humean theory of practical reasoning has to have an account of 
which desires are relevant, and which or not – or rather, which desire-like 
states are genuine desires, and which are not. Failure to distinguish between 
desires, wishes, disowned cravings and passing fancies, say, puts the Humean 
in the same position as a cognitivist who fails to mark the difference 
between rational belief and delusion. 
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Schiffer draws a distinction between those desires which are held 
because there is a reason to hold them and those which are not, and claims 
that only the latter have rational authority. The changes Schueler suggests 
making to Schiffer’s account (i.e., introducing the automatic pleasure 
property) are interesting in that it seems as if Schueler is recommending 
further restricting the range of desires which are classed as reason-
providing to just those where the connection between desire and sensation 
is secure. 
 If anyone were to claim that all remotely desire-like mental states 
have rational authority in virtue of being unpleasant to endure, then their 
view could easily be disproven by counter-example. If Schiffer were to claim 
that all desires and desire-like mental states have rational authority, even 
under a hefty ceteris paribus clause, then his view would be easy to disprove. 
For it seems clear that not every sort of non-cognitive state makes actions 
rational and intelligible, even if we allow every assumption that could 
justifiably be asked for. Not all non-cognitive mental states have any obvious 
connection with intentional action at all; moods might be an example. 
Feeling cheerful does not seem to make sense of actions in the way that 
desires might be thought to; it might make sense of the manner in which 
actions are performed, but that is a different question. Some philosophers18 
argue that there are non-cognitive states which are involved in mental 
actions like judging or coming to believe; but it would seem odd to say that 
these states, which play a largely technical, philosophical role, make sense 
of actions. Finally, there may be disagreement over how they are best 
described, but it seems likely that some urges or cravings will fall into this 
category, too, if the actions the subject is urged to perform do not seem good 
to them, even insofar as they have those urges. Some manifestations of 
                                                          
18 See for example (Velleman 2000) and (Bilgrami 2006). 
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obsessive compulsive disorder seem to fit the bill; some subjects are driven 
to perform repetitive actions that they see as senseless and detrimental19. 
 So clearly it would be wrong to interpret Schiffer as claiming that 
anything that looks at all like a desire, from a philosophical standpoint, 
promises pleasure or is unpleasant to endure, and has rational authority; 
since it is obvious that not everything which looks like a desire really is 
unpleasant, and that not every desire-like state has any rational authority. 
But Schueler begins by objecting that not all desire-like states are 
unpleasant or have rational authority. Schueler goes further, and claims that 
even those desires which look like they must have rational authority if any 
do, are not necessarily unpleasant; Schiffer and proponents of the future 
relief view need only deal with this second set of desires. 
Schiffer’s view, if it is taken to mean that all likely candidates are 
reason-providing desires, must be false. The theory should be taken to 
account for those desires which we might naturally think make sense of 
actions, since it is the alleged rational authority of those desires that stands 
in need of explanation. So all Schiffer needs to show, is that the majority of 
the desires that (seem to) have rational authority either promise pleasure or 
are unpleasant to endure unsatisfied. He is under no obligation to show that 
all desires have rational authority, or that all desires are unpleasant; or even 
that every desire which we might think has rational authority really has any. 
To the extent that the theory does not cohere with our common sense 
intuitions, then we can demand that the proponent of Schiffer’s view explain 
why some desire which we think makes sense of our actions in fact does not. 
And this explanation will have to go further than simply pointing to the fact 
                                                          
19 Some sufferers of obsessive compulsive disorders feel anxiety if they try to resist the 
compulsion, and perform the compelled actions precisely for the reason that it will 
relieve their anxiety; others develop delusive beliefs to the effect that performing the 
compelled actions is a means of preventing some catastrophe. I have in mind the 
subjects who perform the actions because they are compelled to do so, who may 
experience anxiety if they resist, but do not take relief from anxiety to be a reason to 
perform the actions. 
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that the desire is not unpleasant to endure, since that is part of what is at 
issue; they would also have to explain the appearance of rational authority, 
presumably by finding some pleasure or unpleasantness somewhere in the 
situation. 
 To summarise: not everything which looks like it might have rational 
authority really does; so Schiffer should not be read as claiming that 
anything which looks at all like a desire with rational authority is a reason-
providing desire. If Schiffer’s account is correct, then it may well be that 
some mental states which we ordinarily think make sense of actions in fact 
do not. But if there are good reasons for thinking that Schiffer’s account is 
correct, then the fact that it throws up some surprising results should not be 
regarded as sufficient reason to reject it. A counter-example must feature a 
desire which clearly, non-controversially, has rational authority. Similarly, 
Schiffer should not be read as claiming that any mental state which looks at 
all like a desire must promise pleasure or be unpleasant to endure. There 
might, after all, be mental states which share very much in common with 
desires, but which differ in that they do not have the same (or perhaps any) 
phenomenal presence; and it could well be that they lack rational authority 
precisely in virtue of not having the phenomenal presence of a real desire. 
Once again, surprises are not counter-examples; a genuine counter-example 
to Schiffer’s account must be a clear case of a desire which makes sense of 
action and lacks the relevant phenomenal presence. At most, his view should 
account for the rational authority of all those desires which have strong 
claims to rational authority, by showing that they are unpleasant to endure 
or pleasant to satisfy; or else Schiffer must have a good explanation of why 
such a mental state does not really have the authority it seems to. 
With all this in place, let's look at Schueler's phenomenological 
implausibility objection again; Schueler claims that it is not at all obvious 
that if, whilst eating their main course, the subject entertains the desire to 
have chocolate mousse for dessert, this desire must feel uncomfortable to 
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the subject. This is supposed to constitute a counter-example to Schiffer’s 
view since the subject’s desire is one which appears to have some rational 
authority, but which is neither uncomfortable no pleasurable; so it shows 
that Schiffer’s account of the rational authority of desire is wrong. Faced with 
an alleged counter-example, the best response available to the proponent of 
Schiffer’s view is to lean on the plausibility and explanatory power of their 
account against the counter-intuitive strangeness of the example. 
Schueler claims that many desires have “practically no” 
phenomenological presence. “Practically no” is not, of course, the same as 
“none at all”; but if mild desires are supposed to count against Schiffer’s 
claim that the rational authority of desire is to be found in sensations of 
discomfort or pleasure, then mild desires must be insufficiently 
uncomfortable or enjoyable to count in favour of action. Supposing that all 
relevant discomforts can be placed on a single scale, how intensely 
uncomfortable must a desire be before it counts in favour of acting to satisfy 
it? 
It seems plausible that any discomfort at all will count in favour of 
action, to some extent; it is in the nature of discomfort that its subject has a 
reason not to be subject to it. Schueler’s “practically no” must, therefore, be 
read as meaning that mild desires have absolutely no relevant 
phenomenological presence; they are not at all uncomfortable or 
pleasurable. If they were even slightly, then to that extent they would count 
in favour of action. Now, there are two particularly strange aspects to mild 
desires; the first is the idea that we should call something a desire when it 
lacks any trace of the distinctive phenomenal presence associated with 
desires. The second is that we should think that such a mental state counts 
in favour of action, even if it is a desire (this is important because, for mild 
desires to constitute counter-examples to Schiffer, it has to be at least prima 
facie plausible that they are to be thought of as reason-providing desires). 
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The two desires which Schueler puts forward as counter-examples to 
Schiffer’s view are mild thirst, and the desire for a chocolate mousse that 
one might experience during dinner. With regard to the former, it seems 
wholly implausible to me to claim that even mild thirst could have no 
phenomenal presence; on the contrary, it seems that what sets thirst apart 
from mere dehydration is that being thirsty involves a particular kind of 
discomfort. Dehydration is simply the absence of water; a sponge can be 
dehydrated, but it cannot be thirsty. In fact, one can imagine the sensation 
without the biological need to drink; that would seem to constitute an 
instance of thirst. If thirst does, in fact, have an important connection to 
discomfort, then what Schueler refers to as “mild thirst” is not thirst at all, 
since it lacks any phenomenal presence. If it is not thirst, then there seems 
no reason to think it must be a desire at all; in fact, it is not at all clear what 
it would be, beyond the disposition to drink. 
So much for the first example. The second, the desire for chocolate 
mousse, is trickier. I take it that there is no distinctive sensation involved 
with the desire for chocolate mousse; there is nothing in particular that it 
feels like to want a chocolate mousse. It seems only fair to assume, therefore, 
that Schueler’s craving for dessert is in fact a desire; but it remains to be 
seen whether or not it has any rational authority. On the one hand, it seems 
like the sort of desire which should; wanting a mousse for dessert seems to 
make sense of certain intentional actions, like ordering one from the menu. 
Then again, the last three chapters are littered with examples of desires 
which initially appear to have rational authority and turn out not to have, 
and with reasons for thinking that desires do not explain intentional actions 
properly. Schueler’s claim that a desire for dessert explains ordering one 
should not be simply accepted without question. If this desire has no 
phenomenal presence, then why would it have rational authority? Schueler 
understandably offers no explanation. If Schiffer is wrong about the 
normative dimensions of desire, then it is quite possible that Schueler’s 
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desire is rationally authoritative, since it has some other normative feature. 
Since Schueler’s example offers no indication of what this feature might be 
(not that it ought to), all the example shows is that Schiffer could be wrong, 
not that he is. 
It appears that in constructing these counter-examples, Schueler 
brings together the two issues that Schiffer’s account is intended to separate. 
It is conceivable that there could be desires, or at least desire-like states, with 
no phenomenal presence at all; and there are desires which have the 
authority to explain intentional actions. Schueler’s counterexamples feature 
desires which fall into both categories; they are phenomenally barren and 
rationally authoritative. This is a conceptual possibility, but a proponent of 
Schiffer’s view would argue that no existing desire falls into both categories, 
since the phenomenal presence of a desire explains its rational authority. 
Schueler offers no reason for thinking otherwise so the example, although 
thought-provoking, cuts no ice with regard to Schiffer’s view. 
 
 
 
 
3.6 Stampe’s Proliferation Objection to Schiffer 
 
 Stampe objects that Schiffer’s view gives rise to an unwarranted 
proliferation of desires. Given that reason-providing and reason-following 
desires are of different natural kinds, no desire can be both reason-providing 
and reason-following. A reason-following desire is held because there is a 
reason to hold it; so, Stampe argues, Schiffer makes whether or not a desire 
is held for a reason one of the individuation conditions for desires. This gives 
rise to the counter-intuitive consequence that, since reason-providing and 
reason-following desires can share the same objects, it is possible for a 
subject to have two different desires for the same object, simultaneously: 
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It is a danger of indulging in the distinction between two kinds 
of desires, that-since no single thing can be of two contrary 
natural kinds it enforces a criterion of individuation on desires, 
and the results, I think, are quite unnatural. One would not have 
thought that the identity of a mental state, for example, a belief, 
should turn on the matter of whether one does or does not have 
reason to hold it; it would seem that one could come to have a 
reason to hold it, or come to have no reason to hold it, and the 
belief would be the same. Should it be otherwise with desires? 
     (Stampe 1987, p.352, n16) 
 
 Schiffer does not regard this as a problem, stating that the desires will 
have different causes and different durations, so there are ways to tell them 
apart. There is no clear reason why reason-providing and reason-following 
desires with the same object should have different durations, however; it just 
happens that in Schiffer’s example, they do. Moreover, it is not obvious that 
a reason-providing and reason-following desire could not share a cause as 
well as an object. Stampe regards “reason-following” and “reason-providing” 
as natural kind terms, such that no desire is both reason-providing and 
reason-following. That is, Stampe treats the matter as if no desire is held for 
a reason and provides reasons for action. This is not Schiffer’s view, since he 
argues that “r-p-desires also provide the reasons, the justifications, for 
themselves” (Schiffer 1978, p.198); so every desire which is either reason-
providing or reason-following is held for a reason, it’s just that reason-
providing desires provide the reasons for which they are held, whereas 
reason-following desires do not. Schiffer uses the distinction between 
reason-providing and reason-following desires to provide a Humean 
explanation of certain cases of weakness of will, where the subject acts on a 
desire that they do not want to have. The desire which explains the action is 
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reason-providing, but the subject does not take there to be any further 
reason to act that way, so lacks a reason-following desire to do so. Cases of 
weakness of the will, though commonplace, are not normal cases of 
intentional action. Subjects are not usually alienated from the desires they 
act upon. A reason-providing desire provides a reason to hold that desire; in 
the usual case, the subject could have a reason-following desire which 
follows that very reason. In that case, the subject would have two desires 
with the same cause and the same object, and potentially the same duration. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
 Four characterisations of the normative dimension of desire have 
been considered and rejected. The per objectum view said that mental states 
enjoy rational authority through having reasons (sources of rational 
authority) as their objects. This view failed outright on the grounds that the 
object of a desire cannot be the reason for which the subject acts, since the 
objects of desires are not taken by their subject to be facts. From the per 
objectum view, we learned that desires must be the sources of rational 
authority. 
This left the three alternatives which take desires to be per se  reasons 
for action, hence sources of rational authority. The future relief view, which 
identified desires with normatively-relevant sensations like pleasure and 
discomfort, failed since it could not distinguish between the rational 
authority of desire and that of discomfort. It was unable to do so because it 
did not take into account the representational character of desire; it 
conceived of desires as simply afflicting the subject with a certain kind of 
feeling which the subject ought to either prolong or intensify, or to relieve. 
Desires, however, are for things in a way that discomforts are not; so the 
future relief view could not explain why there seems to be a reason for a 
subject with a desire to act so as to satisfy that desire, rather than just to be 
123 
 
rid of it. From the future relief view, we learned that the normative 
dimension of desire, the explanation of its rational authority, must appeal to 
the representational content of desire. 
The simple satisfaction view, claiming that there is something 
intrinsically good about the satisfaction of one’s desires, could show that 
there is such a reason, but could not properly explain why this should be so, 
since it held the goodness of  desire satisfaction to be primitive and 
unexplainable. From the simple satisfaction view we learned that if it is to 
be at all plausible that desires really are sources of rational authority, then 
it has to be possible to offer some explanation of that fact (and without 
locating the source of rational authority outside of the desire itself). 
 Lastly, Schiffer's view, which combines the simple satisfaction and 
future relief views, is the most plausible on offer so far. It has problems of 
its own, in that it allows for the counter-intuitive possibility that a subject 
could simultaneously have two desires to perform the same action. Those 
desires would not share exactly the same properties, since one would be 
reason-following while the other would be reason-providing; so this alone is 
not sufficient reason to reject the view. 
Schiffer leaves at least one very important question unanswered: he 
has nothing to say about the generation of reason-providing desires. This is 
a significant omission. I have suggested that the root of anti-Humean 
scepticism about the possibility of desires explaining intentional actions is 
to be found in the characterisation of desires as fickle and transient. 
Although no Humean view of the role of desire in practical reasoning 
should be taken to apply to every desire-like state, it is undeniable that there 
is a large group of mental states which are capricious and unpredictable. 
The anti-Humeans have been overly impressed by these uncooperative 
mental states and taken them to be representative of the nature of genuine 
desire. This is a mistake, but one which the onus is on the Humeans to 
correct; the Humeans have to find a convincing, interesting way to separate 
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those mental states which are  genuine desires and do have the authority to 
explain intentional actions, from those which are merely like desires in 
some respects and unlike them in important others. Schiffer’s account 
promises to do this, but since he says nothing about how or why a subject 
has the reason-providing desires they do,  he gives us no reason to think that 
reason-providing desires will be any less capricious than whims and urges. 
This omission presents us with a compelling reason to augment 
Schiffer’s view; there is a more general problem with the account, however, 
which presents us with a good reason to reject Schiffer’s characterization of 
rationally authoritative desires. Schiffer claims that a reason-providing 
desire provides its subject with a reason to act so as to satisfy it “for the 
pleasure of” so acting; what makes it the case that there is a reason to act as 
one desires to, is that it is pleasurable to do so. Combined with the core 
Humean claim that every intentional action is properly explained by a 
desire, this entails that every reason which a subject can act on is ultimately 
provided by pleasure; the pleasure of satisfying a reason-providing desire. 
Even assuming that pleasure always gives the subject some reason to act so 
as to attain or prolong it, it is implausible to claim that every possible reason 
to act is grounded in pleasure.  That would be a far stronger and stranger 
claim than the one which motivates the deep self-absorption problem; that 
problem is driven by the claim that if every sound practical argument 
features a desire, then there is a danger that whenever a subject reasons or 
acts, they are concerned with their own desires. The claim at issue here is 
that only pleasure (or discomfort) counts in favour of acting; so regardless 
of the perspectives or concerns of reasoning subjects, their actions are only 
supported by reasons when they act for the sake of pleasure. 
Assuming it is not the case that there is no reason to act except for 
the sake of pleasure (or relief from discomfort), Schiffer’s reason-providing 
desires cannot be the basis for a Humean theory of practical reasoning. The 
Humean theory requires an account of desires which does not make use of 
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something so narrow as pleasure to explain their rational authority. If the 
Humean theory is to be plausible, the normative feature of desire has to be 
flexible enough to account for all possible motivations. A subject who acts 
on one of Schiffer’s reason-providing desires to help a friend, for example, 
acts to help their friend for the pleasure there is to be gained by doing so. 
The Humean theory must allow that there are subjects who help their 
friends for the sake of their well-being, or because they are friends, or 
because it seems like a good thing to do. Schiffer’s claim that the normative 
dimension of authoritative desire is its connection to pleasure or discomfort 
is far too narrow. It does not seem as if every intentional action is performed 
for the sake of the pleasure of doing so; quite the opposite. It appears likely 
that the same difficulty would arise for any single property one could 
choose; it would be false to claim that intentional actions are only 
performed for the sake of happiness, for example. I suggest, therefore, that 
Humeans ought to claim that the authority of desire is not always explained 
by the very same feature. If every intentional action is properly explained 
by a desire, and if it is possible to reason correctly, then there can be no 
single property such as pleasure which accounts for the rational authority 
of every possible desire. 
Furthermore, there is another aspect to the stability or instability of 
desires which Schiffer's account wholly overlooks. Not only are some desire-
like states frustrating in that they arrive and disappear unexpectedly, but 
they can also be frustrating in that they fail to cohere with the subject's other 
desires and judgements of value. Schiffer's account, which connects 
authoritative desires only with pleasure, gives us no reason to expect that 
desires should line up with the subject's overall evaluative stance, and 
recognises no difference between those which do and those which do not. 
What is required, then, is not an account of a connection between desire and 
any particular feature, such as pleasure; but rather, an account of the 
mechanism or system by which desires can be connected to a whole range 
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of different features and states both subjective and objective. If there is such 
a system, then desire is a remarkable mental state. It seems reasonable to 
suppose that the truly unique features of authoritative desires, which they 
do not share even with desire-like states such as cravings and urges, may 
give us some clue as to the nature and workings of this system of 
connections. In the next chapter, I will try to isolate exactly what it is that 
makes some mental state a desire rather than a mere urge; then in chapter 
6, I will set out a proposal for how this system of connections might explain 
the rational authority of desire. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
The Evaluative View 
 
 
This chapter examines the special representational properties of 
desires, how they set desires apart from other mental states, and 
the role they play in accounting for the rational authority of 
desire. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 How could wanting to do something be a reason to do it? Part of the 
motivation for resisting the Humean claim that desires are the basis for 
practical reasoning, is that merely “wanting” seems so fickle and arbitrary. 
It is quite common to want what one judges one should not have, all things 
considered; or even to want things that, in many ways, do not seem 
beneficial or even pleasant. Sometimes, one’s beginning to want something 
does not seem to be prompted by any change in the object or the situation; 
and equally, desires often simply dissipate, for no clear reason, and without 
ever being satisfied. Reflecting on these aspects of desire is enough to make 
one suspect that desires may lack any proper connections to their objects, or 
to the rest of the subject’s mental life. It may seems as if desires are merely 
mental images that crop up from time to time, but which are not 
normatively significant. 
 If desires are to be thought of as having the authority to explain 
intentional actions in the right way, then it cannot be the case that a subject 
who has a desire can remain wholly ambivalent about whether there is a 
reason for them to act on it. Having a desire must commit a subject to a 
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view of what reasons there are for acting; in particular, it must commit the 
subject to taking there to be reasons to act in a way that we can understand 
as being promoted by the desire. This does not mean that desires must count 
in favour of action; quite the opposite. If desires were reasons to act, having 
a desire would not commit the subject to a view of what reasons there were, 
any more so than the existence of any other reason to act. If desires were 
reasons to act, then a subject would be free to overlook or misevaluate their 
own desires, just as much as any other consideration. If, on the other hand, 
desiring commits the subject to a certain view of what reasons there are to 
act, it must be because desiring is an attitude towards what reasons there are 
to act. That is, desires must be evaluative attitudes, not reasons for action. 
 It has to be asked whether the characterization of desire as a type of 
“mental image” is true to actual experiences of desiring, or whether it is a 
philosophical fiction (perhaps arising from taking scepticism about the role 
of desire too seriously). If we are to ask questions like “what is the role of 
desire in practical reasoning?”, then the answers we give had better do 
justice to the subject’s own experiences of desiring and reasoning, and how 
they interpret them (to the extent that the “common sense account” of 
desiring and reasoning is a distinct, coherent idea). If we put forward 
philosophical conceptions of desire that are unlike anything anyone takes 
themselves to experience when they experience desire, then the account of 
practical reasoning that makes use of that conception will not be an account 
of human practical reasoning; it will be an account of the practical 
reasoning of whatever imaginary creatures have those sorts of quasi-desires. 
With that in mind, it has to be asked whether the mental images 
characterization of desire, much as there seem to be prima facie theoretical 
reasons to endorse it, is true to the common sense account of desiring. Even 
if it is not, this is not to suggest that there are no mental phenomena like 
those the mental images calls desires; rather that reflection on one’s own 
129 
 
experiences reveals that these mental images are not desires, and that 
desires are at least as familiar as these images. 
 In this chapter, I will pursue the possibility that the mental images 
view of desire is mistaken; desires, unlike mere mental images, necessarily 
represent their objects as good, in a distinctive representational mode. To 
desire to perform a particular action, for example, is for that action to strike 
you as one which it would be good to perform. One’s performing the action 
would be properly explained by this mental representation, in virtue of its 
contents. For example, there is a world of difference between the mere 
thought that it would be nice if one’s football team won their next game, 
and wanting them to; fans want their teams to win. 
Clearly, much more needs to be said about this view before it can be 
evaluated. We would need to have a proper, theoretical understanding of the 
proposed representational content of these desires (see section 3); and to 
know how they come to be authoritative in virtue of their representational 
contents (section 4). Moreover, it might be thought that appealing to the 
representational contents of desires in order to explain their rational 
authority would be dangerously close to giving a per objectum account of 
the rational authority of desire (section 5); and there are a number of 
obstacles to appealing to anything like the phenomenal properties of desire 
(section 6). First, however, there is a more pressing question: it might be 
thought that if desires are evaluative attitudes, then what explains the 
subject’s intentional actions will be their taking themselves to have a reason 
to act, not the desire itself. That is, if desiring somehow involves an 
evaluation of some considerations, then it will be the evaluation that 
explains how the subject acts; there may be no need to ask how or why the 
subject comes to make that evaluation, and so the desire may drop out of 
the explanation entirely. 
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2. Scanlonian Desires 
 
 There is a good case for thinking that the best move still available to 
a Humean theorist, having rejected the self-ascriptive view, the strict 
backgrounding view, and Schiffer’s view, is to claim that desires are not 
themselves reasons, but are a kind of evaluative attitude. That is, to claim 
that having a desire is a way of taking a stand about what reasons there are 
for action. One way to understand this possibility, is to think about desires as 
involving judgements about what reasons there are to act; perhaps a subject 
who desires something  judges that there is a reason to act so as to have what 
they want. The mental state of desiring is typically partly constituted by one 
of the subject’s evaluative judgements, without being a reason itself; either 
a reason for having that attitude, or for acting. Then the subject’s desires 
would be part of the explanation of their action in a broader sense; they 
could take part in purely psychological explanations, and perhaps 
Davidsonian rationalizing explanations. Lacking normative relevance, 
however, they could not be part the explanation of the subject’s intentional 
action in terms of the subject’s reason for acting. 
 This seems to be roughly T. M. Scanlon’s view of desires, and how 
they relate to action. Having argued that a Humean theory of reasons must 
be grounded in a characterization of desires as a distinctive kind of mental 
state, not something so general as a pro-attitude20, Scanlon picks thirst as a 
paradigm case of the sort of desire that could be the basis for a Humean 
theory. He then analyses the experience of being thirsty, and finds it to 
consist of three elements: 
                                                          
20 Scanlon argues that a general term like pro-attitude would cover many states 
which are held for reasons, rather than being reasons themselves; a theory that 
claims a special role for desires in the explanation of intentional actions would 
have to define “desire” in a way that these so-called “motivated desires” are weeded 
out (p.38). 
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First, there is the unpleasant sensation of dryness in my mouth 
and throat. Also, there is the thought that a cool drink would 
relieve this sensation and, in general, feel good. I take this 
consideration, that drinking would feel good, to count in favour 
of drinking, and I am on the lookout for some cool drink.  
      (Scanlon 1998, p.38)  
   
Abstracting away from thirst, these three elements can be described as: 
 
a present sensation…the belief that some action would lead to a 
pleasant state in the future, and my taking this future good [i.e., 
the pleasant state] to be a reason for so acting. (Ibid) 
 
Scanlon claims that reflecting on instances of desiring reveals these three 
distinct elements, and that when a subject acts on their desire (which is how 
we would naturally describe one who drinks because they are thirsty) their 
action is properly explained by their taking themselves to have a reason for 
so acting: 
 
The motivational work seems to be done by my taking this 
future pleasure to count in favour of drinking. (Ibid) 
 
(Scanlon uses “motivation” to refer to the way in which the subject’s reasons 
for action lead to action; so “motivational work”, in Scanlon’s terms, is the 
work of providing an explanation of action in terms of the subject’s reason 
for acting – i.e., what I have been calling a proper explanation.) 
 The “present sensation”, which seems to correspond most closely to 
what we might think of as the desire itself, plays a supporting role in action 
explanation; it counts in favour of holding a belief about how to achieve 
132 
 
some future pleasure. In the case of thirst, the sensation of having a dry 
throat is a reason to believe that a drink of water would be pleasant; and that 
belief goes some way to explaining why the subject acts as they do, if they 
drink. But neither the belief nor the reason for holding it (the sensation) are 
reasons for action; they do not take part in proper explanations of the 
subject’s intentional actions. 
 If Scanlon’s characterization of the experience of desiring is the best 
way to understand the suggestion that desiring could be an evaluative 
attitude, then it appears that this approach offers no support for a Humean 
theory of practical reasoning. It must be asked, therefore, whether Scanlon’s 
characterization of occurrent desires is plausible in and of itself; and 
whether it presents us with the best or only way of understanding the 
relationship between desires and evaluative attitudes. 
 With regard to the first issue, we can ask the following question: is it 
plausible that a subject could have a present sensation of the type Scanlon 
describes, which leads to a belief about how to achieve a future pleasure, 
which the subject takes to count in favour of action, and yet that subject fail 
to have a desire? It seems to me (and to Scanlon, too) that they could. 
Consider the following example21: 
 
Alan has a terrible toothache, which invades his every waking 
hour. He feels sure that if he went to the dentist then, after a brief 
episode of acute unpleasantness, he would feel much better. He 
judges that the possibility of relief from the toothache comprises 
a good reason to go to the dentist. 
 
                                                          
21 The strategy I use against Scanlon and Tenenbaum in this chapter would yield a 
similar objection if applied to Schiffer’s view, from the previous chapter; it is 
conceivable that there could be a subject who feels (pleasure or) discomfort which 
would be (intensified or) relieved by acting so as to satisfy their Schifferian desire, but 
who does not actually seem to desire anything. The iterations of Alan which appear on 
this page could be just such subjects. 
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This example involves a sensation which leads the subject to believe that 
some future pleasure can be obtained, and the subject judges that there is a 
reason to act so as to attain it. It would seem extremely odd, however, to 
describe Alan as having a desire to go to the dentist, given that Scanlon’s 
description is supposed to apply to a restricted notion of desire that rules out 
mere pro-attitudes. The oddness can be rendered more explicit: 
 
Alan has a terrible toothache, which invades his every waking 
hour. He feels sure that if he went to the dentist then, after a brief 
episode of acute unpleasantness, he would feel much better. He 
judges that the possibility of relief from the toothache comprises 
a good reason to go to the dentist. Nevertheless, the prospect of 
actually going to the dentist fills him with dread. 
 
 Scanlon also thinks the three-part description is deficient; he 
attempts to supply the deficiency with a partial account of the 
phenomenology of desiring. His claim is that the subject of desire will find 
themselves preoccupied by the object of their desire; the object in this case 
being the action which they believe will result in pleasure. They will find 
their attention drawn to the object of their desire, and the thought of it will 
occur to them frequently. While it seems plausible that desires do, at least 
sometimes, capture the subject’s attention in the way Scanlon suggests, the 
reason why Alan seems not to have a desire to go to the dentist is not that 
his alleged desire does not direct his attention. Observe: 
 
Alan has a terrible toothache, which invades his every waking 
hour. He feels sure that if he went to the dentist then, after a brief 
episode of acute unpleasantness, he would feel much better. 
Knowing this, he is plagued by visions of the horrors he will have 
to endure in order to be rid of his troublesome tooth. The thought 
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of the impending dental surgery hangs over him like a shadow, 
pervading and spoiling every happy moment. He judges, 
nevertheless, that the possibility of relief from the toothache 
comprises a good reason to go to the dentist. 
 
Now we can see Alan’s attention as directed toward the object of his alleged 
desire, but it seems even less natural to think of him as having a desire at 
all. Alan’s attention being directed towards some action or eventuality in no 
way indicates or ensures that he would want to perform that action, or bring 
about that eventuality. As in this example, it is perfectly possible for a subject 
to dwell on future possibilities that fill them with dread, and which are in 
no way what they desire. It seems that Scanlon’s attention-directing property 
is characteristic of at least some desires, but that this property combined 
with the three elements mentioned above does not amount to a 
characterization of desire. What is missing? 
 I suggest that the reason why it seems obvious that Alan does not 
have a desire to go to the dentist22 is that the example says next to nothing 
about how the prospect of going to the dentist seems to Alan. “Seems” not 
in the sense of what judgements he makes about it, but how it appears or is 
presented to him. Let’s return to Alan once more: 
 
Alan has a terrible toothache, which plagues his every waking 
hour. He feels sure that if he went to the dentist then, after a brief 
episode of acute unpleasantness, he would feel much better. The 
idea of going to the dentist strikes him as the answer to his 
present predicament; it seems to him that it would be good if he 
could get to the dentist as soon as possible. He judges that the 
                                                          
22 Of course, if Alan does intentionally go to the dentist, then a Humean theory of 
practical reasoning would have to provide a different explanation of his action; 
presumably by finding a different desire that explains his action. 
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possibility of relief from the toothache comprises a good reason 
to go to the dentist. 
 
 In this version of the example (from which I have removed the 
attention-directing characteristics, for clarity), Alan does seem to want to go 
to the dentist. Including a description of the way that the object of his 
putative desire is presented to Alan seems to transform the example from 
one of a subject who takes themselves to have a reason for action into one 
of a subject who has a desire to act. In Scanlon’s examples, the third element 
(that the subject judges that they have a reason for action) is taken to be 
what explains the subject’s action in the right way; without it, the mere 
sensation and its attendant belief do not have the authority to explain action. 
In this last example, however, it is less clear; there is no obvious reason why 
Alan’s judging that he has a reason to go to the dentist has rational authority 
which its seeming to him that it would be good to go, lacks. If we can give a 
proper explanation of Alan’s action by appeal to his judgement about what 
reasons there are, we ought to be able to give a parallel explanation by 
appeal to its seeming to him that it would be good to act in a particular way 
(on the assumption, to be considered in section 3, that what is meant by 
“goodness” here is precisely “that which there is a reason to pursue”). 
 Scanlon’s examples seem to lend weight to the thought that 
evaluative attitudes, such as judgements, explain intentional actions in the 
right way. Scanlon’s four-element characterization of desires provides no 
support for a Humean view of practical reasoning, because the evaluative 
attitude (judgement) is put forward as something that can be distinguished 
from the other elements of desire and considered separately, allowing the 
desire itself to recede into the background, merely psychological action 
explanation. Indeed, part of the point in Scanlon characterizing desires in 
this way is precisely to represent desires as involving a kind of evaluation 
that also occurs in other contexts, so undermining the Humean claim that 
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desires present a unique source of motivation 23 . If this separation were 
impossible, i.e. if desire were presented as an intrinsically evaluative attitude, 
then it would not be possible for desire to fade into the background; for 
appealing to the subject’s evaluations would mean precisely appealing to 
their desires. 
An account of desire as an evaluative attitude would support a 
Humean view of practical reasoning if it portrayed desires as intrinsically 
evaluative. Exactly what this means, and how objects of desire are presented 
to their subjects, stands in need of much more clarification; and it is not 
obvious at this point how this aspect of desire might account for its rational 
authority, despite the analogy with judgement. However, it does seem that 
the account of the way things seem to the subject is crucial to getting the 
account of desire right; Alan did not seem to have any desire to go to the 
dentist until it was made apparent that going to the dentist appeared, to him, 
to be a good thing to do. 
Moreover, if this “seeming” is a distinctive characteristic of desire, 
then it is reasonable to assume that it will also be important to the account 
of the rational authority of desire. The Humean theory of practical 
reasoning claims that only desires have the rational authority to explain 
intentional actions; it seems reasonable to assume, therefore, that desires 
have their rational authority in virtue of some characteristic that they do not 
share with other mental states. The way the objects of desire appear to their 
subjects seems to fit that description. 
 
 
3. Representational Contents of Desires 
 
                                                          
23  Remembering, once again, that by “motivation” Scanlon means a proper 
explanation of intentional action. 
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 In the previous section, it was argued that if the idea that desires are 
evaluative attitudes is supposed to ground a Humean theory of practical 
reasoning, then the “evaluative component” of a desire cannot be separable 
from the “desire proper”. It must be the case that in so far as the subject has 
the requisite evaluative attitude, what they have is a desire. Desires cannot 
merely include evaluations; they have to be essentially evaluative attitudes. 
If the evaluative component is separable from the desire proper, then the 
desire can sink into the background, and the explanatory work can be done 
by the evaluative component alone. Alan did not seem to have any desire to 
go to the dentist until his situation was described as one in which it seems 
to him that going to the dentist would be a good thing. This seems like good 
evidence for thinking that the evaluative nature of desire must be accounted 
for in terms of the way things appear to the subject. 
 The next questions, then, must be: what does it mean for the object 
of a desire to appear to the subject? And is there a distinctive way an object 
seems, when it is the object of a desire? Whether the evaluative-attitude 
conception of desire can be the grounds for a Humean theory of practical 
reasoning depends on the possibility of giving distinctively Humean 
answers to those questions. In the previous section, Scanlon’s view was 
presented as a representative non-Humean account of the relationship 
between desires and evaluative attitudes, and used to show that, in order for 
a Humean account to be in the offing, desires must actually be evaluative 
attitudes, not just related to them. 
In 3.1, I will set out Tenenbaum’s view of desires; Tenenbaum claims 
that a subject desires an object insofar as that object appears good to them, 
and that “appearing good” is to be understood as conceiving of as good, from 
a particular perspective. In 3.2, I will argue that Tenenbaum’s account, 
though closer to describing true desires than Scanlon’s, still falls short; there 
are still possible subjects who meet Tenenbaum’s criteria for desiring, but 
seem not to desire anything. In 3.3, I will set out Stampe’s account of desire, 
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according to which desires are mental states which represent their objects 
as good, in a distinctive representational mode. In 3.4, I will argue that 
Stampe’s account is sufficient to capture real desires; there are no subjects 
who have desires, by Stampe’s lights, but seem not to desire anything. 
Making this last claim plausible requires me to take a stand on what the 
representational mode of desire is; that is, what it is like to desire something. 
 
3.1 Desires as Appearances 
 
Sergio Tenenbaum holds a “scholastic view” of desires, according to 
which a desire is a state in which the object of that desire appears good to 
the subject. Tenenbaum takes the scholastic view to apply to pro-attitudes, 
not desires proper, ruling out the possibility of a Humean theory from the 
outset24: 
 
The sense of desire covered [by Tenenbaum's account] is the weak 
sense in which whenever I have something as my aim, or would 
have it as my aim were it not for countervailing considerations, I 
desire it. “Desire” in this sense need not be passionate, warm, or 
even felt in any way. 
      (Tenenbaum 2007 p.26) 
 
As we shall see, Tenenbaum’s scholastic view has more in common with 
cognitivist theories of practical reasoning than Humean ones; indeed, he 
takes the plausibility of the scholastic view to count against the Humean 
views. Even so, it will be useful to imagine the view Tenenbaum could have 
taken had he applied his claims to desires proper rather than pro-attitudes. 
                                                          
24  Tenenbaum also has a deeper, philosophical objection to Humean views. He 
understands Humean views as claiming that desires explain intentional actions in a 
purely psychological sense, and objects that “there are no “brute pushes” in the practical 
realm” (p.22). I have argued in Chapter 3 that retreating such an explanation of 
intentional action is not a viable move for a Humean to make. 
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The important features of the scholastic view, for my purposes, are that it 
treats a putatively non-cognitive state as an evaluative attitude; and that it 
claims that the attitude counts as evaluative in virtue of being an appearance 
of its object. Hereafter, this is the view I will be referring to as “the scholastic 
view”: the pseudo-Tenenbaumian view that desires proper are evaluative 
attitudes in virtue of being appearances of their objects. 
 According to the scholastic view, what it means for the object of a 
desire to appear good to its subject is that, to the extent that the subject 
desires the object, they conceive of it as good: 
 
[F]or an agent to desire X is for X to appear to be good to this 
agent from a certain evaluative perspective...[W]e desire only 
what we conceive to be good.   
     (Tenenbaum 2007, p.21) 
 
 Tenenbaum does not regard “appearing” as a having a single, simple 
definition. Rather, being an appearance of an object is a function that can be 
realized in different ways; that is, there are different senses in which an 
object can appear to a subject. Presumably, Tenenbaum makes this claim 
because his scholastic theory is not concerned with desires, but with pro-
attitudes, which might not all be appearances for the same reasons. 
 This raises a more immediate concern, which is particularly pressing 
for Tenenbaum's view: is it in fact true, or even plausible, that there are 
multiple modes of appearing which all give rise to the same type of 
appearance? Tenenbaum claims that the broader uses of appearance 
illustrated in the table below are the “analogues of desire in the realm of 
theoretical reason”; but how are we to understand this analogy? What does 
Tenenbaum mean when he claims that desires are appearances of the good? 
Furthermore, if the Humean theory of practical reasoning should construe 
desires as evaluative attitudes in virtue of their being appearances of their 
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objects, then it matters for that theory whether there is just one sense of 
appearance or several. Investigating what senses of appearance are available 
will shed some light on that theory's commitments. 
 Tenenbaum presents five examples of appearing, which fall into two 
categories: 
 
Perceptual Appearances Inclinations to Judge 
From far above, the car appears very 
small. 
Looking only at the evidence 
you gathered, it appears that 
she is not guilty. 
It appears red to me, but you had 
better ask someone else. 
Presented this way, the 
argument appears to be valid; 
but when we formalize it, we 
see that it is not. 
The raccoon appears to be dead.  
 
(The contents of this table are paraphrases closely based on Tenenbaum's 
examples on (Tenenbaum 2007, p.39)). Perceptual appearances are those 
where the object appears to the subject through a perceptual mode; it looks, 
sounds, smells, etc., a certain way. In the first case, the car looks very small; 
it appears very small by looking very small. I do not intend the use of “by” 
to signify mediation; the car does not on the one hand look very small, and 
then appear very small. Its appearing very small consists in its looking very 
small; it “visually-appears” very small. The other sort of appearance 
Tenenbaum considers is appearance in the sense of an inclination to judge; 
I will call these “evidential appearances”. In the first case, the evidence 
appears to the subject in such a way that the subject is inclined to judge that 
the defendant is not guilty. 
 Tenenbaum’s view raises an interesting question: although it seems 
natural to use “appears” in the context of evidential appearances, in what 
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sense is in evidential appearance an appearance? Perceptual appearances 
seem like paradigm cases of what it means to be an appearance; is there a 
coherent sense of “appearance” which both perceptual and evidential 
appearances share? Can it really be the case that when we say “it appears she 
is innocent”, we have in mind the same sense of “appearance” which we use 
to say “it appears the raccoon is dead”? If so, then that commonality will tell 
us something about what desires proper must be like if they are appearances 
of their objects; if there is not, then the whole idea of desires as appearances 
will be under-specified, at best. 
At first glance, it seems very odd to consider perceptual and 
evidential appearances as members of a single family of appearances. There 
are many significant differences between them, which may lead one to think 
that talk of “appearance” in the evidential case is in some sense figurative, 
and does not refer to an appearance in the way that appearance-talk in the 
perceptual case does. That is, the differences between perceptual and 
evidential appearances are so great that one might believe that there is 
really no single sense of “appearance” which unites them both. 
 It might be thought that evidential appearance in some way includes 
perceptual appearance, and so the sense in which evidential objects appear 
to the subject is to be explained in terms of their perceptual appearances. 
Then, it would make sense to understand talk of “evidential appearances” as 
a shorthand for perceptual appearances combined with the subject's 
inclination to make certain judgements on the basis of those appearances 
(we might say, the perceptual appearance combined with the subject's taking 
the content of that appearance to be evidence for some conclusion). There 
would be no true sense of “evidential appearance”. 
 Perceptual appearances are necessarily presented to the subject in a 
particular mode (visual, olfactory, auditory, etc.), whereas inclinations to 
judge do not seem to be presented in any mode in particular. In fact, there 
is a sense in which they do not seem to be presented to the subject at all. In 
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the case of the inconclusive evidence, the items that constitute the evidence 
(documents, let’s say) must, one assumes, be presented to the subject 
perceptually, and hence in some sensory mode or other; but they are only 
perceptually presented qua objects, not qua evidence. What I mean is, the 
documents must be presented to the subject’s senses in order for the subject 
to be in a position to be inclined to judge, on the basis of the documents; but 
Tenenbaum clearly does not think that the subject sees that the documents 
are evidence; if so, this would be a case of perceptual appearing. Presumably, 
that the subject must see the documents is just an enabling condition on 
their appearing to the subject as evidence, and not constitutive of their 
appearing to them in that further sense. This suffices to show that 
Tenenbaum does not think evidential appearances can be reduced to 
perceptual appearances, but it leaves the burden of proof with him to show 
in what sense evidential objects appear to the subject, i.e., in what sense 
evidential appearances are appearances at all. 
 According to Tenenbaum, what unites these two very different senses 
of appearing is the idea that in both cases, understanding what is meant by 
“an appearance” requires an appeal to the idea of a perspective. In the 
perceptual case, the car appears very small from a certain perspective (a 
high vantage point); in the evidential case, the defendant appears innocent 
from a certain perspective (i.e., in light of only part of the evidence). It may 
be that other appearances would provide different, even contradictory 
perspectives on the same objects; this may lead the subject to doubt the 
veracity of certain appearances, but it makes no difference to the content of 
those appearances. Tenenbaum claims that we should understand the sense 
in which the object of a desire appears to its subject because it meets this 
more abstract definition; a desire affords its subject a perspective on its 
object. It does so because, in accordance with the old formula of the schools, 
to desire something is to conceive of it as good; on Tenenbaum’s strict 
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reading of this proposition, a subject desires something to the extent that 
they conceive of it as good. 
 
3.2 Tenenbaumian Desires 
 
 According to Tenenbaum, any appearance (perceptual, evidential, or 
desiderative) is an appearance in virtue of the fact that it affords the subject 
a perspective on its object; a viewpoint, in the visual case, or a partial grasp 
of the argument, in the evidential case. An appearance is perceptual if (let’s 
suppose) it affords the subject a perspective on its object through the 
exercise of the subject’s senses. An appearance is desiderative if it affords its 
subject a perspective on its object by being a conception of the goodness of 
its object: 
 
“To say that desiring is conceiving something to be good is to say 
that a desire represents its object, perhaps implicitly, as good – 
that is, as something that is worth being pursued.”   
     (Tenenbaum 2007, p.21) 
  
Here are two basic differences between Scanlonian and Tenenbaumian 
desires: 
 
(a) Although both sorts are evaluative attitudes, Scanlonian desires 
have that status in virtue of being partly composed of a 
judgement, which would be an evaluative attitude all on its own, 
independently of the other elements in virtue of which it happens 
to be part of a desire. In Tenenbaum’s account, to desire is to 
conceive of as good; the evaluative nature of desiring is not 
explained by any separable, component part, but is an essential 
feature of the desire itself. 
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(b) The essential feature of desires in virtue of which they are 
evaluative attitudes is, on Tenenbaum’s account, their 
representational content. There is a way that the object appears to 
the subject, insofar as they desire it, and the desire is a conception 
of the good in that it represents its object as good. On Scanlon’s 
account, if the object of a desire is represented to its subject at all, 
it seems to be through a belief which partly constitutes the state 
of desiring; that belief does not represent the object as good, but 
rather relates it to a future state of pleasure or relief (for example, 
believing that drinking would alleviate one’s thirst). 
 
In light of these differences, Tenenbaum’s account of desire seems 
like a better basis for a Humean theory of practical reasoning that Scanlon’s. 
Subjects with Scanlonian desires do not seem to actually desire anything. 
Tenenbaum’s account appears to be on a better footing in this regard, since 
it claims that the object of the subject’s desire appears to them in a particular 
way, namely it is represented to them as good. Perhaps even this is not 
enough, however; after all, desires are not the only mental states with 
representational content, nor the only ones which can represent their 
objects as good. 
 
Alan has a terrible toothache, which invades his every waking 
hour. It seems to Alan that if he went to the dentist, then, after a 
brief episode of acute unpleasantness, he would feel much better. 
Going to the dentist appears (to Alan) to be the thing to do. 
 
This time, Alan has a Tenenbaumian desire: he has an appearance of 
some action as good, in the sense of to-be-done, which consists in the 
representational content of some mental state of his. It certainly seems more 
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plausible that Tenenbaumian Alan has a genuine desire than that either of 
the Scanlonian Alans did. At least the object of this Alan’s desire appears to 
him to be good; the Scanlonian Alans were merely preoccupied by the 
thought of the objects of their desires. Even so, Tenenbaumian Alan still 
seems to be a long way from actually desiring to go to the dentist. 
 
Alan has a terrible toothache, which invades his every waking 
hour. It seems to Alan that if he went to the dentist, then, after a 
brief episode of acute unpleasantness, he would feel much better. 
Going to the dentist appears (to Alan) to be the thing to do, but 
nevertheless, the prospect leaves him cold. 
 
Here, I have added a phrase to the example which makes it clear that Alan 
does not have a desire, without removing anything from the Tenenbaumian 
characterization, stating anything incompatible with it, or making the 
subject seem incoherent. We could describe this case as one it which Alan 
has recognized that going to the dentist is a good idea, as opposed to judged 
that it is. 
 This formulation seems to capture the difference between going to 
the dentist appearing (being represented as) good to Alan, and Alan holding 
a (potentially) non-representational evaluative attitude towards it (as on 
Scanlon’s account). But neither recognizing nor judging that it would be 
good to perform some action amounts to desiring to perform it. 
Tenenbaum’s own view, as I have mentioned, is that the role in action 
explanation that Humeans claim must be played by desire, is played by a 
pro-attitude, rather than by a mental state of a more particular type. In fact, 
he takes the philosophical use of “desire” to pick out pro-attitudes, not 
distinctive mental states; an assertion which Schueler criticizes as a tactical 
error, and which was discussed in chapter 2. Because of Tenenbaum’s view 
of desires, it should come as no surprise that subjects with Tenenbaumian 
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desires do not seem to have a desire in the Humean sense. The point of this 
discussion is to decide whether Tenenbaum’s account of appearances of the 
good can be used as the basis for a successful, Humean characterization of 
desire as an evaluative attitude. That is, whether it would be useful, from a 
Humean point of view, to snip Tenenbaum’s account of desires as 
appearances of the good away from his claim that desires are pro-attitudes, 
and graft it onto a more substantive account of desires as distinctive mental 
states. So when I claim that Tenenbaumian Alan seems not to desire to go 
to the dentist, what matters is this: even were we to assert, contra-
Tenenbaum, that the appearance of Alan’s action as good were constituted 
by the representational character of a mental state of a particular type, not 
a pro-attitude, it would still seem implausible to suggest that the mental 
state in question is a desire. 
According to Tenenbaum’s definition, it seems likely that Scanlonian 
desires would count as appearances. The subject of a Scanlonian desire has 
mental state which affords a perspective on some action; they believe that it 
would lead to a future state of pleasure or relief, and they judge that there 
is a reason to perform the action. In fact, Scanlonian desires seem rather like 
instances of evidential judging. In the same way that certain documents can 
make it appear to a juror that the defendant is not guilty, certain sensations 
can make it appear to the subject that they ought to find something to drink. 
Nonetheless, the pseudo-Tenenbaumian view does seem closer to capturing 
real desire than Scanlon’s account. It claims that desires are appearances of 
the goodness of their object, where appearances generally are to be 
understood as mental states which afford a perspective on their object. Then, 
it claims that desires are appearances of the goodness of their objects 
because they are representations of their objects as good. 
This seems to suggest that whatever improvement over Scanlon’s 
account lies in Tenenbaum’s account, is to be found in his explanation of the 
way in which desires constitute appearances. For the same reason, however, 
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it seems plausible that the deficiency in the account lies here too. Scanlon’s 
and Tenenbaum’s accounts do not contain precisely the same flaw. 
Scanlonian desires are not genuine desires because the object of a 
Scanlonian desire is not represented to its subject in any way in particular; 
whereas Tenenbaumian desires are not genuine desires because their objects 
could be represented in just the same way by mental states other than 
desires. Tenenbaum’s account does not pick out a distinctive mental state 
(and nor was it meant to). In order to differentiate desires from other mental 
states, Humeans must make claims about the way in which desires represent 
their objects; in particular, they must show that desires represent their 
objects as good, in a way that no other mental state can. 
How do real, familiar desires represent their objects? That is, what is 
it like to desire something, as opposed to judging, recognizing or even 
perceiving that it is good? 
 
3.4 Stampe’s Account: the Desiderative Mode of Representation 
 
 There is no way that the world must seem to me when I believe it 
would be good if my team won. I do not judge that it would be good if they 
won, as I might judge that coffee is more expensive than it used to be; nor 
do I merely recognize that it would be good if they won, as I might recognize 
that it rained earlier and the pitch is soft. If I desire that they win, then it 
seems to me as if their winning would be a good thing. That’s an 
understatement. When I desire that my team win, their winning strikes me 
urgently and forcefully as good, and it seems to elicit, or even demand, a 
response from me. The prospect of my team’s victory is represented to me 
to me as a fragile possibility that desperately ought to be realized. This 
unshakeable truth strikes me with a force that far surpasses merely thinking 
that it would be good if my team won. Stampe writes: 
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[I]n desire, one is somehow struck by, affected by, the merits of 
the thing wanted, or the prospect of having it, in a way that one 
needn’t be if one merely knows it would be good; so one may say, 
“I know it would be best to take that job, but the prospect of doing 
so simply leaves me cold, does not strike me as something I want 
to do; it somehow doesn’t seem to me the good prospect I know 
it is.”…[T]here is something characteristic of desire: if one wants 
a thing it seems to one as if the thing wanted would be 
good…[O]ne might say, consistently, “Although it doesn’t seem to 
me to be so, the President is a great man”. 
        (Stampe 1987, p.357) 
 
The object of a desire seems a particular way to its subject, whereas the 
object of an evaluative belief need not seem any way to its subject. 
Stampe accounts for this difference in terms of the representational 
mode of desiring. Desiring, he claims, is to believing as feeling is to seeing; 
much, though not all, of what can be felt can be seen, but what is felt is 
represented, as it were, in a different mode than when it is seen, even if it is 
represented as having just the same properties. Much, though not all, of 
what is desired can also be believed (though, admittedly, not at the time it is 
desired); but what is desired is represented in a different mode than when it 
is believed, even if it is represented as having just the same properties. 
 Stampe claims that the fundamental difference between the 
representational content of desire and that of belief is a modal one (where 
“modal” is used in the same way in which we talk about “sensory modes”). A 
difference in representational mode constitutes a difference in 
representational content; the content of a particular representation is how 
it represents its object, and representations which differ in mode represent 
their objects in different ways, even if they share an object. Desires and 
beliefs use different modes of representation even when they share an 
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object; so desires and beliefs that share an object necessarily differ in their 
representational contents. 
This is true even where the desire and the belief have the same 
representational character (i.e., represent their object as having the same 
properties). The very same property is presented in different modes when it 
is part of the representational character of a belief or a desire, just as the 
roundness of a coin can be represented visually or somatically. Likewise, a 
belief and a desire could share the same propositional contents, and still 
have different representational content. A belief and a desire can have the 
same propositional content (for example, I can believe or desire that I have 
a cup of coffee, though not simultaneously); but if they do, their 
representational contents will still differ. A desire with the propositional 
content that I have a cup of coffee necessarily represents the state of affairs 
of my having a cup of coffee as good, in the desiderative mode; whereas a 
belief that I have a cup of coffee does not represent that state of affairs as 
good, at all. A desire with the propositional content that I have a cup of 
coffee has a different representational mode, and hence different 
representational contents, to the belief that I have a cup of coffee, even 
though the two share the same object and the same representational 
character. 
 Stampe has very little to say about what it means to desire something 
in the desiderative mode; that is, what it is really like to desire. This is 
understandable, given how hard it is to describe sensations, and the extent 
to which such a project seems to rely on taking one’s own experiences to be 
representative of all analogous experiences. Even so, given that what is at 
stake in this discussion is precisely how real desires are to be characterized, 
it is necessary to make the attempt. The charge I have levelled at Scanlon 
and pseudo-Tenenbaum was that the subjects who have their sorts of 
“desires” seem not to really desire anything. If a Stampe-style account is to 
pass the same test, then we have to be clear about what it is like to have a 
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Stampe-style desire; that is, we have to be clear about what the distinctive 
mode of representation of desire, actually is. We know what it is like to have 
a Scanlonian desire: one has an unpleasant sensation which leads to a belief 
about how it might be relieved, the prospect of relief (or some other related 
object) preoccupies one’s thought or attention, and one judges that there is 
a reason to act so as to relieve the unpleasantness. And we know what it is 
like to have a Tenenbaumian desire: there is some object which appears 
good to one, at least from a certain perspective. What is it like to have a 
Stampe-style desire? 
 I think the following three characteristics properly belong to the 
representational mode of desiring. I do not claim that this list is complete, 
or that it represents a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for 
representing in the desiderative mode. Rather, I take it that these three 
properties characterize typical desires. Some mental states may lack one or 
two of these, either at times or entirely, while still remaining desires; some 
desire-like mental states (such as wishes, urges and cravings) may fail to be 
desires in virtue of lacking one or two of these characteristics. Mental states 
can have these characteristics in greater or lesser degrees, and the extent to 
which a mental state has a particular characteristic can vary over time. As I 
argued in the previous chapter, “desire” is a very specific category of mental 
state, which bears superficial similarities to a great many others. Whether a 
particular mental state is a desire may turn out to be an empirical question, 
in the sense that it may have to be judged on a case-by-case basis. With those 
caveats in place, here are my suggested characteristics of the 
representational mode of desiring: 
 
(a) Risk: The objects of desire are very often tantalizingly out of 
reach. The nature of being tantalized is such that what one wants 
must seem obtainable, or at least very nearly so, and yet 
uncertain. The objects of desire are represented as goods the 
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subject could come to have, but also that they might fail to. 
Remember, this is a characteristic of the representational mode 
of desiring, not its content; whatever desirable properties the 
desire represents its object as having, it represents as subject to 
risk. The refreshing sensation of a cool drink of water is 
represented by the desire to drink as one which the subject could 
come to enjoy, but which they might also not be able to have. 
(b) Forcefulness: The object of one’s desire is represented as not 
merely affording a response (typically an action) but as 
demanding it; the objects of desire are to be responded to, in the 
normative sense of “to be”. One ought to act so as to get what one 
wants, and to be pleased when  one’s desires are satisfied. 
(c) Goodness: The object of one’s desire is necessarily represented 
as good. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Sigma States 
 
 
In this chapter, I consider some different views of how desires 
might be related to other factors such as their objects and the 
subject's other mental states, and how these relations might help 
to establish that desires actually do represent their objects as 
good, and hence that the special representational properties of 
desire can account for its rational authority. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 In the previous chapter, I followed Stampe in arguing that desires 
represent their objects as good, not through their contents, but through a 
particular representational mode. This chapter is concerned with explaining 
the rational authority of desire, in light of that characterization of the 
representational characteristics of desire. This section sets out Scanlon’s and 
Tenenbaum’s accounts of the rational authority of desire; partly for the sake 
of completeness, but mainly in order to draw useful comparisons with the 
Stampe-style account developed towards the end of this chapter. Section 5 
explains Stampe’s view of the rational authority of desire, and deals with 
some problems which are more-or-less internal to the account. In section 6, 
I put forward a problem for Stampe’s account based on Schueler’s “putting-
together point” (see chapter 2). Solving this problem requires making a 
substantial addition to the account. 
 I will argue that Scanlon’s and Tenenbaum’s higher-order approval 
accounts are not suitable bases for a Humean theory of practical reasoning, 
since they make the rational authority of desire derivative, not original. 
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Stampe’s account is more useful from a Humean point of view (which is 
unsurprising since Stampe sets out to defend a Humean theory of reasons, 
whereas Tenenbaum and Scanlon do not), but it still requires considerable 
modification. First, many of Stampe’s claims about the relationship between 
desire and perception should either be understood as metaphorical or 
dropped entirely. Secondly, I will argue that Stampe’s explanation of why the 
objects of desire are good requires considerable revision to be even plausible 
by Stampe’s own standards. Thirdly, in section 6, I will argue that the rational 
authority of desire cannot be explained simply by appeal to the existence of 
a set of mental and bodily states, as Stampe aims to; the explanation must 
include mental events, as well. The argument here is closely analogous to 
Schueler’s “putting together” point and my response to it, dealt with in 
chapter 2. 
 
2. Higher-Order Approval Accounts 
 
 Scanlon and Tenenbaum offer accounts according to which the 
rational authority of a desire is explained by the fact that the subject 
approves of or endorses the desire. Scanlon appeals to the subject’s faculty 
of judgement, while Tenenbaum argues that what matters is the way the 
desire fits into the subject’s considered view of how things are, evaluatively 
speaking. It will turn out that the two accounts are not very different, 
particularly in terms of how they stand in respect to the Humean view. 
Neither regards desire as a source of rational authority, so neither can act as 
a model for a Humean account of the rational authority of desire. I will 
extend this conclusion to cover all higher-order approval accounts, i.e., those 
which explain the rational authority of mental states by appeal to the 
relationship they stand it to what might be called the subject’s considered 
evaluative perspective. 
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2.1 Scanlon’s Judgement-Based Account 
 
 Scanlon argues that desires are composed of three (sometimes four) 
elements; and that whatever rational authority a desire might seem to enjoy 
is derived from the evaluative judgement which partially constitutes that 
desire. When the subject of a Scanlonian desire acts in a way that we are 
inclined to (properly) explain in terms of what that subject wants, what 
explains their action in the right way is their judging that there is a reason 
to act as they do. The fact that we are inclined to appeal to the subject’s 
desires at this point is accounted for by the fact that the desire which 
explains their action in the right way is one component of a desire. Part of 
what it means for the subject to desire to act in a certain way, is that they 
judge that there is some reason for them to do so. So Scanlon offers a 
judgement-based account of the rational authority of desire (and a 
“debunking” explanation of the intuitive plausibility of appealing to desires 
to explain intentional actions). 
 If the subject did not judge there was a reason to act some way, then 
they would not desire to, because they would lack one of the essential 
components of a Scanlonian desire. A subject cannot desire to act in a way 
that they judge there is no reason to. This feature Scanlon refers to as 
“judgement sensitivity”; an attitude is judgement sensitive if it is held only 
if the subject takes there to be a supporting reason. If the subject lacks or 
loses a certain evaluative judgement then they will not have any desire 
which that judgement would be a constituent of; so desires are sensitive to 
the subject’s evaluative judgements. In Scanlon’s example, a thirsty subject 
has an unpleasant sensation of dryness in the mouth, believes that having a 
drink would make them feel better, and judges that it would be good to have 
a drink of water. If they lacked that judgement, or if they judged that there 
was no reason for them to drink water, then they would not have a desire to 
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drink water; they would only have a sensation and a thought about how to 
relieve it. 
 So, when a desire seems to explain an intentional action in the right 
way, the normative force of the explanation is not provided by anything 
distinctive of or originating in desiring, but in the subject’s judgements of 
what reasons there are to act. Desires can only explain intentional actions 
when they (the desires) are in harmony with the subject’s evaluative 
judgements. If we consider a desire divorced from any evaluative 
judgements, then it lacks any rational authority whatsoever. 
 One might think that the claim that a desire only explains intentional 
action (in the derivative way it does, on Scanlon’s view) if the subject judges 
that there is a reason to act in that way, is not true to everyday experience. 
That is, one might think that, in day to day life, it does not seem to be the 
case that the sorts of intentional actions in which desires are involved are 
always accompanied by, and indeed are always explained by, judgements. 
There is a familiar type of situation in which one acts because, as we often 
say, one “feels like it”. These are a subset of the cases Scanlon identifies as 
“matters of taste”, where not only is the subject’s prospective pleasure 
uniquely important to the question of how they ought to act, but nothing 
terribly important is at stake, either. For example, one’s choice of partner is 
a matter of taste, but an important one; one’s choice of tie is equally a matter 
of taste, but one’s future happiness and well-being rarely hangs on one’s 
choice of tie. “Because I felt like it” seems an appropriate explanation of a 
subject’s wearing a red tie rather than a blue one, but not of marrying one 
person over another. 
 In these cases, which I will call “matters of fancy”, it is not obvious 
that the subject must take there to be a reason to act in precisely the way 
they do; though their action may be one of a range of actions that they 
regard as supported by reasons, there may be no reason for which the 
subject picks one action over  another within that range. If I wear a red tie 
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because I feel like it, I may judge that there is a reason to wear a tie, but no 
reason to wear this tie in particular, or to wear this tie rather than that one. 
In such a case, it would not seem that in wearing the red tie I had acted 
unintentionally or irrationally; it would (or at least it may well) seem that 
my feeling like wearing that tie is the best explanation there is of my doing 
so. 
 Ruth Chang suggests amending Scanlon’s account to deal with 
matters of fancy. In (Chang 2004), she argues that Scanlon could allow that, 
in the case of matters of fancy, the subject’s desire properly explains their 
action when considered independently of the evaluative judgement which 
normally partly constitutes a desire, but not when considered independently 
of the subject’s whole system of evaluative judgements. In matters of fancy, 
the subject’s desire properly explains their intentional action because the 
subject has already judged that, in instances such as this, there is a reason 
to do whatever they feel like doing. So whereas in the usual case a desire 
derives its rational authority from the judgement which partly constitutes 
it, in matters of fancy the desire derives its authority from a judgement 
about the desire itself and the type of situation the subject finds themselves 
in. 
 
2.2 Tenenbaum’s Evaluative Perspectives 
 
 Tenenbaum claims that a desire is an appearance of the goodness of 
its object, and explains intentional actions in the same sense that other sorts 
of appearances explain the responses with which they are associated. For 
instance, in whatever sense the raccoon’s appearing dead explains believing 
that it is dead, desiring to phi explains phi-ing. 
 Tenenbaum understands all appearances, including desires, as partial 
“takes” on how things are; representations of the world from a particular 
perspective, which is necessarily incomplete. The raccoon appears dead at 
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this distance, or from this angle; but it may not appear dead from a different 
vantage point, or considering different evidence (i.e., in light of further 
appearances). Whether a particular appearance of the raccoon as dead is a 
good reason to believe that the raccoon is dead depends on whether that 
appearance can be corroborated by comparing it to other appearances of the 
raccoon, or whether considering it in light of other appearances will unmask 
it as misleading. We say such things as, “certainly the raccoon appears dead 
from over here; but it was moving around just a moment ago, and from up 
close you can see it’s still breathing. It may appear dead, but that is not a 
good reason to believe it really is.” 
  All appearances are inconclusive in this way; the rational authority 
of a particular appearance depends on how it stands in relation to the 
subject’s total stock of appearances, and judgements about them. An 
appearance is rationally authoritative to the extent that it coheres or 
harmonises with the subject’s overall grasp of how things are, so that it can 
be assimilated into that collection with minimal disturbance, in the form of 
contradictions and inconsistencies. In the raccoon example, the appearance 
of the raccoon as dead has insufficient authority to explain believing it really 
is dead, because that appearance is contradicted by too large a proportion of 
the subject’s pre-existing stock of appearances. In the case of a desire (an 
appearance of the goodness of its object), the desire has the authority to 
explain acting so as to satisfy it, insofar as the subject’s pre-existing stock of 
appearances, their overall evaluative standpoint, is compatible with the 
goodness of that object. A desire will lack rational authority if, or to the 
extent that, the representation of its object as good is contradicted by or 
inconsistent with the subject’s overall standpoint. 
 
 
3. The Normativity Problem: Stampe’s Account 
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 Just as a proper explanation of intentional action is one which 
accounts for intentional actions in terms of what is distinctive about them, 
a proper explanation of rationally authoritative desires must explain those 
desires in terms of what is distinctive about them. Proper explanations of 
intentional action are given in terms of the subject’s reasons for acting, since 
intentional actions are those which are performed because the subject sees 
there to be a reason to perform them. Rationally authoritative desires are 
essentially representations of their objects as good. A proper explanation of 
the creation of rationally authoritative desires must, therefore, show how 
those desires come to be representations of their objects as good, in the ways 
they do. That is, the account must explain why, in the case of a particular 
desire, it has the object and the representational content that it does. 
 Subjects (human ones, at least) have bodily states and mental states. 
How things are with the subject (i.e., which bodily and mental states the 
subject is in) makes certain situations better than others, with regard to that 
subject. For instance, if that subject is exhausted, then it would be better if 
they were resting rather than continuing to exert themselves, all other 
things being equal. Of course, not everything about that subject makes 
resting a good idea; their memories, for example, probably have no bearing 
on the case one way or another. Those things which do matter, in this regard, 
Stampe refers to collectively as a sigma-state. A sigma-state is a functional 
state realized by some collection of the subject’s bodily and mental states; it 
makes it the case that some state of affairs would be good, while others 
would not. In the example, the subject’s resting would be good, while the 
subject’s going for a run would not. 
 According to Stampe, human subjects are sensitive to sigma-states. A 
subject who is in a sigma-state will have a mental representation caused by 
that state. But the mental representation does not represent the sigma-state; 
it represents the state of affairs that, because of the sigma-state, would be 
good. The subject who is exhausted would have a mental representation of 
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themselves resting (that is, of a state of affairs in which they rest). Moreover, 
just as the sigma-state makes the state of affairs in question good, the mental 
representation caused by the sigma-state represents that state of affairs as 
good. 
 Stampe claims that these mental representations are desires. They 
represent states of affairs which do not obtain; in each case, that which is 
related to the sigma-state which caused the desire. Those states of affairs are 
the “objects” of desire, in the sense of being what they are desires for (note 
that this “intentional object” of desire, as I’m going to be calling it, is always 
a state of affairs, never an object in the everyday sense). A desire represents 
its intentional object as good, but not in the way that a belief might represent 
its object as good. Desiring is not a matter of conceiving of a certain state of 
affairs as a bearer of the property “goodness”; rather, desiring means being 
struck by the goodness of the state of affairs in question. 
  
3.1 How Desires Get Their Objects 
 
 Perception-like states have objects in two different senses; there are 
the objects which cause those states, and there are the objects which those 
states are about, or which those states represent. The former Stampe calls 
“perceptual objects”, and the latter I will call “intentional objects”. The 
lynch-pin of Stampe’s account is the separation of the intentional and 
perceptual objects of desire; that is, Stampe rejects the seemingly obvious 
assumption that desires are caused by what they are desires for. By 
separating the intentional and perceptual objects, Stampe makes it possible 
to give a detailed account of why a subject has the desires they have, and 
how desires are related to other mental and bodily states, without making 
the rational authority of desire out to be per objectum or based on higher-
order approval (i.e., without locating the source of rational authority outside 
of desire). On the other hand, it does give rise to some puzzles and potential 
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problems. In this section, I will set out the relationship between the 
perceptual and intentional objects of desire; in the next section, I will 
explore one of the most obvious objections to the separation of the two 
objects. 
What, then, are the perceptual objects of desires, if not their intentional 
objects? Stampe’s view is that desires are proprioceptions; perceptions of 
states of the subject. The state which causes the desire, that is, the state 
“which causes it to seem to [the subject] as if the thing wanted [i.e., the 
intentional object of the desire] would be good” (p.372), Stampe labels “∑”. 
A sigma-state can be composed of the subject's bodily states, and other 
perceptual states, including other desires (though not, of course, the desire 
of which it is the cause), and beliefs. 
 For example, the bodily state in which the subject is depleted of water 
might give rise to the desire for something to drink; the state in which the 
subject is low on water and believes that lemonade is more refreshing than 
coffee might give rise to the desire for lemonade. More specific, complex, or 
far-reaching desires must, presumably, be caused by more complicated 
sigma-states that involve more of the subject's beliefs and desires. Since all 
sigma-states are composed of states of the subject, the desires they cause are 
proprioceptive states. Some sigma-states include perceptual states of the 
subject; the desires they cause are apperceptive (i.e., perceptions of the same 
subject’s other perceptions). So all desires are perceptual states; specifically, 
they are proprioceptive. Furthermore, some desires are apperceptive. 
Desires make indications through their representational content; 
desires represent their intentional objects as good, so it seems plausible that 
they are indicators of the goodness of their intentional objects. Analogously, 
the fuel gauge in a car represents the tank as filled to a certain proportion 
of its volume (or represents the fuel as filling a certain proportion of the 
tank, if you prefer), so represents the level to which the tank is full (or the 
amount of fuel relative to the size of the tank). While it is probably safe to 
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assume that we all have a pretty good grasp of what fuel is, and what fuel 
tanks are, it would be reckless to assume that everyone shares a 
philosophical conception of goodness. So, to understand how desire 
functions as an indicator, and how its role as indicator solves the Normativity 
Problem, we shall first need to know what Stampe means by “good” when 
he claims, for example, that a desire represents its object as good. 
On the topic of goodness, Stampe writes: 
 
∑ is to be a state of the subject such that, ideally, if one is in such 
a state – a state that  makes it seemd to one as if it would be good 
if p – then it would be good were one for example to drink, or 
generally, that it would be good were the objective of the desire 
to obtain.     
      (Stampe 1987, p. 373) 
 
One’s being in a sigma-state explains why one has a certain desire; that is, it 
explains how the mental representation comes to exist, and why it has the 
representational content it does. It also explains why the intentional object 
of that desire would be good if it came about, if indeed it would be. For 
example, the state in which the subject is depleted of water could be a sigma-
state; it would both bring it about that drinking would strike the subject as 
a good thing, and it would explain why it would be good for the subject to 
drink. The goodness of the intentional object of a desire is explained by the 
perceptual object of that same desire; the perceptual object, the sigma-state, 
brings it about that the intentional object is represented to the subject as 
good. 
 A sigma-state accounts for the goodness of a particular non-obtaining 
state of affairs, and brings into existence a desire which has that state of 
affairs as its intentional object. So a desire is connected to the goodness of 
its object, which is what a desire purports to indicate, through its own cause; 
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the sigma-state. This explains why a particular desire has the 
representational content it does; the sigma-state which causes the desire also 
picks out the state that it is a desire for. When a subject has a desire caused 
by a particular sigma-state, it seems to them as if it would be good were a 
certain state of affairs, the one appropriately related to the sigma-state, to 
obtain. 
Desires are proprioceptive states in which the subject is sensitive to 
their own “condition”, as it were, (that is, whatever makes up the sigma-state 
in question) and thereby comes to know what would be good. Desires come 
to be indicators in virtue of the fact that what causes a desire also explains 
the goodness of its object. This is the connection between desires and the 
goodness that they purport to be indications of; to the extent that the 
relationships between sigma-states and desires, and sigma-states and the 
intentional objects of desire, are consistent, desires will be reliable indicators 
of the goodness of their intentional objects. 
So the mechanism that connects the representational content of a 
desire, its indicative readout, to what it is an indication of, is the two-limbed 
connection between desires and sigma states, on the one hand, and sigma-
states and the intentional objects of desire, on the other. That is, between 
desires and their perceptual objects, and between the perceptual and 
intentional objects of desire. In the case of the fuel gauge we can also ask, 
knowing the nature of the connection between the amount of fuel in the 
tank and the reading on the dial, what change in the amount of fuel is 
indicated by which direction of movement of the needle. That is, we can ask 
how differences in what it is an indication of are reflected in the read-out; if 
the amount of fuel decreases, how will the read-out change? 
Does the corresponding question make sense in the case of desire? It 
seems to me it does: how are differences in the intentional object, or 
perhaps, differences between similar but non-identical intentional objects, 
reflected in the representational character of the relevant desires (i.e., the 
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desires with which those intentional objects share a sigma-state)? The 
answer is fairly simple: differences between similar intentional objects are 
reflected by corresponding differences in the representational character of 
the desire. The representational character of a desire is the way it represents 
its object as being. If there are two intentional objects (i.e., non-obtaining 
states of affairs) that are similar enough to facilitate a comparison, but 
which differ in some respects, then the desires which they are the objects of 
will represent them as being different in just the ways that they are different, 
all other things being equal. A desire for a large cup of coffee will differ 
from a desire for a small cup of coffee just in that the latter represents its 
object as one’s having a large cup, whereas the latter represents its object as 
one’s having a small cup. This is because the properties of intentional 
objects, and so the representational character of desires for those objects, are 
explained by the appropriate sigma-state. What makes it the case that a 
desire is for a large cup of coffee also makes it the case that the desire 
represents its object as a large cup. Naturally, these are generalisations that 
describe the connections between sigma states and desires when everything 
is functioning perfectly; the existence of aberrant desires does nothing to 
undermine the descriptions of the mechanisms involved. 
 
 
 
3.2 Objection to Separating the Intentional and Perceptual Objects of Desire. 
 
 The perceptual object of a perception-like state is whatever object 
which causes the state to occur; the objects of non-epistemic perceiving. In 
the case of visual perceptual states, the perceptual and intentional objects 
are the same; a visual perceptual state is caused by the very same object that 
it is a way of coming to know about. Seeing a chocolate mousse being 
brought out of the kitchen causes the perception of a chocolate mousse 
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being brought out of the kitchen, and is a way of coming to know about that 
chocolate mousse. 
 One may be tempted to think the same might be true in the case of 
desire; that a desire is a non-epistemic perception of what it is a desire for. A 
desire for chocolate mousse would be a perception of a chocolate mousse; 
the intentional and perceptual objects of a desire would be the same. This 
cannot, however, be the case. The intentional object of a desire is not an 
object in the everyday sense, but rather a state of affairs which does not 
obtain. If the state of affairs which obtains is the “way things are”, then a 
non-obtaining state of affairs is a “way things are not”. On the assumption 
that the way things are not is not causally efficacious, the intentional objects 
of desires are not their perceptual objects25. Stampe offers much the same 
argument when he claims that the intentional object of a desire cannot be 
its perceptual object, since the perceptual object of any perception, desire 
included, must appear some way or other to the subject; and “what is 
presumably not (yet) the case cannot be appearing any way” (p.372). 
 This might be a problem. The proper explanation of the creation of 
desires must account for desires coming to have the intentional objects they 
have, but the intentional objects of desires cannot be their causes; perceptual 
objects, their presumed causes, cannot be identical with their intentional 
objects. So how desires come to have their intentional objects has to be 
explained in terms of their perceptual objects. Once the perceptual and 
intentional objects of desire are separated, there is a danger that the 
explanation of how the subject comes to have particular desires might turn 
                                                          
25 Even proposed instances of “negative causation” are not examples of causation 
by non-obtaining states of affairs. In the famous example, part of what caused the 
Titanic to hit an iceberg was the fact that there were no binoculars on the bridge. 
That there were no binoculars on the bridge is a fact; it is how things were, not how 
they were not. 
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out to be merely causal, and fail to connect desires to other mental states or 
to their objects in a way which could account for their rational authority. 
While it would be problematic to claim that the intentional objects of 
desires count in favour of having those desires (since it would be implausible 
to claim that desires are sources of rational authority if they are themselves 
had for reasons), one simple way to set desires into a normative framework 
would be to have the intentional objects of desires be their perceptual 
objects. Then, desires could be understood as perception-like responses to 
their objects, perhaps specifically to the goodness of their objects; desiring 
would be a matter of being sensitive to goodness, in a similar way to that in 
which visual perceiving is a matter of being responsive to reflectance 
properties. If desires are not responses to what they are desires for, then it 
may become difficult to see how they could count in favour of actions 
directed towards their intentional objects. All the burden of fitting desires 
into a normative framework falls on the perceptual objects. 
 Moreover, separating the perceptual and intentional objects of 
desires gives rise to what may appear to be an absurd consequence. It seems 
absolutely obvious that, at times, we desire things that we can easily 
perceive; and furthermore, that part of the reason why we want them is that 
we can see them, right there in front of us. For example, walking past a 
bookshop this morning I caught sight of a brand new, cloth-bound, hardback 
copy of one of my favourite books; immediately, I wanted it. A moment ago, 
I had not thought that such an object existed, much less want it; and yet now 
here it was, and I did. It certainly seemed as if what I wanted was the book, 
and my seeing it played a crucial role in my coming to want it. This cannot, 
however, be exactly right, if we assume that the book itself was the 
perceptual object of my desire, because the perceptual object of a desire is 
never its intentional object. Whatever account Stampe offers of the 
relationship between the perceptual and intentional objects of a desire must 
explain the intuition that sometimes subjects desire what they can perceive, 
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partly because they can perceive it. He is certainly aware of this 
phenomenon and the need for an explanation. He writes, for example: “[o]f 
course you do see things sometimes that seemd as if they would be good to 
have and you want them.” (p.371). 
 Both of these issues can be resolved by examining the way in which 
sigma states explain desires. A sigma state makes it the case that it would 
be good were the world a certain way, and causes the subject to desire that 
the world be that way. That is, it accounts for both the representational 
content of the desire, and the goodness of its object. Since perceptual states 
can be among the constituents of sigma states, the subject’s seeing 
something enticing can be part of the explanation of their coming to desire 
to have it, and the goodness of having it. 
 
3.3 The Goodness of Desires 
 
 Now the connection between desires and the goodness which they 
indicate has been set out, and the manner in which they indicate it made 
clear; but it seems we are not much nearer to knowing what is meant by 
“goodness” in this context. Or perhaps it would be better to say we are no 
nearer to knowing whether Stampe is justified in claiming that the property 
which desires indicate is “goodness” understood in the least theoretically 
loaded, most familiar sense available. 
If anything at all counts in favour of performing a particular action, 
then the goodness of that action surely must do. It could be argued that it 
does not follow from something’s being good that there is a reason to 
achieve it, all other things being equal. I shall regard Stampe’s use of 
“goodness” as stipulative, picking out that which there is a reason to realise, 
whatever that may be. So it would be possible, for instance, for a committed 
hedonist to read all instances of “good” in Stampe’s account as “pleasurable”, 
if they think that pleasurability is the property which there is always reason 
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to pursue. If it is accepted that desires function as indicators, then it can still 
be asked whether the property they indicate really is goodness; this question 
will be equivalent to asking whether desires, conceived of in the way Stampe 
does, really have rational authority at all. 
 Sigma-states explain why the intentional objects of desire are good, 
when they are. Sigma-states can include bodily states of the subject, of which 
Stampe’s example is the state of being depleted of water. They can also 
include perceptual states of the subject; and Stampe suggests (p.373), 
somewhat tentatively, that they might include other cognitive and conative 
states of the subject. So the explanation of the goodness of the intentional 
objects of desire, or the justification for claiming that the property bestowed 
on those objects by the sigma-state is goodness, must be given in terms of 
some of these component parts of sigma-states. 
 Let’s take a simple example. Suppose, following Stampe’s lead, that 
the state of being depleted of water comprises a sigma-state for a particular 
subject; since the subject is depleted of water, the prospect of drinking 
strikes them as good, and indeed it really would be good if they were to 
drink. And why would it be good if they were to drink? Because they are 
depleted of water. The fact that the subject is dehydrated is not supposed to 
count in favour of acting, but it is supposed to show that the desire to act is 
an indication of goodness, and therefore a reason to act. Dehydration, the 
sigma-state, makes it the case that there is a reason to act. It does so in the 
sense that it causes the desire, which actually is a reason to act. Moreover, it 
does so in the sense that it explains why desire is a reason to act, since the 
connection between sigma-states and the intentional objects of desire is 
what qualifies desires as indicators. 
 
3.4 Desiring and Perceiving 
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 This section will explain Stampe’s view of the relationship between 
desires and perceptions, and why it is better to regard the authority of desire 
as an instance of the authority of indicators, not of perceptions. Stampe 
identifies four reasons for thinking that desires have the rational authority 
of perceptions, listed below. Given the discussion of Tenenbaum’s 
appearances, above, it will probably be quite clear to the reader that (1-4) 
provide insufficient justification for the claim that desires have the authority 
of perceptions (though I will explain why this is so in each instance). Most 
obviously, of the four points below only (4) addresses the claim that desiring 
is a way of perceiving; (1-3) are all concerned with showing that desires are 
analogous to perceptual states in certain respects, not that they actually are 
perceptual states. It seems plausible that Stampe thinks of perception itself 
as very much like, if not actually a special kind of, indication; but it makes 
better sense of his position, given more modern philosophical commitments 
and debates about the nature of perception, to drop the perceptual analogy 
entirely, and simply think of desires as indicators. 
 
(1) Perceptions represent their objects in a distinct mode, and desires 
represent their objects in a distinct mode; so desiring fulfils one criterion 
for being a type of perception. Desiring and perceiving are both ways of 
representing objects to a subject. Different modes of sensory perception 
represent their objects in different ways (visually, somatically, aurally, etc.). 
Desire, too, has a distinctive mode of representation. Desiring something 
means being struck by its goodness; being affected or moved. The subject 
does not merely take it to be good, but it seems good to the subject. 
“Seeming”, according to Stampe, is a perceptual quality. 
It is false that “seeming” is a perceptual quality; at least in the sense 
in which it would have to be to support Stampe’s argument. Plausibly, what 
one fears seems a certain way to one; it seems frightful or fearsome. Surely 
fearing is not a case of perceiving what one is afraid of! Stampe’s claim that 
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seeming is a perceptual quality could be understood as the claim that 
perception in a particular mode is the paradigm case of things seeming a 
particular way to the subject; so the appeal to perception is understood as 
illustrative, not a substantive commitment. 
(2) Desires and perceptions have the same sort of rational authority; 
that is, they make sense of actions in the same way. Conceiving of desire as 
a way of perceiving allows us to understand the rational authority of desire 
by comparing it to the rational authority of perception. Seeing rain falling 
outside, one is struck in a particular way by the state of affairs of its raining: 
visually. Seeing rain falling makes sense of believing that it is raining; 
indeed, Stampe asserts that it counts in favour of believing that it is raining. 
Analogously, in desiring that it rain, one is struck in a particular way by the 
state of affairs: one wants it to be so. Desiring that it rain makes sense of 
certain actions, such as checking the weather forecast, or doing a rain dance. 
Perceiving, moreover, seems to have per se rational authority; what counts 
in favour of believing that it is raining, in the example, is the visual 
perception that rain is falling. It may be that there are better reasons not to 
believe that it is raining (if, for instance, one knows this appearance of rain 
to be a clever optical illusion); but nevertheless, the fact that it visually 
seems to one that it is raining remains a reason to believe that it is, albeit a 
defeasible one. Likewise, the fact that it seems, in the desiderative sense, to 
one that rainfall would be good counts in favour of doing a rain dance, even 
if there are better reasons not to (suppose one knows that rain dances are 
very time consuming). 
This seems an accurate description of the rational authority of desire, 
in that it differentiates the authority of desire from that of belief, and gets 
the “scope” of desire’s authority right; a single desire is rarely a conclusive 
reason to perform an action, and particular desires are often overruled. It 
does not, however, support the conclusion that desires are perceptions; it 
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would only do so if it were also the case that kinds of state are individuated 
by differences in their rational authority. 
(3) Desiring is an instance of the subject’s being responsive to a 
certain property, just as perceptions are instances of sensitivity to properties. 
To desire something is to be responsive to its goodness in a particular way, 
just as to see something is to be visually sensitive to (let us suppose) its 
reflectance properties. 
It may be true that both perceiving and desiring are instances of the 
subject’s being sensitive to a certain type of property and responding in a 
particular way; but a whole host of mental states which seem to be neither 
desires nor perceptual state fit this restriction. For example, to be morally 
indignant is to respond to the unfairness or injustice in a situation by feeling 
a particular way; to be sad is to respond to the pathos in a situation in a 
certain way, and so on. 
(4) There is a difference between the perceptual and intentional 
objects of desire, which is analogous to the difference between epistemic 
and non-epistemic objects of perception. The non-epistemic object of a 
perception is what causes it; whatever the perception constitutes an instance 
of sensitivity to. The epistemic object of a perception is what the subject 
comes to know through perceiving. Take, for instance, seeing a bowl of red 
apples. The non-epistemic object of the perception is (let’s say) the 
reflectance properties of the bowl and the apples. The epistemic object of 
the perception is what the subject comes to know through perceiving; that 
there is a bowl of red apples on the table. 
Drawing a distinction between the perceptual and intentional objects 
of desire (what causes the desire and what the subject wants, in other words) 
gives Stampe’s account a lot of explanatory power, and a way to understand 
desires as connected with other mental states and considerations without 
forfeiting their per se rational authority. As we saw in section 4.2, however, 
the relationship between a desire and its cause cannot be the same as the 
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relationship between a perceptual state and its non-epistemic object; so this 
fourth and final observation does little or nothing to support the claim that 
desires are perceptual states. 
 
3.5 A Possible Objection Undermined 
 
As soon as we introduce goodness into the discussion, the temptation 
arises to claim that it is the goodness itself that counts in favour of action, 
not the subject’s desires. If the intentional objects of desires are good, then 
why wouldn’t it be that goodness which counts in favour of action, not the 
desire for it? Why would it be necessary to appeal to desires to explain 
intentional actions, when we could appeal directly to their intentional 
objects? To claim that the goodness of what is desired counts in favour of 
action would be to model the rational authority of desire after that of belief. 
We have already seen why the intentional objects of desire cannot be the 
source of desire’s rational authority, as they would be if they counted in 
favour of action, in chapter 4 section 2.2. The intentional object of a desire 
is not an object in the ordinary sense; it is a state of affairs which does not 
obtain. All reasons are facts , and non-obtaining states of affairs, ways the 
world is not, are not facts. The intentional objects of desire, therefore, cannot 
be reasons for action, because they are not facts, and all reasons are facts. 
There is a sense in which it is false to say that the intentional objects 
of a desire are (or can be) good. They are never really good, because they 
are never really anything. They are non-obtaining states of affairs; ways the 
world is not. Saying that the intentional object of a desire is good, is really a 
shorthand for saying that the actual situation is such that it would be good 
were things the way the intentional object depicts. What a sigma-state 
explains is not, strictly speaking, the attribution of a certain property to the 
intentional object of a desire; what it explains is the fact that it would be 
good were the intentional object of the desire to be realized. 
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3.6 Where the Explanation Has to End 
 
Could a staunch opponent, at this point, appeal once again to the 
simple anti-Humean challenge (“just because you want to phi doesn’t mean 
there is a reason to do it”)? Could they claim that the subject’s being in a 
certain sigma-state does not make it that case that it would be good were the 
object of their desires to be achieved? That one is dehydrated, they might 
object, does not make it the case that it would be good were one to drink. If 
not, then the attempt to explain why desires count in favour of action by 
appeal to sigma-states fails, since desire would fail to be an indication of 
goodness. In order for this sort of objection to count against Stampe’s view, 
it must be claimed that the sigma-state does not confer any goodness on the 
intentional object of the related desire, whatsoever; it would not be enough 
were this opponent to claim that sigma-states do not necessarily give rise to 
sufficient reasons to act, since that much is evident and obviously 
compatible with Stampe’s view. 
Of course, making this objection against the example in question, 
dehydration and the desire to drink, seems ridiculous. If anyone were to 
earnestly claim that a subject’s being dehydrated does not, all other things 
being equal, make it the case that it would be good were they to drink, then 
it is not at all clear what anyone could say in response. The ceteris paribus 
clause in the last sentence is very important. I do not intend to claim that a 
subject’s being dehydrated makes it the case that, all things considered, it 
would be good were they to drink. We can imagine circumstances in which 
there are decisive reasons against the thirsty subject drinking, and still 
maintain that the Stampe-style account of the rational authority of desire is 
right about what makes desires indications of the goodness of their objects. 
One might claim that, with decisive reasons to the contrary in play, 
the subject’s dehydration does not make it good that they drink, to any extent 
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at all. But the claim I take to be non-controversial is that, in the absence of 
competing reasons, dehydration makes it the case that it would be good to 
drink. Whether dehydration makes it that case that it would be somewhat 
good to drink, in the face of a decisive reason not to, is immaterial once it is 
agreed that it would make it good to drink, were it not for the strong reason 
not to. Those philosophers who think that, in any given situation, an action 
is either the best available or not good at all, can agree with the substance 
of the view of the rational authority of desire put forward here; they would 
simply be committed to the claim that, in any given situation, only one 
desire correctly indicates goodness in its object. 
The anti-Humean challenge can be raised, however, with regard to 
examples that are a lot less clear cut; in particular, those which involve 
desires that are not so obviously grounded in bodily states of the subject 
(like Bert’s desire for the Alphacycle). If it is false that all desires are 
grounded in bodily states of the subject, there will be some Stampe-style 
desires to which the basic anti-Humean challenge can be put. Having said 
that, it is by no means settled that there are any desires which are not 
ultimately grounded in bodily states of the subject. Besides bodily states of 
the subject, all a sigma-state can comprise are that subject’s beliefs, desires, 
perceptions and other mental states. If all of these other states are 
themselves grounded in bodily states of the subject – which include, I 
presume, brain states – then even desires whose sigma-states do not include 
bodily states directly will ultimately owe their existence to the subject’s body. 
Regardless of the role of bodily states in grounding the goodness of 
the intentional objects of desire, it appears that the basic anti-Humean 
challenge can be raised against at least the more complex Stampe-style 
desires, in a form that makes sense, and that might reasonably expect a 
philosophical answer. The anti-Humean can ask why sigma-states make the 
intentional objects of desires good to achieve; that is, why some aggregate 
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of states of the subject makes it the case that it would be good were things a 
certain way (namely, the way the subject wants them to be). 
Considering this objection brings us back to a point I raised when 
discussing the simple satisfaction view in chapter 4. A Humean account of 
practical reasoning has to tread a fine line between being able to explain 
why it is that desires count in favour of action in enough depth to make it 
plausible that they do, while avoiding locating the source of rational 
authority outside of desire itself. The authority of desire has to be accounted 
for, to some extent at least, or else desires will seem too arbitrary, too much 
like the dictates of the coin-flipping homunculus, to be the basis of practical 
reasoning. But giving an account of the normativity of desire runs the risk 
of explaining it away, typically by pointing to some set of considerations that 
constitute reasons for holding desires; then it can be claimed that it is those 
considerations that really count in favour of action, and desires are not 
doing any of the philosophical work. 
It is around this point that, I think, the explanation “bottoms out”; 
there is nothing else substantial or revealing to say in defence of Stampe-
style desires. That this is so in the case of dehydration is clear; there is simply 
nothing that can be said to one who doubts that being dehydrated makes it 
good to drink, all other things being equal. I think the same is true in a more 
general sense; if someone truly doubts that being in a state that gives rise to 
a non-deviant desire makes it such that the intentional object of that desire 
is good, then it seems likely that they will be unsatisfied with any further 
argument that proceeds along these lines. After all, the account on offer has 
already, by this point, provided a detailed explanation of how it is that desires 
come to be sources of rational authority; the normative dimension of desire, 
the feature in virtue of which desires make sense of action, has been pursued 
and characterized exhaustively. 
So it can be imagined that the anti-Humean might agree with 
Stampe’s characterization of desires but deny that sigma-states can play the 
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role set out for them, and so deny that wanting a bicycle or a book or a 
chocolate mousse counts in favour of action. At this point, it seems that no 
further argument can be given, without running the risk of locating the 
source of rational authority outside of desires themselves. 
Allow me to try persuasion, instead. Although there may be nothing 
better to say in defence of Stampe’s view once we reach the point at which 
the explanatory relation between sigma-states and goodness is called into 
question, that is not to say there is nothing to be said at all. It might be that 
the idea that sigma-states confer goodness on the intentional objects of 
desires cannot be made more plausible in the abstract, but consideration of 
particular sigma-states and the intentional objects they give rise to can make 
it easier to believe in the relation. I take it that putting forward these sorts 
of expositions does not amount to philosophical progress towards the goal 
of understanding how desires come to have rational authority; no changes 
are being made to the account, it is simply a question of applying it to 
particular cases. 
It is easy to doubt the generalization “sigma-states confer goodness 
onto the intentional objects of desire”, but hard to be sceptical of the idea 
that dehydration (the label I have used to refer to the particular sigma-state 
of being depleted of water) makes it the case that it would be good were one 
to drink (that is, makes it such that the obtaining of a state of affairs in which 
the subject drinks, the intentional object of a desire to drink, would be good). 
Perhaps this is because dehydration is a familiar concept, and it is easy to 
accept that dehydration, as well as being a state of water depletion, is a state 
in which it would be good were one to drink. As applied to a human subject, 
dehydration has a clear, normative connection to drinking. Naturally, things 
other than humans can be “dehydrated”; a sponge, for instance, becomes 
literally dehydrated when squeezed. But there is nothing particularly good 
about a sponge being hydrated, or anything really bad about it being 
dehydrated; which is to say, sponges do not have sigma-states. 
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 Perhaps in any concrete example of a sigma-state and its 
corresponding intentional object, the details can be filled in in such a way 
that the connection between the two cannot be reasonably doubted. Given 
the scope for variation between different constituent parts of sigma-states, 
the uniqueness and eccentricity of different subjects, and the almost 
limitless possibilities of the intentional objects of desire, it is not clear how 
it could be proven that such a move will always be available. It may be that, 
given the tremendous variety involved, there is very little that is universally 
true of the relationships between sigma-states and the intentional objects of 
desire. For instance, is it reasonable to expect that what makes it plausible 
that there is an explanatory relation between dehydration and the goodness 
of drinking is the same as what makes it plausible that there is an 
explanatory connection between the goodness of being an academic 
philosopher and its sigma-state? Even so, I will put forward one example as 
a sort of “proof of concept”26. Let’s return to Bert and the Alphacycle once 
again. Bert has a desire to own the Alphacycle; that is, owning the 
Alphacycle strikes him as something worth doing, or bringing about. 
Specifically, he finds the bike’s clean lines and bright colours attractive, and 
is wont to imagine himself riding it out of the shop and into town (as I wrote 
earlier). The smooth, aerodynamic shape evokes in Bert a sense of fast and 
fluid motion, putting him in mind of the pleasant sensation of cycling at 
speed (though he may not realize that this is going on). Perhaps the bright 
paintwork is reminiscent of the team colours worn by professional cyclists, 
whom Bert admires, and would hope to be associated with. 
Those factors explain why Bert wants this bicycle; that is, they are 
part of the sigma-state. Moreover, since the Alphacycle has these 
                                                          
26 Not to be mistaken for a “conceptual proof”; rather, evidence that there is nothing 
obviously wrong about the idea that particular examples of sigma-states playing an 
explanatory role are more persuasive than consideration of the general proposition 
that that role is always played by a sigma-state. 
 
177 
 
associations for Bert (speed, proficiency and success), it is plausible that he 
will be more motivated to use it, gain more satisfaction from doing so, and 
ultimately become a better cyclist. So the factors which explain why Bert 
wants the Alphacycle also make it the case that, were he to buy the 
Alphacycle rather than another bike, he would become a better cyclist. On 
the assumption that, other things being equal, it would be good were Bert 
to become a better cyclist (or at least, it would be better than him becoming 
a less competent cyclist), the same factors which explain his wanting the 
Alphacycle also explain why his having it would be a good thing. The factors 
in question are memories and associations, which can probably be thought 
of as perceptions and beliefs (or if not, Stampe’s account can tolerate the 
minor modification to the effect that memories and associations can 
comprise sigma-states). 
  
4. The “Missing Desires” Problem 
 
 In this section, I will put forward a problem for Stampe’s account 
drawing on Schueler’s “putting together” point. Four possible responses 
come to light, of which two are non-starters, but the other two appear to 
provide ways to enhance Stampe’s core account which go beyond simply 
solving the problem posed here. I will argue that a subject has the desires 
they do not merely because they have a collection of other mental and 
bodily states (a sigma-state), but because of the occurrence of a mental event 
(occasionally a mental action) involving those states. 
 
4.1 The Problem 
 
 Often, subjects simply fail to have desires which we might expect 
them to have, based on their other preferences, beliefs, experiences, and in 
particular, their other desires. For example, it is possible to have a burning 
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desire to see performances of Shakespeare’s plays, but be disinterested 
towards Marlowe. These situations are, I take it, quite commonplace, and 
they do not seem to entail any inconsistency or incoherence on the part of 
the subject. Stampe’s account aims to explain why subjects have the desires 
they do by appeal to other states of the subject which jointly make it the case 
that it would be good were some state of affairs to obtain. 
A natural way to characterize cases of missing desires in Stampe’s 
terms would be to think of them as instances where a set of mental and 
bodily states of the subject makes it the case that it would be good were two 
non-exclusive states of affairs to obtain, but the subject only comes to desire 
that one of those states of affairs obtain, and is indifferent towards the other.  
In that case, why does the same set of states give rise to just one such desire, 
and not both? Or, why one as opposed to the other? It is not clear that 
Stampe’s account, as it stands, has the resources to answer these questions; 
in which case, it does not provide a full explanation of the desires that the 
subject does have. 
This is a pressing problem for Stampe’s account because of his claims 
about the representational character of desires. If a desire is a mental state 
with a certain representational character, then it cannot be claimed that the 
subject has a desire unless the object of that desire is represented to them, 
in the appropriate mode. 
 This situation is comparable to Schueler’s “putting together” problem, 
discussed in chapter 2. There, Schueler objected that it is quite possible for 
a subject to have a belief and desire (or two beliefs) from which a practical 
conclusion follows, and simply fail to draw the inference. Schueler argued 
that, in light of the putting together point, the existence of some mental 
states the contents of which entail a conclusion is insufficient to explain a 
subject’s actually arriving at that conclusion. He argued that mental actions 
would be required to make the explanation work, which presented a 
problem for the strict backgrounding view, since the strict backgrounding 
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view is, of course, supposed to explain actions. Here, it seems possible for a 
subject to have the mental and bodily states which make it that case that it 
would be good were some state of affairs to obtain, and fail to desire that 
that state of affairs come to pass. The explanation is insufficient, and must 
be augmented; but by what? 
 
4.2 Two Types of Solution: State-Based and Occurrence-Based 
 
  Let us call the set of states which makes it the case that it would be 
good were a certain state of affairs to obtain, but which fails to give rise to a 
desire, a “delta state”; now the question is, what is the difference between a 
delta-state and a sigma-state? There seem to be two types of option; either a 
delta-state lacks some constituent state which a sigma-state possesses, or 
some mental occurrence is involved in the explanation of the transition 
from delta to sigma (i.e., some mental occurrence partly explains the 
subject’s coming to have a desire). The arguments for and against either 
option are much the same as those for state-based and occurrence-based 
responses to Schueler’s putting-together point, so I will not spend too long 
on them here. More importantly, the addition that must be made to Stampe’s 
account in order to solve the Missing Desire problem also offers a way to 
explain a widely-held intuition about desires, or perhaps about rationally 
authoritative states generally. 
 It seems very likely that no state will be able to explain the transition 
from a delta state to a sigma state (i.e., to explain how a subject comes to 
have a particular desire), because for every sigma state, it is possible to 
imagine a delta state which shares all of its components. That is, for any 
given collection of mental and bodily states which gives rise to a desire, it 
will be possible to imagine a situation in which all of those states are present 
but no desire results. This is analogous to Schueler’s claim that the subject’s 
drawing an inference from two beliefs cannot be explained by the addition 
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of further beliefs,  since one would then be required to explain the subject’s 
bringing the further belief into contact with the original two, and so on. 
Discussion of Schueler’s putting-together point could be restricted to 
only including mental states which could be involved in reasoning (i.e., 
mental states with propositional contents); in responses to the Missing 
Desire problem, however, the proponent of a state-based solution may appeal 
to any bodily or mental state. As such, the sort of response put forward in 
this paragraph cannot be as convincing here as it was for Schueler. It seems 
clear that no further belief can explain a subject’s drawing an inference, 
since inferences themselves are drawn from beliefs; so the proposed solution 
appeals to the very same mechanism it was supposed to explain. The point 
can probably be extended to cover any state with propositional content, but 
it is hard to see whether or not it can be extended to every bodily or mental 
state. Perhaps there could be some state which relates to the contents of a 
delta state in a different way to how those states relate to each other; then 
the proposed solution would appeal to a different mechanism from the one 
it is supposed to account for. Given the ambiguity regarding how exactly the 
components of a sigma-state relate to one another, this possibility cannot be 
ruled out. 
In the absence of any clear indication or evidence of what the mystery 
state might be, let us consider occurrence-based solutions instead. 
Supposing that some mental occurrence explains the transition from a delta 
state to a sigma state (i.e., a subject coming to have a desire), it is important 
to know whether that mental occurrence is an action or an event. That is, to 
put it crudely, whether the subject brings it about that they come to desire 
something, or whether it just happens to them. If it is the former, that could 
amount to a serious problem for the Humean view. If it is claimed that 
sigma states explain desires, and desires explain actions, it had better not be 
claimed that actions explain sigma states. Asserting these three claims 
would produce the same sorts of problems discussed in chapter 2. In short, 
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it would severely diminish the explanatory role of played by desire, and it 
might involve the account in a vicious circularity (if the account is 
committed to providing an explanation of mental actions in which desires 
play the same role they do in as its explanation of bodily actions, which it 
would be if, for example, it were committed to thinking of bodily and mental 
actions as intentional actions in the very same sense). 
On the face of it, the claim that desires are necessarily the results of 
mental actions seems implausible. It seems pretty clear that in the vast 
majority of cases, coming to desire something is not preceded by a decision, 
or consideration of evidence, or explained by any sort of deliberation. But 
non-Humeans, especially those sympathetic to the higher-order approval 
model of rational authority, will want to exert pressure in a different 
direction. At various stages in this thesis, I have argued that characterizing 
a workable Humean theory of practical reasoning will require its proponent 
to adopt a strictly defined and limited conception of “desire”. Now, that 
strategy can be made to play against the Humean; the opponent might 
argue that the mental states which fall in that limited range, i.e., genuine 
desires, are the results of mental actions. The strong intuition that desires 
are not generally brought about through action is the product of lumping 
all desire-like states under one heading. Of course, the non-Humean will 
contend, coming to fancy or feel like something need not be the result of 
an action; but those states are not genuine desires. One of the chief features 
of genuine desires is that they are sources of rational authority, whereas the 
mental states associated with feeling like doing something, for example, are 
not (or at least, need not be). Genuine desires, those that have the authority 
in themselves to make sense of action, are the products of mental actions. 
The non-Humean can support this line of objection by arguing that 
it allows us to account for the rational authority of desire by appeal to 
higher-order approval; either by claiming that a mental action of a familiar 
type is required for the transition between a delta state and a sigma state, or 
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else by claiming that the transition itself is a mental action (i.e., that “coming 
to desire” is a mental action). By a “familiar type” of mental action, I mean 
a mental action which occurs in other contexts, and for which there is a well-
known name; for example, judging, deciding, observing (in the active 
sense), or drawing an inference. 
The first alternative offers an easy way to understand the account as 
a higher-order approval one. Any one of a range of familiar kinds of mental 
action could form the basis for a higher-order approval account; that is, any 
of these types of mental action could be understood as the mechanism by 
which the subject approves of the representations. In Scanlon’s account, the 
subject approves certain courses of action by judging that there is a reason 
to perform them; in Tenenbaum’s account, the subject approves the 
representational content of desires by finding a coherent fit for it in their 
stock of other appearances. In the hybrid view on offer here, perhaps the 
subject would judge that it would be good were the world a certain way, or 
find out that it would be good, given their other bodily and mental states. It 
is likely that such an account would be non-Humean, since it would put 
mental actions at the foundation of the explanation of intentional action. 
There is a significant problem with this proposal, however; whatever 
mental action is supposed to explain the transition from a delta state to a 
sigma state, there is no clear reason why the performance of that mental 
action would result in the production of a desire. For example, it is not 
obvious that judging that it would be good were the world a certain way 
must result in the world’s being that way seeming good to the subject, in the 
manner distinctive of desiring. Or rather, given that this proposal is to be 
contrasted with the claim that coming to desire is a particular type of mental 
action, I should say: it is not obvious that judging that it would be good were 
the world a certain way, is itself an instance of, or an act of, coming to desire 
that it be that way. After all, most mental actions seem to have 
corresponding mental states; in judging one arrives at a judgement, 
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deciding culminates in decision, observing produces observations (which 
are probably beliefs). Of course, a proponent of the view that a pre-existing 
type of mental action is required in order to come to desire something could 
object that they are not committed to Stampe’s view of the representational 
characteristics of desire, and that they are adopting this view on its own 
merits. But then, if one were to take that line, it would not be clear why 
desires should form part of the account at all. If the aim here is not to defend 
Stampe’s account of the rational authority of desire, then why not stick with 
whatever mental state is correlated with whichever mental action is 
introduced into the account? 
The second alternative, that coming to desire is a mental action of a 
distinctive type, seems more promising in this respect at least; clearly an act 
of coming to desire results in the subject’ having a desire, when successful. 
That is, if there is such a type of mental action as coming to desire, then 
plausibly it would be picked out and individuated from other types of mental 
action precisely by the fact that, when successful, action of that type 
culminate in desires. The disadvantages are that the account seems very ad 
hoc, and that it is not clear what the mental action “coming to desire” might 
be. To put it another way, it is not clear why anyone ought to regard coming 
to desire as a mental action, especially given that everyday life seems to 
include experiences that are aptly characterized as instances of coming to 
desire things, and those experiences do not always seem to be experiences 
of mental action. This point holds true even when we restrict it to apply only 
to those desires which have rational authority. For example, it is widely 
accepted that desires properly explain decisions about matters of taste, such 
as what to have for dinner. Desiring fish and chips for dinner properly 
explains going to the chip shop; and I take it for granted that anyone who 
has ever walked past a chip shop while it’s open knows what it is like to come 
to desire chips. That instance of coming to have a familiar, authoritative 
desire, does not seem to be an instance of the subject’s performing a mental 
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action; so unless chip-based desires are in some way aberrant, it cannot be 
the case that every instance of coming to have an authoritative desire is a 
mental action. 
 The only viable option seems to be to claim that coming to have a 
desire is a mental event. In that case, we may ask whether coming to desire 
is a mental event of an already-familiar type, or a distinctive kind in its own 
right; and whether coming to desire is necessarily a mental event, or 
whether it might on occasion be a mental action. 
 Taking the second question first, there is no clear reason for thinking 
that coming to desire is never a mental action. The arguments above support 
the conclusion that coming to desire is not necessarily a mental action, and 
their familiarity suggests that it may be so only rarely; but neither of these 
factors support the conclusion that coming to desire is never a mental 
action. In fact, much as examples of the mental event seem commonplace, 
bringing oneself to desire is not inconceivable either. A significant subset of 
Missing Desire cases will be those where the subject can see that it would 
make sense for them to have the desire they conspicuously lack, and judge 
that it would be good were they to have it. A subject finding themselves in 
this situation may, for example, deliberately dwell on the putatively 
desirable aspects of the object they judge it would be good were they to 
desire; or rehearse the reasons there are for desiring it; or convince 
themselves that having the desire is a virtue, and pay approving attention to 
it in others, in the hope of cultivating their own desire for it. It seems 
plausible that at least some of these strategies will involve the performance 
of mental actions; whether those mental actions would be the proximal 
causes of the desires they help to bring about is a further issue, but the 
balance of evidence seems to suggest that coming to have a desire may be a 
mental action, though it need not be. 
 If the arguments of the preceding paragraphs are correct, then 
coming to desire may be a mental action of a familiar kind, but it is typically 
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a mental event. Above, I wrote that claiming that coming to desire is a 
mental action of a distinctive kind would seem ad hoc, in light of the fact 
that everyday experience seems to suggest that coming to desire is not 
always a mental action at all. The same sorts of examples I appealed to there 
seem to support the conclusion that coming to desire could be a distinctive 
kind of mental event. For instance, when walking past a chip shop one comes 
to desire chips; on seeing an excellent edition of a beloved book, one begins 
to desire to own it; on feeling the sun on one’s face, one desires to go 
somewhere warm on holiday. What makes these experiences recognizably 
similar, I suggest, is that they are all experiences of a single, distinctive kind 
of mental happening; coming to desire. 
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Chapter 7 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
In this final chapter, I will summarise the two fundamental 
problems dealt with in this thesis (section 1), and the extended 
argument I have used to address them (section 2). 
 
1. Two Fundamental Problems 
 
A large number of the puzzles and problems facing the Humean 
theory of practical reasoning are rooted in a conflict between a basic 
requirement of practical reasoning and an apparent feature of the nature of 
desire. If reasoning practically is a way of arriving at a normative conclusion, 
then it has to be concerned with the way things are independently (in a 
certain sense) from the subject. If reasoning practically is supposed to be a 
way of arriving at reasoned, well-supported conclusion about the way the 
world ought to be, then it has to be constrained and regulated by the way 
the world already is; or at least, the subject’s best assessment of how it is. 
Practical reasoning, if it is a way of arriving at a genuinely normative 
conclusion, cannot be necessarily guided by or pre-occupied with 
considerations that are isolated, transient or capricious. If the practical 
inferences a subject may draw were necessarily determined by flipping 
coins, or the direction of the wind, or phases of the moon, then there could 
be no true practical reasoning. 
Unfortunately, desires seem precisely isolated, transient and 
capricious; absolutely the wrong sort of considerations to play a decisive or 
fundamental role in practical reasoning. Why a subject desires the things 
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they do, or even what they desire in the first place, can remain a complete 
mystery to them. What a subject desires can change without warning or 
explanation, and a subject may have desires which run contrary to their 
deeply-held convictions. Many philosophers have noticed the apparent 
unsuitability of desires to play any role in practical reasoning, and argued 
that the two are best regarded as completely unrelated. 
Conflict between the “outward-looking” nature of practical reasoning 
and the apparently “inward-looking” nature of desire gives rise to two 
central challenges with regard to formulating a Humean theory of practical 
reasoning. First, if desires are as inward-looking as they may seem, then 
placing a desire into a piece of practical reasoning will distort the focus or 
concern of that piece of reasoning. If desires are not connected in any 
significant way with their objects or with the subject’s other mental states, it 
is hard to see how a piece of practical reasoning which involves a desire can 
be about anything but that desire; and if it is about the subject desires, then 
it is hard to see how its conclusion can be about what the subject ought to 
do, rather than about what they desire, or desire to do. 
Secondly, even if it could be proven that desires do not have this 
troublesome tendency to deform any reasoning they come into contact with, 
this would not amount to proving that they are the right sort of 
consideration to feature in practical reasoning at all – let alone to be 
necessary features of practical reasoning, a claim to which the Humean is 
committed. Desires could turn out to be much like any other features of the 
world; pineapples, for instance. There are no peculiar problems surrounding 
the role played by pineapples in practical reasoning. It is perfectly possible 
to draw a normative conclusion from premises among which pineapples 
feature; but nobody in their right mind would claim that pineapples play a 
special role in practical reasoning, much less that no practical inferences 
can be drawn without pineapples. 
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Any proponent of the Humean theory of practical reasoning has, 
therefore, to show both that desires are not so inward-looking that they 
distort any reasoning of which they are a part, and that they are outward-
looking enough play a special role in practical reasoning (i.e., a more 
significant role than could be played by pineapples). The former I have 
referred to as the Self-Absorption Problem, and the latter, the Problem of 
Normativity. Using these two terms and a distinction between episodes of 
practical reasoning and the arguments which structure them (see chapter 
2), it is possible to classify many of the objections ranged against the 
Humean theory of practical reasoning as problems of one of four kinds: 
 
 
 Normativity Self-Absorption 
Episode of 
Reasoning 
Premises in reasoning are 
mental representations 
 
Practical reasoning is a mental 
action 
Psychological inaccuracy 
 
 
Phenomenological 
implausibility 
Argument Reasoning from desires 
results in committing the 
naturalistic fallacy 
Nothing that can appear 
in the premises of an 
argument is identical with 
a desire 
 
The problems listed in the table are common-or-garden 
philosophical conundrums, standing in the way of formulating a convincing 
Humean Theory of Practical reasoning; but they are grounded in the deeper 
conflict between the inward-looking nature of desire and the outward-
looking nature of practical reasoning. That is to say, they are based on 
widely-accepted propositions about practical reasoning and desires (though 
the real extent and nature of desire’s self-absorption is, as I have argued, 
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rather different to caricature I presented above). As such, these problems 
are potential sources of insight into the relationship between practical 
reasoning and desire. So although they are to be solved, they ought to be 
solved by alterations and concessions on the part of the Humean. Or to put 
it another way, by making substantive claims about the nature of desire and 
the role it plays in practical reasoning, in a way that is sensitive to the 
concerns and intuitions of the non-Humeans. That, of course, has been the 
aim of this thesis; in the next section, I summarise the arguments I have put 
forward against the problems in the table above. 
 
2. Summary of the Arguments 
 
 Chapters 2 and 3 use the self-ascriptive and strict-backgrounding 
views to make clear what is required of a working Humean theory of 
practical reasoning. In chapters 4, 5 and 6, I attempt to develop a theory 
which meets these requirements, drawing heavily on Stampe’s view in “The 
Authority of Desire”. 
 
3.1 Chapter 2: The Self-Ascriptive View 
 
An obvious way to understand desires in practical reasoning is 
through the self-ascriptive model; that is, to claim that desires feature in 
practical arguments when one of the premises is the self-ascription of a 
desire: “I desire…”. Then, practical arguments could take the form of 
syllogisms, where the self-ascription form the major premise, the minor 
premise is a proposition about how to satisfy the desire self-ascribed by the 
major premise, and the conclusion is a judgement about what to do. 
 It could be argued that the self-ascriptive practical syllogism is not a 
valid form of inference, since it derives a conclusion about how things ought 
to be from premises which are solely about how things are. I argued that the 
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practical syllogism can only be seen in this light if one reads the desire self-
ascription in the major premise at face value; that is, as merely stating a fact 
about the subject's psychology. It is wholly implausible that they should be 
read this way. Explanations in philosophy and everyday experience are 
littered with self-ascriptions of other states, particularly belief and 
knowledge. Desire self-ascriptions are to be understood in a way analogous 
to knowledge self-ascriptions; they are not to be regarded as shifting the 
subject of the explanation from the content of the state to the state itself, 
but the state itself does make a difference to what inferences may be drawn 
from that content. 
 Schueler argues that proponents of the self-ascriptive view are 
committed to a view of the psychology of practical reasoning which is, on 
reflection, quite obviously false. The self-ascriptive view claims that every 
valid practical argument includes a premise which ascribes a desire to the 
subject; but it is quite obvious that not every instance of correct, explicit 
practical reasoning begins with the subject thinking to themselves, “I 
desire…”, or words to that effect. Schueler is clearly correct about this, but 
he seems to regard it as a serious problem for the Humean theory of 
practical reasoning generally; really, it is only a knock-down argument 
against the self-ascriptive view. What Schueler’s objection here shows, is that 
a successful Humean theory of practical reasoning has to put forward a 
careful account of how desires feature in practical reasoning; the simple 
self-ascriptive view is psychologically inaccurate. 
 
3.2 Chapter 3: The Strict Backgrounding View 
 
 Given that there are significant obstacles to forming a Humean 
theory of practical reasoning, it might be thought that Humeans should not 
appeal to practical reasoning at all, but should aim to properly explain 
intentional action in some other way. In “Backgrounding Desires”, Pettit and 
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Smith argue that Humean explanations of intentional action ought not to 
appeal to practical reasoning; rather, they claim, desires feature in 
Davidsonian rationalising explanations which do not amount to or involve 
episodes of practical reasoning (section 3.1-2). 
Schueler objects that Pettit and Smith’s “strict backgrounding view” 
is not a complete explanation of intentional action. The mere existence of 
mental states in the mind of the subject does not explain the subject coming 
to perform some intentional action which the contents of those mental 
states comprise an argument in support of. This is clear from the existence 
of those situations where there is good reason for thinking the subject knows 
a simple way to get themselves out of a predicament, and they choose much 
more complicated means. Schueler argues that the subject must perform a 
mental action in order to come to perform the intentional bodily action, and 
that the mental action is an act of putting together the mental states. This is 
a problem for the Humean theory for two reasons. First, according to 
Schueler, if practical reasoning is the mental action of bringing two mental 
states together, then it must involve the subject’s awareness of those mental 
states. So what in fact gets brought together through the subject’s action are 
not the mental states themselves, but the subject’s representations of them; 
that is, their beliefs about them. So even if we assume that desires are present 
in the premises of some practical arguments, it turns out that those desires 
will not be part of the episodes of practical reasoning which that argument 
structures. Secondly, if practical reasoning is a mental action, then the 
desires which appear in practical reasoning are not at the basis of the 
explanation of intentional action; the Humean theory of practical reasoning 
is false. 
As well as highlighting some problems internal to the account, I 
argue that Schueler is correct to claim that something must happen in the 
mind of the subject in order to explain intentional actions in the right way; 
the coming together of the mental states the contents of which appear in 
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practical reasoning. There is insufficient justification, however, for claiming 
that the subject must bring these states together through the performance 
of a mental action. Schueler claims that it must be a mental action, since the 
bringing together of mental states in order to bring about intentional action 
is practical reasoning; but Schueler’s own descriptions of the coming 
together of these mental states do not sound like descriptions of mental 
actions. Indeed, there are numerous English phrases which seem to describe 
the coming together of mental states in the requisite way (i.e., so as to 
explain intentional an action  properly) which do not seem to describe 
mental actions. I conclude that it is open to a Humean to claim that a mental 
event has to form part of the explanation of intentional action; and that in 
specific instances, this event may be a mental action; but that it need not be 
in every case. If practical reasoning is not necessarily a mental action, then 
neither of Schueler’s objections to the Humean theory are realised. In the 
first case, since no mental action is required, the subject’s awareness of the 
mental states need not figure in the explanation. In the second case, since 
no mental action necessarily forms part of the explanation, the Humean 
theory is unaffected. 
 The chief advantage of adopting a strict backgrounding view is 
supposed to be that it relieves the proponent of the Humean view of any 
obligation to explain how desires feature in practical reasoning. There is no 
possibility of a strict backgrounder making implausible claims about the 
psychology of practical reasoning, since they need not make any claims 
about the psychology of practical reasoning at all. I argue, however, that 
adopting the strict backgrounding view does not actually have this 
advantage. On the strict backgrounding view, desires are supposed to 
participate in rationalising explanations of intentional action; explanations 
which show the positive light in which the subject saw their action, by appeal 
to the subject’s mental states, but which do not appeal to episodes of 
practical reasoning. What makes it possible to give these explanations is the 
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fact that the mental states in question can be seen to jointly constitute the 
subject’s positive evaluation of their action (i.e., the positive light in which 
the subject sees their action). In order to understand this sort of explanation, 
we have to understand how the mental states it appeals to relate to one 
another, i.e., the way in which they jointly constitute the subject’s positive 
evaluation of their action. Given that mental states are individuated by their 
propositional contents, claiming that a set of the subject’s mental states 
jointly constitute the subject’s positive evaluation of their action commits 
one to the claim that the contents of that set of the subject’s mental states 
form an argument in favour of their action; that is, a practical argument. In 
particular, the very practical argument which would structure the episode 
of practical reasoning, by appeal to which the subject’s action might 
otherwise be explained. In short, adopting the strict backgrounding view 
allows the Humean to avoid saying anything about occurrent episodes of 
practical reasoning, but they are still committed to explaining how desires 
come to feature in the premises of practical arguments, and facing all the 
problems associated with that question. Given that there are episodes of 
practical reasoning which are perfectly explicit and accurate (i.e., those in 
which the subject literally runs through the practical argument), adopting 
the strict backgrounding view offers no advantages at all. 
 More importantly, discussion of the strict backgrounding view 
reveals a different and more interesting version of the self-absorption 
problem. The backgrounders are committed to the claim that intentional 
actions are necessarily properly explained by desires (and, if my argument 
above is right, that correct practical arguments necessarily feature desires). 
This entails that even if desires were not to feature in the subject's reasoning, 
the subject would still be acting on the basis of a highly subjective 
consideration; that is, on a consideration which not only belongs to the 
subject, but which is one of the subject's attitudes towards something 
external. All Humeans are committed to the claim that when subjects 
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reason well, act on the basis of their own attitudes towards external 
considerations, not on the basis of those externalities themselves. According 
to the anti-Humeans, at least, the claim that practical reasoning necessarily 
involved highly subjective considerations runs contrary to our 
understanding of reasoning subjects as concerned with considerations that 
are relatively objective. 
 
3.3 Chapter 4: The Self-Referential View 
 
What desire seems to lack, which belief seems to have, and the lack 
of which accounts for the anti-Humean intuition that desires are not 
normatively significant,  is a network of connections to other mental states 
and to their own objects. Some familiar experiences can certainly make it 
seem as if desires are laws unto themselves; the subject has little or no 
control over what they come to desire, or when, or why. Desires can seem 
peculiarly unresponsive to the subject’s considered judgement about what is 
worth doing or having, up to the point that the subject might experience 
intense desires for things which they otherwise regard as trivial or repulsive. 
There may seem to be no clear connection between what is worth desiring, 
either in fact or by the subject’s lights, and what the subject actually desires. 
What the Humean must do, in order to show that desires are normatively 
significant and can play a special role in properly explaining intentional 
action, is show that desires are in fact responsive to something outside 
themselves; ideally, to their objects and/or the subject’s mental states. 
Chapter 4 considers how desire might be outfitted with the requisite 
connections, without abandoning any of the fundamental claims of 
Humeanism. Four views are discussed in this chapter (and a fifth in chapter 
6). First, there is the view that desires are able to explain intentional actions 
in the right way (that is, they are rationally authoritative) in virtue of their 
connection to their objects. The resulting picture of practical reasoning is 
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non-Humean; on this view, desires do not explain intentional actions on 
their own merits, but only by reference to something which purports to exist 
independently of the desire, i.e., its object. On this view, desires are not 
sources of rational authority, they are merely conduits for the rational 
authority of their objects. That would be reason enough for a Humean to 
reject the view, but it seems there are reasons why no-one should assent to 
it. Whatever one thinks a subject desires when they have a desire, be it some 
object (in the everyday sense), to perform an action, or to bring about some 
state of affairs, it will be the case that the subject does not take the 
intentional object of their desire to be a fact. On the plausible assumption 
that reasons for action are all facts, the objects of desire can never be reasons 
for action, so no sound practical inference can be drawn from the object of 
a desire. Hence, the view that desires properly explain intentional actions by 
being conduits for the rational authority of their objects must be false. 
A second possible view (which I labelled the “future relief” view) 
characterises the rational authority of desire as an instance of the rational 
authority of discomfort. Desires explain intentional actions in the right way 
because they are unpleasant to endure unsatisfied (or it is comparatively less 
pleasant to endure them than to satisfy them), and discomfort by its very 
nature properly explains any action to relieve or overcome it. But this cannot 
be right either; the authority of desire is not in fact the same as the authority 
of discomfort. Discomforts authorise any sort of action to relieve them, 
whereas desires seem only to properly explain actions which promise to 
satisfy them. Having a craving for cornflakes makes sense of eating 
cornflakes, but also of focussing on something else, or substituting another 
food for cornflakes. Desiring cornflakes does not make sense of focussing 
on something else instead27; it makes sense of eating cornflakes. 
                                                          
27At least, it does not when it is considered as a desire, rather than as a generic 
discomfort or distraction. There are “therapeutic stance” cases where desires are part 
of the reason-giving explanation of actions the subject takes to rid themselves of the 
desire without satisfying it, but in those cases the desire does not play a distinctive role. 
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A third view claims that desires have the authority to explain 
intentional actions in virtue of the fact that desires are satisfiable, and 
satisfying a desire is intrinsically good. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this view 
cannot be adopted, partly because it leaves too many questions unanswered. 
Why is it intrinsically good to satisfy desires? What does that goodness 
consist in? Moreover, this “simple satisfaction” view has no way to respond 
to the most basic anti-Humean challenge; just because you want to phi, that 
doesn’t mean there is a reason to do it. According to the simple satisfaction 
view, this common intuition is flatly mistaken; but the simple satisfaction 
view does not, in itself, have the resources to explain why. 
Stephen Schiffer’s view, including an important modification 
suggested by Schueler, is rather like the conjunction of the simple 
satisfaction and future relief views. This view claims that certain desires can 
explain intentional actions because those desires are pleasurable to satisfy 
or uncomfortable to endure, and there is always reason to do something that 
promises to be pleasurable or less uncomfortable. So this view appeals to 
pleasure (or relief) to explain why it is that there is a reason to satisfy desires. 
It differs from the simple satisfaction view in giving this explanation as part 
of the account of the rational authority of desire, rather than appealing to 
intrinsic goodness; and it differs from the future relief view, in that it claims 
that what counts in favour of action is the prospect of satisfying a desire, not 
the possibility of relief or pleasure itself. 
Schiffer's view looks like the most credible so far; it makes plausible 
predictions about which desires explain which actions, and gives at least a 
partial explanation of why this should be so. Schueler objects that the view 
is committed to claims about the phenomenology of reasoning that are 
implausible, if not wholly inaccurate; specifically, he claims that the view is 
committed to claiming that the phenomenal characteristics associated with 
                                                          
It is just another consideration, no different from a pineapple. The therapeutic stance 
is discussed briefly in chapter 4 section 3.2 of this thesis; a more thorough discussion, 
which informs my use of the term, is in (Moran 2001, chapter 3). 
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Schifferian desires (pleasure and discomfort) are extremely pervasive, and 
that this is not the case. Schueler claims that the most familiar, convincing 
examples of Schifferian desires typically lack any salient phenomenology. 
Schueler’s example is mild thirst. He contends that if any desire explains 
intentional action properly then mild thirst does; and that the sort of mild 
thirst that most of us experience on a daily basis has no phenomenal 
presence. I argue that Schueler’s claim here is much less plausible than 
Schiffer’s; it is much harder to believe that a mild thirst has no 
phenomenology and yet explains intentional actions in the right way 
(indeed, it is hard even to imagine a mild thirst which has no 
phenomenology!) than it is to believe that everyday experience is 
phenomenologically much richer than some philosophers would like to 
think. Stampe also presents an objection to Schiffer's view, which,  though 
interesting, does not amount to a decisive reason to reject to Schiffer's 
account. 
The real problem with Schiffer's account is that it does not do enough 
to address anti-Humean scepticism regarding the normative significance of 
desires. Schiffer's view only connects desire to pleasure, and offers no 
explanation of how rationally authoritative desires come into being (that is, 
it does nothing to explain why a subject wants what they want, when they 
want it). If rationally authoritative desires were merely Schiffer's reason-
providing desires, then we would have no reason to ever expect them to be 
any more stable or significant than passing fancies. Moreover, it is very hard 
to believe that all practical reasons are ultimately dependent on pleasure 
alone. In order to address the anti-Humean challenge properly, it must be 
shown that desires are related to a host of different properties and 
considerations, including the subject's other mental states and the 
intentional object of the desire. 
 
3.4 Chapter 5: The Evaluative View 
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Scanlon puts forward a view according to which desires are able to 
exercise some rational authority, but according to which they do not have 
distinctive representational characteristics. Tenenbaum, meanwhile, argues 
that desires are representations with a particular sort of contents 
(specifically, they necessarily represent their objects as good). I argue that 
neither of these views capture what we ordinarily mean by “desire”; there 
are plenty of counter-examples to either view. That is, it is quite easy to 
imagine a subject who fits the criteria for having a Scanlonian or 
Tenenbaumian desire, but who does not seem to actually desire anything; 
in fact, Scanlonian and Tenenbaumian “desires” could turn out to be 
attitudes of fear or revulsion. The argument is heavily based on examples 
so I won’t repeat them here (see chapter 5, sections 2 and 3). 
The possibility of offering this sort of response to Tenenbaum seems 
to show that no specification of what representational contents a state must 
have will suffice to guarantee that that state is a desire. Instead, capturing 
the everyday notion of desire requires making a distinction between 
representational content and mode of representation. Desires may have any 
representational contents (allowing for formal restrictions, such as that the 
intentional object of any desire must be an action) at all; what sets desires 
apart from other mental representations is the mode in which they represent 
their objects. Desire is to belief as feeling is to seeing; both feeling and 
seeing can represent the same content, but the way in which they represent 
it is entirely different. 
Stampe makes the distinction between representational content and 
mode of representation, and claims that desires represent their objects in 
the mode of goodness (to be understood as analogous to the claim that 
beliefs represent their objects in the mode of truth). Exactly what this 
goodness consists in is the subject of the next chapter, which is concerned 
with how the representational view, and in particular Stampe’s evaluative 
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view, can address the Normativity Problem. At the end of this chapter, I 
suggest that in fact “goodness” is not the only distinctive aspect of the 
representational mode of desiring; desires also modally represent their 
objects as subject to risk and demanding a response (typically action). 
  
3.5 Chapter 6: Sigma States 
 
In order to present a response to the Normativity Problem, a 
proponent of the representational view of desire must show that desires are 
responsive to other considerations, such as the subject’s other mental states, 
and the objects of desire. This chapter is primarily concerned with the efforts 
of one particular proponent of the evaluative view, Stampe, to supply the 
requisite connections. I argue that although many of the details of Stampe’s 
argument may be wrong, the basic strategy is correct. 
The account has two key features. First, the separation of the cause of 
desire from its intentional object. This makes it possible to argue for a 
connection between desires and a whole variety of different factors, rather 
than being restricted to only the intentional objects of desire, or well-known 
features such as pleasure or satisfaction. Secondly, he argues that what 
makes desires unique as a mental attitude is that they represent their objects 
as good, but through the a distinctive mode of representation, not as part of 
their representational contents. 
Scanlon and Tenenbaum have their own accounts of the rational 
authority of desire, and they are quite similar to each other. In essence, both 
Scanlon and Tenenbaum claim that desires can exercise some rational 
authority if and when they are approved of by the subject (though, of course, 
they do not advance the same account of what this approval consists in). I 
argue that although these “higher approval” accounts are coherent, they do 
not represent a strategy which Humeans could appeal to, because they make 
the authority of desire derivative. On the higher approval accounts, desires 
200 
 
are not sources of rational authority; they may, on specific occasions, make 
sense of intentional actions, contingently on standing in the right sort of 
relation to the subject’s considered judgement. 
According to Stampe’s representational view, the representational 
contents of desires are fixed by collections of mental and bodily states called 
“sigma states”. The sigma state makes it the case that it would be good were 
the world a certain way, and that it seems from the subject's point of view, 
that it would be good were the world this way. Desiring that the world be 
some way consists in it seeming to one that it would be good were it that 
way; thus, desires are evaluative attitudes since they represent their objects 
as good, and are related to the goodness of their intentional objects. What 
makes desiring that things be a certain way different from believing that it 
would be good if they were, is that whereas a belief about the goodness of 
some non-obtaining state of affairs must ascribe goodness to its object 
through its content, a desire does it through the mode of representation. So 
“desiring” is a distinctive way of representing some way the world might be. 
Desiring is to believing as feeling is to seeing; just as seeing and feeling can 
convey the same information but in a different mode, so believing and 
desiring are two different ways of apprehending the goodness of some way 
the world might be. 
 Finally, I argue that Stampe’s claims that desire is a perceptual state 
have to be understood as purely metaphorical, and the way in which a sigma 
state makes it the case that some future state of affairs would be good were 
it to obtain, has to be set out rather differently from Stampe’s account. There 
is no special need to restrict the possible objects of desire in the way Stampe 
does, since it is possible for desires to feature in the premises of practical 
arguments through desire self-ascriptions. Lastly, I argue that, in keeping 
with Schueler’s argument and my response to it detailed in chapter 2, some 
mental event is required to explain the subject’s coming to have a desire, 
over and above the mere existence of the constituents of a sigma state. 
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4. Conclusion 
 
 The view I have developed in chapters 5 and 6 is just one way of being 
a representationalist about desire; there could be others. There are two 
distinguishing features of the view I have put forward which it seems 
plausible any other Representational View should adopt. The first is the 
distinction between representational content and mode of representation, 
and the claim that what’s distinctive about desire is its mode of 
representation, not its content. This makes it possible to avoid the problems 
of self-absorption by allowing for a plurality of different featuring relations. 
The second is the separation of the intentional object of desire from its 
cause, which allows us to give an account of the connectedness of desire in 
order to respond to the normativity problem, without adopting a per 
objectum account of the rational authority of desire. 
Finally, I would like to draw your attention to the following passage 
in which Hume himself separates the causes of desires from their 
intentional objects. The two sets of passions Hume refers to are pride and 
humility, and love and hatred. It is also interesting to see that Hume remarks 
on the fact that, although the objects of a passion like pride are relatively 
uniform (since they are all concerned with the self), its causes are very 
diverse; this is very close to the reason for which I rejected Schiffer's view. 
The emphases on “cause” and “object” are Hume's, not mine: 
 
 In these two sets of passions, there is an obvious distinction to 
be made between the object of the passion and its cause. The object 
of pride and humility is self: The cause of the passion is some 
excellence in the former case; some fault, in the latter. The object 
of love and hatred is some other person: The causes, in like 
manner, are either excellencies or faults. 
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 With regard to all these passions, the causes are what excite the 
emotion; the object is what the mind directs its view to when the 
emotion is excited. Our merit, for instance, raises pride; and it is 
essential to pride to turn our view on ourselves with complacency 
and satisfaction. 
 Now, as the causes of these passions are very numerous and 
various, though their object be uniform and simple; it may be a 
subject of curiosity to consider, what that circumstance is, in 
which all these various causes agree; or in other words, what is 
the real efficient cause of the passion. 
      (Hume 1997, P 2.3-5) 
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